The discussion of espionage, cooperation with intelligence services of other countries or financing of violent acts are undoubtedly legitimate areas of criminal law intervention. No responsible legal system can be indifferent to real threats to the lives of citizens, territorial integrity, public security and critical infrastructure. But the problem begins when “national security” is transformed from a concept necessary for the protection of society into a flexible title for controlling daily life, economic activity, civic relations and even the livelihood of individuals. In such a situation, the main question is no longer whether espionage should be a crime or not; the question is whether the state can include the mere receipt of money, currency, subsidies, wages or cryptocurrencies from a foreign source within the scope of security crimes, without precise proof of intent, knowledge, organized connection and objective harm?

In the published text of the “Law on Enhancing Punishment for Espionage and Cooperation with the Zionist Regime and Hostile Countries Against National Security and Interests,” receiving “money or property,” including property, vehicles, gold, currency, and “any type of encrypted asset” from spies or affiliates of intelligence services, with the knowledge of the affiliation and if related to the actions subject to the law, is considered subject to heavy penalties. The same text, in other articles, also criminalizes a range of security, military, economic, financial, technological, political, cultural, media, and propaganda cooperation in relation to national security.

At first glance, it might be said that the law in question is aimed solely at dangerous and deliberate behavior. However, the experience of security criminal law shows that the main danger usually lies not in the title of the law, but in the scope of its interpretation. The more vague the concepts of “cooperation,” “assistance,” “foreign source,” “dependence,” “enhancement,” “legitimization,” “national security,” and “national interest,” the greater the possibility of arbitrary, broad interpretation, and political use of the law. In such a situation, citizens are afraid not only of committing a crime but also of carrying out legitimate activities, because they do not know exactly where the line between a professional collaboration, a financial transaction, a research grant, a media salary, a freelance project, or a family contribution is and “security cooperation.”

From a human rights perspective, the first criterion for evaluating such laws is the principle of legality of the crime and the punishment. This principle does not only mean that the crime must be written into law; it must also be clear, precise, foreseeable and limited. An individual must be able to understand in advance what conduct is prohibited and what the consequences will be. Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights emphasizes the prohibition of punishment for conduct that was not at the time the crime was committed and the prohibition of imposing a heavier penalty; but the spirit of this principle, beyond the prohibition of retroactivity, is also based on the predictability and clarity of criminal law.

In security crimes, this principle is doubly important. The more severe the punishment, the more precise the definition of the crime must be. Heavy penalties cannot be created with vague concepts. A citizen cannot be exposed to a charge that may threaten his freedom, dignity, property, or even life with general terms. Criminal law, especially when dealing with security charges, should be the last resort of the state, not its first reaction.

The issue of receiving money or cryptocurrency from abroad must be understood in the context of people’s real lives. Today, the personal economy of many people has crossed national borders. A translator, journalist, programmer, researcher, artist, online teacher, civic activist, content creator, student, legal advisor, migrant worker, family member of a migrant, and even a patient in need of financial assistance may directly or indirectly receive money from abroad. In a country where banking restrictions, sanctions, disconnection from the global financial system, and economic crisis have made official channels for exchanging money difficult or costly, the use of cryptocurrency for some citizens is not a sign of criminal concealment, but a way to survive, work, receive treatment, study, or make ends meet.

For this reason, criminalization must make a clear distinction between “foreign source” and “criminal source”, between “receiving money” and “receiving money to carry out operations”, between “professional communication” and “intelligence communication”, and between “civil or media activity” and “organized cooperation with the security service”. If this distinction is lost, the law becomes a tool for producing legal insecurity, rather than a tool for countering a real threat.

From a human rights perspective, receiving money cannot in itself be a security crime. What can bring conduct into the realm of crime is a set of precise elements: actual knowledge of the criminal nature of the source, a specific intention to collaborate with a security or hostile structure, a direct link between the receipt of the money and the commission of a harmful act, and the existence of an objective and demonstrable harm or risk. Removing any of these elements would derail criminal law from the path of justice and turn it into a system based on suspicion and labels.

Meanwhile, the concept of “knowledge” should not be simply assumed. Knowing that an individual or entity is operating abroad is not the same as knowing about their security affiliation. Receiving a salary from a media outlet, university, NGO, research institute, human rights organization, or foreign employer does not in itself prove criminal intent. Even receiving money from a source that the government later identifies as “intimate” or “affiliated” should not automatically give rise to criminal liability. Knowledge must be real, personal, verifiable, and relevant to the time of the conduct; not hypothetical, a posteriori, or based on the perception of security institutions.

The same is true of cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrency is a tool, not a crime. Just as a banknote, a bank account, a gift card, or a money order can be used for legal or illegal behavior, cryptocurrency has meaning depending on the context, intent, and outcome of its use. Securing the tool itself is a legal and policy mistake. If a government is faced with financial crime, money laundering, or the financing of violent acts, the right tools are transparent regulation, appropriate anti-money laundering rules, the possibility of appeal, independent judicial oversight, and a precise definition of criminal behavior; not turning every unusual or cross-border transaction into a potential sign of espionage.

