This article seeks to show that in contemporary wars, the field of conflict is no longer limited merely to the military sphere; rather, humanitarian, media, communications, and legal domains are increasingly absorbed into the logic of war. In such a situation, war advances not only through weapons, bombardment, and the destruction of physical infrastructure, but also through the control of narratives, the restriction of information flows, the weakening of civil institutions, and the redefinition of independent civilian actors as “suspect” or “threatening” elements. Focusing on this transformation, the present article analyzes the “securitization of humanitarian action” and the “silencing of independent information” not as two separate processes, but as two intertwined manifestations of a shared logic; a logic through which activities that are inherently civilian and humanitarian are absorbed into security discourse and stripped of their civic position.

The article’s theoretical and analytical foundation rests on two sets of sources. The first is the research of Liam Swiss and Heather Dicks, which, using comparative data from 136 countries between 1997 and 2019, shows that there is a meaningful relationship between the increase in “securitized aid” and the increase in violence against aid workers. This research argues that the more foreign aid is defined through the logic of security, crisis management, security-sector reform, and quasi-peacekeeping interventions, the more complex, hostile, and dangerous the humanitarian operating environment becomes. The second is the ARTICLE 19 report on digital warfare, censorship, and threats against journalists in Sudan, Palestine, and Ukraine, which shows how in today’s conflicts internet shutdowns, security labeling, attacks on communications infrastructure, and restrictions on independent media access have themselves become part of war strategy.

Within this framework, Iran is analyzed not only as the scene of an ongoing war, but also as a case in which clear signs of the securitization of the humanitarian and civic sphere existed even before the war. From this perspective, the case of the dissolution of the Imam Ali Society, as well as examples such as the case of Hamid Ghareh-Hassanlou, are not viewed merely as legal or administrative events, but as important case studies in the process of securitizing social and humanitarian action in Iran. These examples show how even activities focused on poverty, child laborers, vulnerable women, social work, medicine, and charity can be shifted from the position of humanitarian support to one of security suspicion.

The article’s main argument is that present-day Iran must be understood at the intersection of three processes: militarization, securitization, and information blackout. Militarization places public space and political decision-making under the logic of wartime emergency; securitization strips civic, media, and humanitarian spheres of their independence; and information blackout weakens the possibility of verification, public oversight, legal documentation, and even effective relief. The result of this overlap is not simply increased pressure on civic activists or journalists, but the direct weakening of civilian security and the restriction of society’s capacity for a humane response in times of crisis.

Accordingly, the article concludes that defending independent humanitarian activity and defending accurate, free, and reliable information is not merely a defense of civil liberties; it is a defense of the most fundamental rights of society in wartime: the right to survive, the right to know, the right to access aid, and the right to record the truth. Whenever these two spheres are absorbed into security logic, not only is the possibility of protecting civilians reduced, but the conditions are also created for violations to go unanswered, for ambiguity to spread, and for truth to be gradually erased. Thus, understanding Iran’s situation in light of comparative experiences and recent research shows that protecting humanitarian and media space is an inseparable part of any responsible vision for reducing the harms of war and safeguarding human dignity.

Introduction

War in the contemporary world is no longer confined merely to physical battlefields. If, in the past, the dominant understanding of war was limited to confrontation between military forces, occupation of territory, and destruction of vital infrastructure, in today’s conflicts other dimensions have increasingly gained importance: the battle over narrative, control over the flow of information, political legitimacy, and the management of public perception. Under such conditions, war proceeds simultaneously on multiple levels: on the military level through armed operations, on the communications level through information control and the war of narratives, and on the social level through the redefinition of civic and humanitarian actors within the framework of security logic. From this perspective, the battlefield has expanded not only along military front lines, but also into the media space, communication networks, and the sphere of humanitarian action.

In many contemporary conflicts, what is outwardly called “security action” in practice leads to a process through which non-military domains are gradually integrated into security logic. In this process, humanitarian activity, independent journalism, human rights documentation, and even the free circulation of information are removed from their civic and humanitarian position and redefined as “suspect,” “dangerous,” or “aligned with the enemy.” This trend, referred to in the literature of political science and security studies as “securitization,” occurs when governments or powerful actors portray a social or civic sphere as a security threat and thereby create the grounds for exceptional measures, severe restrictions, and broad controls.

In the realm of war and armed conflict, securitization often encompasses two key arenas: first, humanitarian action, and second, independent information and media. In the first arena, relief organizations, volunteer groups, local social networks, and humanitarian actors may, instead of being regarded as part of the humanitarian response to crisis, be placed within a framework of security suspicion. In the second, journalists, documentarians, and independent media may be portrayed as threatening elements or instruments of psychological warfare. The result of such a process is the weakening of humanitarian space and the restriction of society’s access to independent and reliable information; a situation that directly affects civilian security and the possibility of accountability for human rights violations.

In recent years, numerous studies have shown that this trend has increasingly become part of the pattern of contemporary wars. On the one hand, empirical studies show that integrating humanitarian activity into the framework of security logic makes the aid environment more insecure and more violent. On the other hand, reports by organizations defending freedom of expression show that in many conflicts, information control, internet shutdowns, attacks on media infrastructure, and the criminalization of independent journalism have become tools for managing the narrative of war. In such circumstances, silencing independent voices is no longer merely a secondary consequence of war; in some cases, it becomes part of war strategy itself.

