Espionage, cooperation with the intelligence services of other countries, and the financing of violent acts are undoubtedly matters in which criminal-law intervention is legitimate. No responsible legal system can remain indifferent to genuine threats to the lives of citizens, territorial integrity, public security, or critical infrastructure. The problem begins when “national security” shifts from being a necessary concept for protecting society to becoming an elastic label for controlling everyday life, economic activity, civil relations, and even people’s livelihoods.

In such circumstances, the central question is no longer whether espionage should be criminalised. It is whether the state may bring the mere receipt of money, foreign currency, a grant, wages, or cryptocurrency from a foreign source within the scope of national security offences without precisely proving intent, knowledge, an organised connection, and concrete harm.

Under the published text of the “Law on Increasing the Punishment for Espionage and Cooperation with the Zionist Regime and Hostile States against National Security and National Interests,” the receipt of “funds or property,” including real estate, vehicles, gold, foreign currency, and “any form of crypto-asset,” from spies or persons affiliated with intelligence services is subject to severe penalties where the recipient knows of that affiliation and the receipt is connected to conduct covered by the law. In other provisions, the same law also brings a range of security, military, economic, financial, technological, political, cultural, media, and propaganda-related forms of cooperation within the scope of criminal law where they are linked to national security.

At first sight, it may be argued that the law targets only dangerous and intentional conduct. Experience with national security criminal law, however, shows that the principal danger usually lies not in the title of the law but in the scope of its interpretation. The more ambiguous concepts such as “cooperation,” “assistance,” “foreign source,” “affiliation,” “strengthening,” “legitimisation,” “national security,” and “national interests” remain, the greater the scope for discretionary enforcement, expansive interpretation, and political use of the law.

In such circumstances, citizens fear not only committing an offence but also engaging in lawful activities, because they do not know precisely where the boundary lies between professional cooperation, a financial transaction, a research grant, payment for media work, a freelance project, or family assistance, and “security-related cooperation.”

From a human rights perspective, the first standard for assessing such laws is the principle of legality in criminal law. This principle does not mean merely that an offence must be set out in legislation. The law must also be clear, precise, foreseeable, and narrowly defined. A person must be able to understand in advance which conduct is prohibited and what consequences it carries.

Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits punishment for conduct that was not criminal at the time it was committed and the imposition of a heavier penalty than the one then applicable. The underlying principle, however, extends beyond the prohibition of retroactive criminal law and also rests on the foreseeability and clarity of criminal legislation.

This principle is especially important in national security cases. The more severe the punishment, the more precisely the offence must be defined. Severe penalties cannot be built on vague concepts. Broad language cannot be used to expose a citizen to an accusation that may threaten their liberty, reputation, property, or even life. Criminal law, particularly where national security allegations are involved, must be the state’s measure of last resort, not its first response.

The receipt of money or cryptocurrency from abroad must be understood in the context of people’s actual lives. Today, the personal economies of many individuals extend beyond national borders. Translators, journalists, programmers, researchers, artists, online teachers, civil society activists, content creators, students, legal advisers, migrant workers, relatives of migrants, and even patients in need of financial assistance may receive money from abroad, directly or indirectly.

In a country where banking restrictions, sanctions, disconnection from the global financial system, and economic crisis have made formal channels for transferring money difficult or costly, the use of cryptocurrency may represent, for some citizens, not evidence of criminal concealment but a means of survival, employment, medical treatment, education, or meeting the basic costs of living.

Criminalisation must therefore draw clear distinctions between a “foreign source” and a “criminal source”; between receiving money and receiving money in exchange for carrying out an operation; between a professional relationship and an intelligence relationship; and between civil or media activity and organised cooperation with an intelligence service. If these distinctions disappear, the law ceases to be an instrument for confronting genuine threats and becomes an instrument for producing legal insecurity.

From a human rights perspective, receiving money cannot in itself constitute a national security offence. Conduct may enter the criminal sphere only where a set of precisely defined elements is established: actual knowledge of the source’s criminal character; a specific intention to cooperate with an intelligence or hostile structure; a direct connection between the receipt of funds and the performance of a harmful act; and the existence of concrete and demonstrable harm or risk.

Removing any of these elements diverts criminal law from the path of justice and turns it into a system based on suspicion and labelling.

The concept of “knowledge” must not be readily presumed. Knowing that a person or institution operates outside the country is not the same as knowing that it is affiliated with an intelligence service. Receiving payment from a media organisation, university, non-governmental organisation, research institute, human rights organisation, or foreign employer does not in itself establish criminal intent.

Even receiving money from a source that the state subsequently describes as “hostile” or “affiliated” should not automatically give rise to criminal liability. Knowledge must be actual, personal, provable, and present at the time of the conduct. It must not be assumed, constructed retrospectively, or based solely on the interpretation of security agencies.

The same applies to cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrency is a tool, not a crime. Just as cash, a bank account, a gift card, or a money transfer may be used for lawful or unlawful purposes, the significance of cryptocurrency depends on the context, intention, and outcome of its use. Treating the instrument itself as a security threat is both a legal and policy error.

Where the state is confronting financial crime, money laundering, or the financing of violent acts, the appropriate response is transparent regulation, proportionate anti-money-laundering rules, access to appeal, independent judicial oversight, and precise definitions of criminal conduct. It is not the transformation of every unusual or cross-border transaction into a potential sign of espionage.