Another human rights concern is the impact of such laws on freedom of expression, freedom of the media and civic activity. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights defines the right to freedom of expression as including freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds “regardless of frontiers”. Restrictions on this right are only permitted when provided for by law, are necessary and proportionate to an aim such as national security or public order. The UN Human Rights Committee has also emphasized in its general comment No. 34 that when a State invokes national security to restrict expression, it must demonstrate the precise nature of the threat and the necessity and proportionality of the restrictive measure in a specific and individual manner.

This criterion is crucial to our discussion. A journalist who receives a fee from a foreign media outlet, a researcher who receives an international grant, a human rights activist who receives financial support to document human rights abuses, or a citizen who sends a video of a public event to a media outlet should not be subject to security charges simply because of a financial or media connection with a foreign country. A crime is conceivable when the government can show a direct, immediate, and demonstrable connection between that conduct and a specific threat to national security; rather than simply redefining criticism, information, civic engagement, or receiving a fee in terms of security.

Here we must speak of the “chilling effect,” an effect that may even begin before the law is widely implemented. When citizens do not know how receiving money from abroad, collaborating with the media, participating in a research project, receiving help from family, or using a cryptocurrency wallet might be interpreted, they give up many of their rights in advance. Journalists write less, researchers cooperate less, families send less help, civil activists document less, and citizens avoid legitimate and legal communications to protect themselves. The result of such a situation is not greater security, but a society that is more silent, poorer, and less trusting.

This issue is also important from the perspective of economic and social rights. The right to work, the right to a living and the right to just and favorable conditions of work are part of the fundamental human rights. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes the right of everyone to gain their living by work which they freely choose or accept. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights also describes the right to work not only as a means of income, but also as part of human dignity and social justice. Iran also ratified the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1975.

Therefore, when criminal legislation is enacted in a way that places cross-border employment, scientific and cultural collaborations, free online work, or receiving wages from abroad in an atmosphere of fear and accusation, we are not just facing a criminal issue; we are facing a threat to the right to work, the right to livelihood, the right to cultural participation, the right to education, the right to research, and the right to a dignified life. National security should not be ensured at the cost of destroying the economic and legal security of citizens.

The issue becomes even more worrying when severe penalties, including the death penalty, are included in such laws. The right to life is the most fundamental human right. Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to life and that in countries that have not yet abolished the death penalty, it should be applied only for the “most serious crimes” and with the strictest guarantees. The UN Human Rights Committee has also emphasized in its General Comment No. 36 that the death penalty, if it exists, should be applied only in the most exceptional cases and under the strictest restrictions.

From this perspective, any law that allows vague financial, media, cultural or communicational conduct to be linked to capital punishment poses a serious threat to the right to life. The death penalty or extremely severe punishments cannot be based on stretchy concepts, weak evidence, political interpretations or opaque confessions. The more severe the punishment, the heavier the burden of proof on the state; and the more security-related the charge, the stronger, not weaker, the fair trial guarantees must be.

In this regard, the issue of a fair trial is also fundamental. Article 14 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights emphasizes equality before the courts, the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, the presumption of innocence, the right to access a lawyer, adequate opportunity for defense, the right to confront witnesses and the prohibition of coercion to confess. These guarantees are even more important in security cases, because usually some of the evidence is confidential, some of the investigation process is closed to the public and some of the public atmosphere of the case is shaped by political or security propaganda.

If the law both broadens the scope of criminal conduct and makes the proceedings expedited, security-based, or limited to specific branches, the risk of miscarriage of justice increases. In a case that may involve long-term imprisonment, confiscation of property, or even life, speed should not be a substitute for care. Real national security is enhanced by an independent court, effective counsel, verifiable evidence, a reasoned verdict, and the possibility of meaningful appeals; not by eliminating or weakening defense guarantees.

Finally, a fundamental distinction must be insisted on: national security is a legitimate concept, but the securitization of everything is illegitimate. The state can and should confront espionage, sabotage, the financing of violence, the disclosure of classified information, and knowing cooperation with intelligence services. But this confrontation must be limited, precise, based on specific intent and harm, and consistent with human rights principles. Every receipt of money from abroad, every media connection, every academic collaboration, every civic activity, every family contribution, every cryptocurrency payment, and every political criticism cannot be placed under the heavy shadow of national security.

The boundary between personal finances and national security, from a human rights perspective, can be summarized in a few clear principles: the source must be clearly criminal or security-related; the recipient must have knowingly and intentionally collaborated with that source for an illegal purpose; there must be a direct relationship between the receipt of the property and the actual threat; the conduct must be harmful or at least involve an objective and demonstrable risk; and the proceedings must be conducted in an independent court with full respect for the rights of the defense. Wherever these elements are absent, criminalization is not a defense of security, but an attack on the freedom, livelihood, and dignity of the citizen.

Human rights are not against security; they are against turning security into an unlimited license to interfere in people’s lives. A safer society is one in which its citizens know that the law is precise, the court is independent, accusations are based on reason, punishments are proportionate, and receiving wages, family assistance, research support, or the use of new financial technology, without criminal intent or action, does not make them security suspects. National security is sustainable when it is built on the legal security of citizens, and legal security means that no human being should live in constant fear of security interpretation in order to make a living, communicate, work, and live a normal life.