The importance of this discussion for Iran today arises from the fact that the country is in a condition in which military war has coincided with profound changes in the field of information and communications. Alongside escalating military tensions, numerous reports have been published about widespread internet disruptions, restricted access to information, pressure on journalists, and a reduced possibility of independent verification. These developments have caused the information environment in Iran to become increasingly restricted and have made society’s access to accurate and reliable information more difficult.

In this regard, human rights and media reports have warned that internet shutdowns and communications restrictions in Iran may place civilians at greater risk, because these restrictions obstruct information-sharing, the coordination of relief, and independent documentation. At the same time, reports have recorded pressure on journalists, restrictions on media activity, and violations of press freedom. Such signs indicate that the question of war in Iran is not limited merely to the level of military confrontation, but is deeply intertwined with the control of information and the restriction of the media and civic sphere.

From this perspective, Iran today cannot be analyzed merely as a military battlefield. What is taking place is a combination of military war, a war of narratives, and the control of information space. Under such conditions, humanitarian activity, volunteer networks, independent journalism, and human rights documentation all come under increasing pressure. This situation makes Iran an important case for studying the intertwining of three key processes: militarization, securitization, and information blackout.

Examining this situation from an analytical perspective is of particular importance because it shows how war can lead to a redefinition of the boundaries between the security sphere and the civic sphere. When humanitarian and media actors are absorbed into security logic, not only is civic space weakened, but the possibility of effectively protecting civilians is also reduced. For this reason, studying the securitization of humanitarian action and the silencing of independent information is not merely a theoretical debate in security studies, but a matter directly linked to human lives, access to humanitarian assistance, and the possibility of recording the truth during war.

Within this framework, the article seeks, drawing on comparative research and international experiences, to analyze Iran’s situation in the broader context of the securitization of the humanitarian and media sphere. The aim of this analysis is to show how restricting humanitarian action and independent information can become part of the structure of war and what consequences this may have for society, civilians, and the future of legal accountability.

1. Conceptual Framework: The Securitization of the Humanitarian and Media Sphere

In its simplest definition, securitization occurs when a social, civic, or political phenomenon is removed from the sphere of ordinary policymaking and elevated to the level of a “security threat,” in such a way that the imposition of restrictions, exceptional measures, and even judicial and security responses against it are made to appear legitimate. In the literature of security studies, especially within the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School, securitization is a discursive and political process through which an issue is removed from the domain of normal politics and placed in the realm of emergency and national security. In such a situation, tools that would normally be considered unjustifiable—from broad restrictions to detention and repression—are justified as necessary actions for preserving security.

In the context of contemporary wars, this process is seen above all in two areas: first, humanitarian and social activities; and second, independent information and media. Under normal conditions, both spheres are considered part of the infrastructure of civil society and play an important role in supporting the most vulnerable segments of society and ensuring the free circulation of information. But when security logic dominates the political and social environment, these same spheres may come to be regarded as potential sources of threat.

The research of Liam Swiss and Heather Dicks intervenes precisely at this point. Their study shows that there is a meaningful relationship between the increase in the “securitization of humanitarian aid” and the increase in violence against aid workers. By analyzing data from 136 countries between 1997 and 2019, the study concludes that the more humanitarian aid is defined within the framework of security logic, crisis management, security-sector reform, and quasi-military interventions, the more hostile the aid environment becomes. Under such conditions, aid workers are no longer seen merely as humanitarian actors, but may be perceived by governments, armed groups, or political actors as part of a power structure or even as instruments of influence. The consequence of this shift in perception is increased danger for aid workers: from kidnapping and attack to detention and even killing.

On the other side, the ARTICLE 19 report shows that in many contemporary conflicts—from Sudan to Palestine and Ukraine—the sphere of media and information has undergone a similar process. The report emphasizes that internet shutdowns, attacks on communications infrastructure, security labeling of journalists, restrictions on access for independent media, and even the physical targeting of journalists have gradually become part of the architecture of war itself. In such a space, the journalist is viewed not merely as a neutral observer, but in the eyes of some actors as a “disruptive element,” a “propagandist,” or a “security threat.”

These two currents—the securitization of humanitarian action and the silencing of independent information—are, in practice, intertwined. Humanitarian activity cannot be effective without access to free information and communications networks, and independent information is likewise impossible without access to human networks and local sources. When one of these spheres becomes securitized, the other is also quickly affected. An aid worker may come under pressure on charges of “cooperating with the enemy” or “infiltration,” and a journalist may be prosecuted on charges of “disrupting security” or “psychological warfare.” The result of such a situation is the gradual collapse of humanitarian and civic space in society.

The Iranian examples are especially important in this regard, because they show that the securitization of the humanitarian and civic sphere is not only a product of war, but may also have taken shape beforehand in political and institutional structures. One of the most prominent examples in this regard is the case of the Imam Ali Society.

