When a prison door is closed, the government does not just restrict a person’s freedom. Water, food, medicine, sleep, light, contact with family, access to a lawyer, the ability to file a complaint, and even record what a prisoner has been through are all at the disposal of the institution that has detained him. This concentration of power makes prison one of the most difficult tests of the rule of law. In a closed environment, the victim, the witness, the medical file, the camera, and the investigating authority may all be under the influence of the same structure that is accused of mistreatment. Prohibiting torture or guaranteeing the right to treatment cannot be achieved simply by writing laws and regulations. An institution outside the prison chain, the police, the prosecutor’s office, and the security apparatus must be able to examine what is really going on in the cell, the clinic, and the interrogation room. The rights of a prisoner become real the moment someone other than the prison guard can see them being implemented.

When the prison inspects itself

Independent monitoring is different from an administrative visit. The presence of a judge, prosecutor, or government delegation in a prison that is part of the same judicial system may generate information, but it does not in itself create independence. A visit that is announced in advance, directed by the prison administration, and conducted in the presence of officers presents a prepared picture of the prison rather than revealing the true state of affairs.

A genuine monitoring system must be independent in its structure, budget, membership, and decision-making from the institutions responsible for detention. Monitors must be able to enter all places of deprivation of liberty without prior notice, from public prisons to police detention centers, information centers, closed psychiatric hospitals, and any other formal or informal place from which a person cannot freely leave.

The choice of the location of the visit, the files to be examined, and the prisoners to be interviewed should be left to the observers themselves. Interviews should be conducted privately and confidentially. Access to entry and exit records, medical records, solitary confinement records, use-of-force reports, camera footage, complaints, and death and injury statistics is also essential. Any prisoner, doctor, lawyer, family member, or employee who cooperates with the monitoring body should be protected from threats and retaliation.

The Nelson Mandela Rules provide precisely such a model. Rules 83 to 85 distinguish between internal inspection and external monitoring and stipulate that external inspections should be carried out by an institution independent of the prison administration. The institution should have access to information and records, freely select the prisons and prisoners to be interviewed, conduct visits without prior notice, and speak to prisoners and staff in private. The outcome of each visit should be recorded in a written report, and the responsible authorities should respond to the implementation of the recommendations. The Mandela Rules are not treaties, and the UN General Assembly has also confirmed their non-binding nature. However, they are the most important global standard for measuring prison management and the treatment of prisoners. Their value lies in the fact that they translate general concepts such as “humane treatment” into observable criteria: does a prisoner have access to a doctor? is prolonged solitary confinement used? is death in custody independently investigated? is confidential complaint possible? Can an outside entity enter a prison without prior permission?

Independent monitoring is not just about discovering wrongdoing after it has happened. Its primary function is prevention. Regular, unannounced visits reduce the likelihood of prisoners being hidden, medical records altered, injuries erased, or shacks staged. Confidential interviews allow prisoners to speak without fear of being seen by an officer. Publishing reports also prevents the findings of monitors from becoming confidential and ineffective correspondence.

This oversight also supports prison staff. Many violations are not simply the result of individual officer behavior. Overcrowding, lack of medication, security orders, lack of skilled personnel, pressure to extract confessions, and weak records systems can all contribute to a flawed structure. An independent body can show which problems are caused by management decisions, budgets, the law, security orders, or personal behavior. In the absence of such a body, responsibility remains hidden and violations are often attributed to a few low-ranking officers.

What does international law say and what has Iran accepted?

International instruments related to prison monitoring do not have the same legal status. Some are treaties and are binding on member states. Some are UN-adopted standards that are not treaties themselves, but are used to interpret state obligations and assess prison conditions.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is one of the most important binding treaties in this area. Article 7 prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 10 provides that all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for their inherent dignity. Article 2 also requires States to effectively guarantee these rights and to provide remedies for their violations. The Covenant does not prescribe a specific monitoring model, but effective implementation of articles 7 and 10 is difficult without the possibility of independent detection of torture, deprivation of treatment and inhuman conditions.

The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment has more specific obligations. Article 11 obliges States parties to regularly review the rules of interrogation, detention arrangements and treatment of detained persons. Articles 12 and 13 emphasize prompt and impartial investigations into allegations of torture, the right to file a complaint, and the protection of complainants and witnesses from intimidation.