Another human rights concern is the effect of such laws on freedom of expression, media freedom, and civil society activity. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds “regardless of frontiers.” Restrictions on this right are permissible only where they are provided by law, necessary, and proportionate to a legitimate aim such as national security or public order.

In General Comment No. 34, the United Nations Human Rights Committee emphasised that when a state invokes national security to restrict expression, it must demonstrate the precise nature of the threat and establish, in a specific and individualised manner, the necessity and proportionality of the restriction.

This standard is vital to the present discussion. A journalist who receives payment from a media organisation abroad, a researcher who receives an international grant, a human rights activist who receives financial support to document violations, or a citizen who sends footage of a public event to a media outlet should not be placed under suspicion of a national security offence merely because of a financial or media connection with actors outside the country.

Criminal liability may be contemplated only where the state can establish a direct, immediate, and demonstrable connection between the conduct and a specific threat to national security. Criticism, reporting, civil cooperation, or the receipt of payment cannot simply be redefined as security-related conduct.

The chilling effect must also be considered, an effect that may begin even before the law is widely enforced. When citizens do not know how the receipt of money from abroad, cooperation with a media organisation, participation in a research project, financial assistance from family, or use of a cryptocurrency wallet may be interpreted, they begin to relinquish many of their rights in advance.

Journalists write less. Researchers cooperate less. Families send less support. Civil society activists document fewer violations. Citizens withdraw from lawful and legitimate relationships in an effort to protect themselves. The result is not greater security but a society that is quieter, poorer, and less trusting.

The issue is also important from the perspective of economic and social rights. The right to work, the right to earn a livelihood, and the right to just and favourable conditions of work are fundamental human rights. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognises the right of every person to gain a living through work that they freely choose or accept. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has likewise described the right to work not merely as a means of earning income but as part of human dignity and social justice. Iran ratified both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1975.

When criminal legislation places cross-border employment, scientific and cultural cooperation, online freelance work, or the receipt of payment from abroad under a cloud of fear and suspicion, the issue is no longer solely one of criminal law. It becomes a threat to the rights to work, livelihood, cultural participation, education, research, and an adequate standard of living. National security must not be pursued at the cost of citizens’ economic and legal security.

The issue becomes still more troubling when severe penalties, including the death penalty, appear within such laws. The right to life is the most fundamental human right. Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that no one may be arbitrarily deprived of life and that, in countries which have not abolished the death penalty, it may be imposed only for the “most serious crimes” and subject to the strictest safeguards.

In General Comment No. 36, the Human Rights Committee emphasised that the death penalty, where it remains in force, must be confined to the most exceptional cases and applied under the most stringent limitations.

From this perspective, any law that permits vaguely defined financial, media, cultural, or communicative conduct to be linked to the death penalty creates a grave risk to the right to life. The death penalty and other exceptionally severe punishments cannot be based on elastic concepts, weak circumstantial evidence, political interpretations, or confessions obtained through opaque processes.

The more severe the punishment, the heavier the state’s burden of proof must be. The more closely an accusation is associated with national security, the stronger, not weaker, the guarantees of a fair trial must become.

Fair-trial rights are therefore fundamental. Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees equality before courts and tribunals; the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal; the presumption of innocence; access to legal counsel; adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence; the right to examine witnesses; and protection against being compelled to confess.

These guarantees are especially important in national security cases, where some evidence may be classified, parts of the investigation may be conducted in secret, and the public atmosphere surrounding the proceedings may be shaped by political or security narratives.

If legislation both expands the range of conduct treated as criminal and subjects cases to accelerated, security-driven proceedings or proceedings confined to particular branches of the courts, the risk of judicial error increases. In a case that may result in long-term imprisonment, confiscation of property, or even the loss of life, speed must not take the place of care and accuracy.

Genuine national security is strengthened by independent courts, effective legal representation, evidence that can be examined and challenged, reasoned judgments, and meaningful rights of appeal. It is not strengthened by removing or weakening the safeguards of the defence.

Ultimately, a fundamental distinction must be maintained: national security is a legitimate concept, but the securitisation of everything is not. The state may and should act against espionage, sabotage, the financing of violence, the disclosure of classified information, and knowing cooperation with intelligence services. Such action, however, must be limited, precise, based on specific intent and demonstrable harm, and consistent with human rights principles.

Not every payment from abroad, media contact, academic collaboration, civil society activity, family remittance, cryptocurrency payment, or expression of political criticism can legitimately be placed under the heavy shadow of national security.

From a human rights perspective, the boundary between personal economic activity and national security can be expressed through several clear principles: the source must be specifically criminal or connected to an intelligence or security body; the recipient must knowingly and intentionally cooperate with that source for an unlawful purpose; there must be a direct connection between the receipt of funds and a genuine threat; the conduct must cause harm or, at a minimum, create an objective and demonstrable risk; and the proceedings must take place before an independent court with full respect for the rights of the defence.

Where these elements are absent, criminalisation is not a defence of security. It is an infringement of citizens’ freedom, livelihood, and dignity.

Human rights are not opposed to security. They oppose turning security into an unlimited licence to interfere in people’s lives. A society is more secure when its citizens know that the law is precise, the courts are independent, accusations are based on evidence, punishments are proportionate, and that payment for work, assistance from family, research support, or the use of new financial technologies will not turn them into national security suspects in the absence of criminal intent and conduct.

National security is sustainable only when it rests on citizens’ legal security. Legal security means that no person should have to live in constant fear that earning a livelihood, communicating, working, or simply living an ordinary life may be reinterpreted as a threat to the state.