1-1. Case Study: The Imam Ali Society and the Securitization of Social Action

The Imam Ali Society was one of the largest and best-known non-governmental organizations in Iran, active since the late 1990s in the fields of poverty, child laborers, vulnerable women, and social support. The organization operated through an extensive network of student volunteers and civic activists in various cities across Iran and carried out projects in school-building, support for deprived children, and the reduction of social harm.

However, in the final years of the organization’s activity, the political and security environment around it gradually changed. Eventually, in 2020, judicial proceedings for its dissolution began, and the court ordered its closure. During this case, the founder and some of the organization’s managers were also arrested, and reports emerged of severe pressure and violent treatment in detention. Many human rights institutions assessed this action as an example of restricting civil society and securitizing social activity in Iran.

From an analytical perspective, the case of the Imam Ali Society is an important example of what is described in the literature on securitization: the transfer of a social and humanitarian activity from the sphere of social policy to the sphere of security threat. In such a process, volunteer networks originally formed to support vulnerable groups may come to be viewed as structures outside state control and, for that reason, become subject to pressure or restriction.

1-2. Another Example: The Case of Hamid Ghareh-Hassanlou

Another important example in this regard is the case of Hamid Ghareh-Hassanlou. He is a specialist in medical imaging, a Gonabadi dervish, and one of those arrested during the 2022 protests in Iran. Ghareh-Hassanlou, who had previously been active in charitable work and school-building and had even participated in the Iran-Iraq war, was arrested together with his wife at their private home on November 4, 2022 (13 Aban 1401).

According to published reports, security forces raided his home at two in the morning and arrested him and his wife. During the arrest, Ghareh-Hassanlou was severely beaten and, due to serious lung injuries and internal bleeding, was transferred to a hospital affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards in Karaj. It was said that the severity of his injuries was such that he required a breathing device and underwent multiple surgeries on his lungs.

In the continuation of the judicial process, Ghareh-Hassanlou was charged and tried in connection with the case related to the killing of a Basij member named Ruhollah Ajamian, and at first a death sentence was issued against him. This sentence was later reduced to 15 years’ imprisonment. During the detention and trial process, reports were published indicating that he did not have effective access to a lawyer and was pressured into confession. Some later documents also showed that on the day of the incident he had saved the life of a cleric, but this testimony was not taken into account in court.

From an analytical perspective, the case of Ghareh-Hassanlou can also be examined within the framework of securitization. A person with a background in medicine, charity, and social service is, in the security atmosphere arising from protests and political crisis, quickly placed in the position of a security defendant. This shift in status—from physician and social actor to security suspect—is an example of the same process described in the literature of securitization.

1-3. Theoretical and Empirical Connection

When these Iranian examples are placed alongside comparative research, a clearer picture emerges. What has happened in Iran is, structurally, comparable to trends observed in other crisis-ridden regions of the world. Just as the research of Swiss and Dicks shows, the more the humanitarian sphere is absorbed into security logic, the greater the danger for its actors. And as the ARTICLE 19 report shows, the silencing of independent information is often part of this same process.

Accordingly, the securitization of the humanitarian and media sphere should be understood not as a separate phenomenon, but as part of the broader transformation of contemporary wars; transformations in which the boundary between the military field and the social field is gradually erased and war extends into the domains of civic and communicative life as well.

2. Three Main Mechanisms: From Comparative Research to Application in Iran

The research of Liam Swiss and Heather Dicks offers three main analytical mechanisms to explain the relationship between the securitization of humanitarian aid and the increase in violence against aid workers. The importance of these mechanisms lies in the fact that they are not limited solely to the field of relief, but can also be used to understand the situation of media, civil society, and even social actors in countries such as Iran. In fact, these three mechanisms show how the entry of security logic into civic spheres can gradually make the environment of humanitarian activity more hostile and insecure.

2-1. The Political Context Becomes More Complex and More Hostile

The first mechanism is that securitization makes the political and social context more complex and more hostile. In such a space, the boundary between a humanitarian actor, civic activist, journalist, and even ordinary citizen, on the one hand, and political or security actors, on the other, is weakened. When a government or power structure defines civic spheres within the framework of security threat, any independent activity—even if inherently humanitarian or professional—may be regarded as part of the conflict.

Under such circumstances, aid workers are no longer seen merely as people trying to reduce human suffering, but may be viewed as bearers of information, instruments of influence, or even suspicious elements. The same logic applies to journalists. Under normal circumstances, the journalist’s duty is to record and convey reality, but in a security atmosphere the journalist may be portrayed as an “agent of psychological operations” or an “enemy propaganda tool.”

In Iran, examples of this change in perception can be seen in recent years. As seen in the case of the Imam Ali Society, a broad social network active in poverty reduction, support for child laborers, and social empowerment gradually came to be regarded in the political environment as a problematic and suspicious institution. This shift in perception shows how a social activity can be moved from the sphere of social policy to the sphere of national security.

The same logic is visible in the case of Hamid Ghareh-Hassanlou. Ghareh-Hassanlou was a physician who participated in charitable activity and school-building and had even served during the Iran-Iraq war. Yet in the security atmosphere generated by the 2022 protests, he was quickly placed in the position of a security defendant, and a death sentence was initially issued against him. Such developments show that in a hostile political environment, even social and professional actors may be subject to security redefinition.