The most explicit treaty on preventive monitoring is the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture, or OPCAT. It establishes a system of regular visits by independent national and international bodies. States parties must establish one or more “national preventive mechanisms” that have access to places of deprivation of liberty, interview detainees, and make recommendations to prevent torture. The philosophy of the protocol is clear: the prevention of torture should not depend on a victim’s complaint or the initiation of legal proceedings.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child also emphasizes in Article 37 that the detention of children should be used only as a measure of last resort, for the shortest possible period, humane treatment, separation from adults, and access to legal assistance. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is even more explicit. Article 16 requires states to place facilities and programmes providing services to persons with disabilities under the effective supervision of independent authorities. This provision can include prisons and detention facilities where persons with disabilities are held.

In addition to these treaties, the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, the Bangkok Rules for Women Prisoners, and the United Nations Rules for Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty also emphasize inspection, the possibility of complaint, special care, and the protection of vulnerable groups. This set shows that independent monitoring is not a marginal issue, but is part of the architecture of minimum prison standards. The Islamic Republic of Iran has acceded to some of these treaties and has not accepted others, but the status of Iran’s obligations and rights and conditions in all of them is not the same.

The Iranian government ratified both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights without any reservations on June 24, 1975, before the establishment of the Islamic Republic. The change of government in 1979 did not eliminate these international obligations. Consequently, the Islamic Republic cannot invoke reservations to limit the prohibition of torture in Article 7, the obligation to treat persons deprived of their liberty humanely in Article 10 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or the right to health in Article 12 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

The situation with the Convention on the Rights of the Child is different. Iran ratified the Convention on 13 July 1994 with a very broad reservation, stating that it had the right not to implement provisions that were incompatible with “Islamic law and applicable domestic law.” This reservation is not limited to a specific article and does not specify which domestic rules may take precedence over which rights in the Convention. As a result, the government has attempted to define the scope of its obligations after ratification by making general references to domestic law. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has found this reservation to be general and vague, stating that such a broad reference could undermine the implementation of many articles of the Convention. Article 51 of the Convention also prohibits reservations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. The Committee has called on Iran to withdraw the reservation and bring its domestic law into line with the Convention.

Iran acceded to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 23 October 2009, but declared that it would not consider itself bound by provisions that might be incompatible with “the rules applicable to Iran”. Although the UN Secretariat has registered this term as a “declaration”, its intended effect is to withdraw its commitment to an unspecified set of provisions of the Convention. The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has also considered it a general right and has called on Iran to withdraw it. Article 46 of the Convention prohibits the right to conditions incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. In contrast, Iran is not a party to the Convention against Torture and its Optional Protocol, OPCAT. It has also not ratified the First Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, so individuals cannot bring individual complaints under that protocol directly to the Human Rights Committee. This legal distinction is important. Since Iran is not a party to OPCAT, it cannot be accused of violating an obligation that specifically arises from this protocol. The Nelson Mandela Rules are also not a treaty, whether Iran is a party to it or not. However, non-accession to OPCAT and the general reservations made to the other two conventions do not exempt Iran from its non-binding obligations under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Islamic Republic remains obliged to prevent torture and ill-treatment, treat all prisoners humanely, provide an effective and safe means of complaint, and independently and impartially investigate deaths, serious injuries, and allegations of torture.

Iran’s reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities do not preclude its membership in these treaties and cannot be considered an unlimited license to ignore the rights of detained or imprisoned children with disabilities. The validity and scope of these general reservations are a matter of serious legal dispute, especially since a state’s domestic laws, in treaty law, cannot in principle justify its failure to implement its international obligations.

The UN Human Rights Committee is not a court, but a specialized body that oversees the implementation of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In its review of the situation in Iran, the Committee has directly linked the obligations of the Covenant to the need for independent monitoring of places of detention, and has called for regular, unimpeded, unannounced, and unmanned access to all places of deprivation of liberty.

The gap between commitment and action

Iran’s problem is not the complete absence of inspections. The Islamic Republic’s authorities themselves have spoken of visits by judges and prosecutors, monitoring boards, cameras, and complaint-receiving systems. The Human Rights Committee also acknowledged in its 2023 assessment that Iranian authorities conduct many inspections of prisons and detention centers. But in the same report, it spoke of the worsening conditions of persons deprived of their liberty in formal and informal facilities: unsanitary conditions, overcrowding, poor quality of water and food, deprivation of medical care, torture and ill-treatment, prolonged solitary confinement, and corporal punishment.

This simultaneity reveals the main point. The number of inspections may be high, but if the inspector is from the same structure responsible for running the prison or pursuing the prisoner, if his entry requires prior coordination, if the officer is present during the interview, and if his report is not published, the inspection does not become independent oversight.