2-2. Behavior and the Operational Environment Become More Dangerous

The second mechanism is that securitization makes the operational environment more dangerous for humanitarian and media actors. When civic or media activities are defined within the framework of security threat, access to information, resources, and communications networks becomes more difficult. In such a space, aid workers and journalists are forced to perform their duties under conditions that are more dangerous both physically and legally.

The ARTICLE 19 report shows that in countries such as Sudan, Palestine, and Ukraine, internet shutdowns, communications restrictions, and security pressure on media have forced journalists to operate in an intensely unsafe environment. In some cases, they must even use unofficial channels to gain access to crisis zones or work without institutional support.

In Iran as well, communications restrictions and security pressure can create such an environment. When the internet is restricted or shut down, not only does media activity become more difficult, but even the coordination of relief is affected. Under such conditions, individuals and local volunteer networks trying to assist those affected may be forced to operate in an environment lacking both informational transparency and institutional support.

From this perspective, the case of Hamid Ghareh-Hassanlou is also noteworthy. Reports indicate that after his arrest he was severely beaten and transferred to hospital because of serious lung injuries. Such events show that in a security atmosphere, even professional actors such as physicians may face grave danger.

2-3. Resources, Data, and Networks Become Attractive to Opportunistic Actors

The third mechanism is that resources, data, images, and human networks become attractive to authoritarian, security, or even opportunistic actors. In many contemporary wars, information has become one of the most important sources of power. Any individual or institution with access to field data, images, or eyewitness testimony can influence the narrative of war.

For this reason, control over such resources becomes highly important for various actors. In some cases, this control is exercised through censorship or communications shutdowns; in others, through intimidation, arrest, or the elimination of witnesses.

This trend has been observed in many war zones around the world. In Palestine, attacks on media offices and the killing of journalists are examples of attempts to control the narrative of war. In Sudan, internet shutdowns and the collapse of media infrastructure have severely restricted access to independent information. In Ukraine, information warfare and cyberattacks on communications infrastructure have become part of war strategy.

In Iran as well, control over information and narratives is of great importance. When access to information is restricted, the possibility of independent verification decreases and the public sphere becomes increasingly dependent on official or unverifiable narratives. Under such conditions, any individual or network able to provide field information, images, or eyewitness testimony may come under pressure or control.

From this perspective, the securitization of the humanitarian and media sphere in Iran can be analyzed within the broader framework of the war of narratives and information control. This process shows that in contemporary wars, power belongs not only to those who possess military tools, but also to those who are able to control the flow of information and thus play a decisive role in shaping political and social reality.

Taken together, these three mechanisms show how securitization can gradually transform the environment in which humanitarian and media actors operate. In such a space, the boundary between the security sphere and the civic sphere is weakened, and activities that under normal circumstances are considered part of the life of civil society may come to be regarded as security threats. Examining the Iranian examples alongside international experiences shows that this trend is not an exception, but part of the broader transformation of contemporary wars; transformations in which the battlefield has moved beyond the military arena and expanded into social, communicative, and humanitarian domains as well.

3. Iran Before the War: Why Is the Imam Ali Society a Foundational Example?

To analyze Iran’s current situation, the starting point need not necessarily be the ongoing war or recent military crises. In fact, many of the trends now visible in the form of the securitization of the humanitarian sphere and the restriction of civic space were already traceable in Iran’s political and institutional structures before the war. For this reason, if the goal is to understand the roots of securitization in Iran, one must pay attention to examples in which humanitarian and social spheres had already come under a security gaze. Among these, the case of the Imam Ali Society is one of the most important and revealing examples.

The Imam Ali Society, established in 1999 by a group of social activists and students in Iran, became over the course of two decades one of the largest and most recognized non-governmental organizations in the country. It worked in fields that, in many societies, are considered among the most important functions of civil society: support for child laborers, vulnerable women, poor families, prisoners, and socially marginalized groups. In addition to charitable activities, the Imam Ali Society carried out projects in the education of deprived children, school-building in poor areas, and social empowerment. In many Iranian cities, a network of young and student volunteers operated within this organization, attempting to reduce social inequality and structural poverty to some extent.

However, the process that eventually led to the dissolution of this organization showed that even activities that are inherently social and humanitarian can, in a particular political environment, be redefined as security matters. In March 2021, Human Rights Watch reported that a court in Iran, at the request of the Ministry of Interior and in coordination with security institutions, had ordered the dissolution of the organization. In that report, as well as in joint statements by human rights organizations, this action was described as a serious blow to Iranian civil society and a violation of freedom of association. In the wake of this process, the founder and some of the organization’s managers were also arrested, and reports were published of severe pressure and violent treatment during detention.

What makes this case important for analyzing securitization in Iran is not merely the closure of a non-governmental organization. Its importance lies in the shift in meaning that occurred at the discursive and political level. An institution whose activities were aimed at reducing poverty, supporting deprived children, and helping vulnerable groups gradually came to be portrayed in official discourse as a problematic and potentially threatening structure. This shift in perception shows how quickly the boundary between “social activity” and “security concern” can move under certain political conditions.

From a theoretical perspective, this transformation is precisely the process described in the literature of securitization. In this process, a social issue—in this case humanitarian activity—is removed from the sphere of social policy and placed in the sphere of national security. Once such a transfer occurs, tools that would normally be considered unjustifiable—such as closing an organization, arresting its managers, or restricting its activity—can be made to appear justified under the banner of “preserving security.”

For this reason, the importance of the Imam Ali Society in this article is not merely historical or descriptive. This case shows that the securitization of the humanitarian sphere in Iran is not a new phenomenon or one arising solely from wartime conditions; rather, it has an institutional and political history. In other words, the current war may have intensified this process, but its roots already existed before the war.

This point matters because many analyses of the restriction of civil society in wartime treat it as a direct result of emergency conditions. But the example of the Imam Ali Society shows that in Iran, the groundwork for the securitization of the humanitarian sphere had already existed. For that reason, the war may not be the beginning of this trend, but rather its accelerator.

From a comparative perspective, this point is also noteworthy. In many countries involved in war or security crises—from Sudan to Afghanistan—the securitization of the humanitarian sphere often intensifies during war. But in Iran, examples such as the Imam Ali Society show that this trend was already taking shape even before wartime conditions. For this reason, studying this case can help us better understand the connection between domestic politics, the securitization of civil society, and wartime conditions.

Ultimately, it can be said that the dissolution of the Imam Ali Society is an example of what might be called the “gradual securitization of social action.” In such a process, activities that in many societies are considered part of the normal life of civil society gradually come to be framed within a security outlook. The consequence of such a process is not only the weakening of civil society, but also the reduction of society’s capacity to respond to humanitarian crises.

For this reason, within the framework of this article, the case of the Imam Ali Society can be regarded as a “foundational case study”: an example showing how the humanitarian sphere in Iran had already been predisposed to be viewed, not as a complement to the state in supporting society, but as a domain requiring control, surveillance, and containment. This reality also changes our understanding of Iran’s current condition, because it shows that the securitization of humanitarian action in Iran is not merely a product of war, but has taken shape on the basis of earlier transformations in the relationship between the state and civil society.

4. Comparing Iran with Sudan, Palestine, and Ukraine

To better understand the trend of securitization in the humanitarian and media sphere in Iran, comparison with the experiences of other war-affected regions is highly important. The ARTICLE 19 report highlights three important cases in this regard: Sudan, Palestine, and Ukraine. These three cases show how, in contemporary wars, information control, media restriction, and the weakening of civic actors have gradually become part of war strategy. Each of these cases shows a particular pattern of interaction between military war and information war, yet they also contain shared elements that are useful for analyzing the situation in Iran.

In Sudan, the civil war that began in 2023 between the army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces was quickly accompanied by the collapse of media infrastructure and severe restrictions on the flow of information. Many media outlets suspended their activities, journalists were forced to obtain security permits in order to work in different areas, and repeated internet shutdowns severely restricted people’s access to vital information about the war, urban safety, and relief efforts. In such a space, journalists faced not only the physical dangers arising from war, but also legal and security pressure. The result of this process was the creation of a vast information vacuum that deprived both Sudanese society and the international community of an accurate understanding of the country’s humanitarian and political condition.

In Palestine—especially during the wars in Gaza—the securitization of the media sphere has taken a different form. Here, in addition to communications restrictions, direct attacks on media infrastructure and journalists have also been observed. Media offices have in some cases been targeted, and large numbers of journalists have been killed during the war. At the same time, severe restrictions on the entry of foreign media into Gaza have meant that the world’s access to independent information about conditions on the ground has been extremely limited. Under such conditions, the information vacuum becomes an important instrument of war, because each side can amplify its own narrative while the possibility of independent verification declines.

In Ukraine as well, the war with Russia has shown the extent to which the media front can become part of the military front. In this war, cyberattacks, information operations, the widespread spread of disinformation, and attacks on communications infrastructure have all formed part of war strategy. Media outlets, social networks, and even messaging platforms such as Telegram have become battlefields for shaping public opinion and managing the narrative of war. Here, information control and the war of narratives have become as important as military operations.

If these three experiences are placed side by side, a common pattern becomes clear: in contemporary wars, information control and media restriction have gradually become one of the main instruments of war. This control may take the form of internet shutdowns, pressure on journalists, restrictions on media access, or even attacks on communications infrastructure. The shared purpose of these measures is to manage the narrative of war and limit access to independent information.

Iran is comparable to these cases in certain respects. In Iran too, alongside military tensions, reports have emerged about internet disruption, restrictions on access to information, and pressure on journalists. These signs indicate that the information and media sphere, alongside the military sphere, has become one of the important arenas of conflict.