The Human Rights Committee has called on the Islamic Republic to establish independent monitoring mechanisms, with regular, unimpeded, unannounced and unmanned access to all places of deprivation of liberty. The Committee specifically mentions facilities under the control of the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence. This recommendation shows that the current system does not guarantee independent and comprehensive access to all security detention facilities. Another gap relates to torture and its investigation. In 2023, the Committee expressed concern about credible reports of widespread and systematic acts of torture and ill-treatment in both formal and informal facilities, in particular by law enforcement officers and members of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. The report cited the use of torture to extract confessions, the presentation of the same confessions in court, the denial of some victims of treatment and the lack of adequate information about independent forensic investigations into deaths resulting from torture or ill-treatment. Iran’s commitment is not limited to prohibiting torture in the text of the law. Any credible allegations of torture or any suspicious death in custody must be immediately withdrawn from the authority of the institution that may have played a role in it. The investigation must be independent, impartial and effective, medical records must be preserved, witnesses and families must be safe, and the outcome must lead to accountability for the perpetrators. The Human Rights Committee has called on Iran to conduct these investigations in accordance with the standards of the Istanbul Protocol for Documenting Torture and the Minnesota Protocol for Investigating Potential Extrajudicial Deaths. An independent and effective complaints mechanism must also be available to prisoners. In practice, a prisoner’s complaint is meaningful only if it is confidential and does not entail punitive costs. A prisoner who fears that he will be transferred to solitary confinement, have his visits stopped, his treatment delayed or a new case opened against him after making a complaint does not have an effective remedy. The existence of a complaints box or an online system without guarantees of confidentiality, independent investigation and the prohibition of retaliation will not solve the problem.

The Islamic Republic’s obligations begin from the very first moment of detention. The Human Rights Committee has stated that a detained person must be able to contact his or her family, have access to a lawyer of his or her choice, be examined by an independent doctor, and be brought before an independent and impartial judicial authority within 48 hours. Detention should only take place in official facilities, and temporary detention should be exceptional, limited, and subject to judicial review. The Committee, however, has expressed concern about prolonged detention, incommunicado detention in undeclared facilities, and the deprivation of access to a lawyer and family contact. These guarantees are not formalities. The greatest risk of torture, disappearance, and forced confessions usually occurs in the early days and before the person’s place of detention is established and contact with the outside world is established. Accurate recording of the time and place of detention, prompt access to a lawyer, and examination by an independent doctor are the primary barriers to this risk.

Treatment is also part of the State’s obligation, not a privilege that depends on the prisoner’s behavior. When a prisoner is completely dependent on the State, deliberately delaying hospitalisation, failing to provide medication or ignoring medical advice can amount to inhuman treatment or even a violation of the right to life. The Human Rights Committee has called on Iran to provide necessary medical care and to bring prison conditions into line with the Covenant, the Mandela Rules and the Bangkok Rules. Overcrowding is also not simply a matter of comfort. Overcrowding affects water, food, hygiene, sleep, ventilation, the spread of disease, violence and access to a doctor. The Committee has called on Iran to reduce prison populations by making wider use of non-custodial sentences and measures. All of these have a common root: self-monitoring.

In a structure where the prison administration, the prosecution authority, the inspector, the attached doctor, the complaint receiving authority, and the investigating authority are all in the same institutional chain, the possibility of discovering the truth is reduced. Even well-intentioned inspectors may not be allowed to enter security detention facilities, access files, or publish their findings. Real reform requires the creation of an institution with an independent budget and membership, a doctor and forensic experts on staff, and unannounced access to all detention facilities, including those of the IRGC, the Ministry of Intelligence, and the police. This institution should be able to speak privately with detainees, publish its reports, and hold authorities accountable for implementing recommendations within a specified timeframe.

Iran’s accession to the Convention against Torture and OpEct would be an important step, but signing the treaty alone is not enough. A mechanism that is called “independent” on paper but whose members, budget, visitation schedule, or reports are under the control of the judiciary and security apparatuses is simply continuing the same self-monitoring system under a new name.

The criterion is simple: can an entity outside the prison chain and the security apparatus enter any detention facility without prior authorization, view files, meet with the prisoner out of earshot of the officers, publish its findings, and protect the complainant from reprisals? As long as the answer is no, minimum standards of treatment of prisoners are not guaranteed. A prisoner whose only guard can testify about his condition is not under surveillance. He is hidden behind a wall.