At the same time, there is one important difference between Iran and cases such as Sudan, Palestine, and Ukraine. In many of those countries, media restriction and the securitization of the humanitarian sphere were intensified mainly in response to wartime conditions. In other words, war as an external factor caused governments or armed actors to exert greater control over information and civic activity. In Iran, however, the evidence shows that the restriction of the humanitarian and media sphere existed even before the war. As explained in the previous section regarding the case of the Imam Ali Society, independent civil society in Iran was already facing structural restrictions before the war. Non-governmental organizations, social activists, and some media outlets had in recent years been subjected to various pressures, and the space for their independent activity was limited.

For this reason, whereas in countries such as Sudan or Ukraine war has intensified information control, in Iran the war has landed on a terrain where processes of securitizing civil society and the media already existed. This point means that Iran’s situation cannot be analyzed simply within the framework of “war-induced securitization.”

In fact, the case of Iran can be understood as an example of what might be called the “intertwining of pre-war and wartime securitization.” In such a situation, processes that already existed domestically before the war—such as the restriction of civil society or the control of media—become intensified under wartime conditions and take on new dimensions.

From an analytical perspective, this characteristic makes Iran an important case for study, because it shows that the securitization of the humanitarian and media sphere does not always emerge suddenly and solely as a result of war, but can also be the product of long-term processes in the relationship between the state, civil society, and the media. In such circumstances, war is not the initiator of this trend, but its accelerator and amplifier.

For this reason, comparing Iran with the experiences of Sudan, Palestine, and Ukraine can help us better understand how contemporary wars gradually erase the boundary between the military field and the civic field. Under such conditions, journalists, aid workers, and social actors all operate in an environment where military danger, security pressure, and communications restrictions exist simultaneously.

Ultimately, this comparison shows that protecting media and humanitarian space during war is not merely a professional or occupational issue, but part of the basic infrastructure of human security. When these spaces are weakened, not only is access to independent information reduced, but the possibility of effective relief, legal accountability, and even the accurate recording of the realities of war is severely restricted.

5. Iran in War: From Information Blackout to the Weakening of Humanitarian Action

Under wartime conditions, information control and communications restrictions often become among the first tools of crisis management and national security. At the same time, experiences from different parts of the world have shown that such measures can have complex and at times contradictory consequences. On the one hand, governments may consider communications restrictions necessary in order to prevent the spread of sensitive information or to control the psychological atmosphere of society; on the other hand, the same measures may disrupt society’s access to vital information, the coordination of relief, and independent documentation. In such a situation, the boundary between the “security management of crisis” and “information blackout” gradually becomes blurred.

Within this framework, on March 6, 2026 (6 March 2026), Human Rights Watch warned that internet blackouts in Iran could violate citizens’ right to access information and increase the risk to civilians. The organization emphasized that the shutdown or widespread disruption of communications not only obstructs public information about the war and urban safety, but also disrupts the work of aid workers, doctors, journalists, and human rights monitors. Particularly in wartime conditions, when rapid access to information can be vital for saving lives, communications restrictions may have significant humanitarian consequences.

At the same time, the Committee to Protect Journalists also reported that during the Iran war, cases of restricted media activity, threats against journalists, and pressure on media outlets had been recorded. Such reports show that the sphere of media and information in Iran has also come under significant pressure in wartime conditions. This situation reflects the same pattern observed in many contemporary wars: as military conflict intensifies, the information space becomes more restricted and the possibility of independent media activity decreases.

Under such conditions, one of the major consequences of information blackout is the gradual weakening of humanitarian action. Humanitarian activity naturally depends on accurate information, stable communication, and social trust. Aid workers need the free flow of information to identify urgent needs, coordinate among relief teams, transfer the wounded, and distribute assistance. When this flow is restricted, the efficiency and safety of humanitarian operations also decline.

In Iran, the securitization of humanitarian action under wartime conditions can take various forms. For example, local volunteer groups that, in times of crisis, transport the wounded, distribute essential items, share information about sheltering, or record humanitarian needs may, instead of being regarded as part of the humanitarian response to crisis, come under security suspicion. In a space where information is regarded as a sensitive resource, even activities such as recording images from damaged areas, conveying information about the condition of the wounded, or sending coordinates of critical zones may be treated as sensitive.

Under such conditions, the scope of this suspicion can become very broad. Doctors, ambulance drivers, local aid workers, social volunteers, and even family and neighborhood mutual-aid networks may come under a security gaze, especially if in the process of helping they are obliged to transmit information about conditions on the ground. While in many relief systems around the world such information is necessary for coordinating humanitarian operations, in a security atmosphere it may be treated as sensitive or security-related information.

This situation is precisely the mechanism referred to in the literature of securitization: the intrusion of war logic into a sphere that in principle ought to operate under the logic of civilian protection. Under international humanitarian law, relief and humanitarian activities should be kept separate from the sphere of military conflict and should receive special protection. But when this sphere is absorbed into security logic, the boundary between humanitarian action and security activity is gradually erased.

To better understand this issue in Iran, it becomes important to return to examples such as the case of the Imam Ali Society. As noted in the previous section, this organization was one of the largest social and charitable networks in Iran, active in poverty and social support. The dissolution of this organization showed that even in non-wartime conditions, independent social networks can come under a security gaze.

When this experience is placed alongside wartime conditions, its importance becomes even greater. If poverty-reduction social networks could be securitized and dissolved in non-wartime conditions, then under wartime conditions local relief networks and humanitarian actors may be even more vulnerable, because during war sensitivity toward information and independent networks increases and the scope of security measures expands.

From an analytical perspective, this situation shows that information blackout is not merely a technical or communications issue, but one with broad social and humanitarian consequences. When access to information is restricted, several processes emerge at the same time: first, the coordination of relief becomes more difficult; second, the possibility of independent verification about conditions on the ground declines; and third, the public sphere becomes increasingly dependent on official or unverifiable narratives.

As a result, information blackout can indirectly weaken society’s capacity for a humanitarian response to crisis. This is especially important in conditions where a significant portion of aid is delivered at the local level and by volunteer networks.

For this reason, Iran’s wartime situation can be understood as an example of the same process described in comparative studies of contemporary wars: a process in which military war becomes intertwined with information war and the securitization of the civic sphere. In such a space, humanitarian and media actors face not only the physical dangers arising from war, but also structural restrictions in the sphere of communications and information.

Ultimately, this situation shows that protecting information and humanitarian space during war is not merely a matter related to media freedom or civil rights, but part of the basic infrastructure of human security. When these spaces are restricted, not only is society’s access to independent information reduced, but the possibility of effective relief, the accurate recording of the realities of war, and accountability for possible violations is also severely constrained.

6. The Silencing of Independent Information in Iran

Under wartime conditions, media and journalists are among the most important sources through which society gains access to independent and verifiable information. At the same time, the experience of many contemporary wars shows that independent journalism often becomes one of the first spheres to come under pressure. The reason is clear: in war, information is not only a tool of public awareness, but also part of political and military power. Each party involved in war seeks to establish its own narrative of events and to limit competing narratives.

In such a space, independent journalism occupies an extremely vulnerable position. The journalist must confront several structural and operational obstacles at once: the physical dangers arising from war, security restrictions, internet shutdowns or disruptions, official censorship, political pressure, self-censorship born of fear, and difficulty in accessing sources of information. This combination of factors makes journalism in wartime not only more difficult, but in many cases more dangerous as well.

In Iran, this situation can take on even more complex dimensions. When the journalist is viewed not as a conveyor of public information and a bearer of society’s right to know, but as a “suspect element,” “aligned with the enemy,” or an “instrument of psychological operations,” the ground is prepared for restricting their activity. Under such conditions, measures such as arrest, summons, restriction of professional activity, or media discrediting can be justified under a security rationale.

This pattern is exactly what ARTICLE 19 warns about in its analysis of contemporary wars. The organization shows that in many new conflicts, the labeling of journalists—for example, as “propagandists” or “enemy agents”—has become a tool for restricting independent media. Such labels enable political actors to justify restrictive measures against journalists within the framework of security discourse.

At the same time, the Committee to Protect Journalists, in following the condition of media in relation to the Iran war, has also reported cases of restricted media activity, pressure, and threats against journalists. These reports show that the media sphere, alongside other civic spheres, has come under pressure as a result of the security atmosphere.

Among the most important factors affecting media work in wartime is disruption of access to the internet and communications. In today’s world, a large part of journalists’ work depends on digital tools. Contact with sources, sending reports, publishing images and videos, and even coordination between journalists and editorial offices all depend on communications infrastructure. When this infrastructure is restricted, journalistic work also encounters serious obstacles.

In Iran, the issue of information blackout is not merely a technical or communications matter. The shutdown or restriction of communications has broader consequences in the social and humanitarian sphere. When access to the internet or communications networks is limited, several processes occur simultaneously.

First, the possibility of independent verification decreases. Journalists, civic activists, and human rights monitors need diverse sources and stable communications in order to verify information. Communications restrictions make access to these sources more difficult and disrupt the process of verification.

Second, the field opens more widely for the spread of official or unverified narratives. When the flow of independent information is restricted, narratives issued by official sources or rumors spreading through unofficial networks can shape the information environment. Under such conditions, distinguishing accurate information from false information becomes more difficult.

Third, the possibility of independently documenting possible violations decreases. One of the important roles of journalists and human rights activists in wartime is to record and document events. This documentation may later be used for legal accountability or historical inquiry. Communications restrictions and pressure on media can disrupt this process.

As a result, information blackout can indirectly lead to increased human insecurity, because in the absence of accurate and independent information, society has less access to awareness about immediate dangers, safe routes, the state of relief efforts, or humanitarian needs.

This is why many human rights institutions emphasize that access to information during war is a vital necessity, not a media privilege. Accurate information can help save lives, improve coordination among aid workers, and prevent the spread of rumors and false information.

Within this framework, internet blackouts or broad communications restrictions during war cannot be seen merely as matters of network management or technology. These measures are directly linked to the right to life, civilian security, and the possibility of legal accountability. When the flow of information is disrupted, not only is society’s access to the realities of war reduced, but the possibility of accurately recording events and independently examining them is also restricted.

From an analytical perspective, Iran’s situation in this regard is an example of the same broader trend seen in contemporary wars: a trend in which military war becomes intertwined with information war and the control of media space. Under such conditions, journalists are not only witnesses to war, but also part of the battlefield of information.

Ultimately, this situation shows that protecting independent information during war is not merely a matter related to press freedom, but part of the basic infrastructure of human security and legal accountability in times of crisis. When this space is weakened, not only is society’s access to independent information restricted, but the possibility of effective relief, the recording of truth, and the prevention of impunity is also drastically reduced.

7. Conclusion

From a conceptual point of view, one fundamental distinction must first be emphasized: protecting humanitarian activity and independent information is not an extraordinary privilege in peacetime, but a vital necessity in wartime. Under ordinary circumstances, media freedom, the independence of civic organizations, or humanitarian activity may be discussed primarily within the framework of democratic values and civil rights. But in wartime, these spheres acquire a function that goes beyond political values. Under such conditions, they are directly tied to the protection of human life, access to vital information, the recording of realities on the ground, and the possibility of legal accountability.

In contemporary wars, one of the greatest dangers is that victims may disappear amid masses of statistics and contradictory narratives. If journalists, documentarians, and humanitarian actors cannot work freely, many of the realities of war will never be recorded. Under such conditions, not only is society’s access to truth restricted, but the possibility of legal pursuit of possible violations is also reduced. This is why, in the literature of international humanitarian law, the protection of civilians, aid workers, and journalists is presented as one of the foundational principles.

In the case of Iran today, the importance of this issue is doubled, because the country’s current condition lies at the intersection of several major processes: military war, information control, and the restriction of civic space. Under such conditions, any responsible analysis of Iran’s situation must simultaneously resist two types of analytical reductionism.

The first is domestic security reductionism. In this view, any independent circulation of information, any social activity outside official chains, or any independent human network can be regarded as a security threat. Within such a framework, humanitarian activities, volunteer networks, or even local information-sharing may, instead of being seen as part of society’s capacity to face crisis, be regarded as domains requiring control and containment.

The second is external geopolitical reductionism. In many international analyses, wars are examined mainly at the level of power competition, regional balance, or military objectives. In such an approach, the main focus rests on military strategies, the balance of power, or the geopolitical consequences of war. But this type of analysis sometimes pushes the human costs of war to the margins and pays less attention to consequences such as the collapse of civic space, information blackout, or the weakening of humanitarian action.

The reality is that, to fully understand Iran’s situation, both types of reductionism must be set aside. War is not merely a military event, but a multilayered phenomenon that simultaneously encompasses military, humanitarian, media, and social dimensions. Ignoring any of these dimensions can produce an incomplete picture of reality.

Within this framework, revisiting examples such as the case of the Imam Ali Society becomes especially important. The dissolution of this organization showed that the securitization of the humanitarian sphere in Iran is not merely a product of wartime conditions, but has a pre-war history. When a non-governmental organization working in poverty reduction, support for child laborers, and social activity is transformed into a security issue, this shows how fragile the boundary between social activity and security suspicion can become.

When this experience is placed alongside the current situation—including widespread communications disruptions and internet blackouts during war—a recognizable pattern emerges. This pattern shows that in Iran, independent humanitarian action and free information can gradually be placed within the framework of security discourse. In other words, from social activity to media activity, spheres that in principle ought to be seen as part of society’s capacity to confront crisis may instead become domains of security control and surveillance.

Comparative research and recent reports also show that such a trend is not limited to Iran. In many contemporary wars, from Sudan and Palestine to Ukraine, it has been observed that whenever war spills into the humanitarian and media sphere, the danger to civilians multiplies, because under such conditions not only does military violence increase, but the possibility of access to accurate information, effective relief, and the independent recording of the realities of war also declines.

From this perspective, Iran’s situation reflects part of a broader trend in contemporary wars: a trend in which military war becomes intertwined with information war and the securitization of the civic sphere. In such a space, journalists, aid workers, and social actors all operate in an environment where military danger is combined with security pressure and communications restrictions.

Ultimately, the main message of this analysis is that defending independent humanitarian action and defending accurate and free information is not merely a defense of civil liberties. In wartime, such a defense is in essence a defense of society’s right to survive, to know, and to record the truth. If the flow of independent information is silenced and independent human networks are weakened, society loses not only its ability to protect civilians, but also its capacity to understand accurately what is taking place.

For this reason, protecting humanitarian and media space during war must be regarded as one of the essential preconditions of human security and legal accountability. Without these two, there is no possibility of effectively protecting people, no possibility of recording the truth, and not even the possibility of accurately judging a war that is unfolding.

Footnotes:

1. ARTICLE 19. (2025, May 10). Digital warfare, censorship, and risks to journalists in conflict: Finding a way forward. ARTICLE 19.

2. Committee to Protect Journalists. (2026, March 10). Press freedom violations in the Middle East during the Iran war. CPJ.

3. Human Rights Watch. (2021, March 10). Iran: Overturn shutdown of charity. Human Rights Watch.

4. Human Rights Watch. (2026, March 6). Iran: Internet shutdown violates rights, escalates risks to civilians. Human Rights Watch.

5. Swiss, L., & Dicks, H. (2025). Aid securitization and violence against aid workers. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 12(1), Article 2.