Social networks are the main platform for opposing the modesty and hijab bill / the emotion of a scholar.

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April 1, 2026
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Year: 2023

Social networks are the main platform for opposing the modesty and hijab bill / the emotion of a scholar.

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One year has passed since the death of Mahsa Amini over the issue of hijab; a year in which the public has been confronted with the issue of mandatory hijab and the government’s confrontation with the people on this issue has taken on a different dimension. Now is a turning point for the government. The three branches of the political system in Iran have joined hands to draft and enforce a law that, in simple terms, silences opposition to mandatory hijab.

The “Family Support Bill through the Promotion of Chastity and Veil Culture”, now known as the “Chastity and Veil Bill”, has sparked many reactions in the political arena and Iranian society on the anniversary of last year’s events. This bill was drafted in the judiciary branch as the “Bill for the Protection of Chastity and Veil Culture” and was sent to the government with 9 articles. The government, after incorporating some opinions, sent it to the parliament about 3 months ago with 15 articles. However, in the parliament, the judiciary commission not only made changes to the title, but also unprecedentedly increased the number of articles to 70.

This draft was approved in the first week of August by the Judiciary and Legal Commission of the Iranian Parliament, and it is said that since its text was uploaded on the Parliament’s system, representatives have submitted nearly 1600 proposals and amendments to be considered during the final review. However, in order to determine the fate of this draft as soon as possible, its final review was referred back to the Judiciary and Legal Commission of the Parliament on August 22nd, with the opinion of the majority of the members. This review, according to Mosi Ghaffarabadi, the head of this commission in the Iranian Parliament, only took a week and was completed on August 29th. Now, with the speed that the Parliament has shown in finalizing this draft, it seems that we will soon witness its final approval in the open session of the Parliament and its implementation.

Interesting that despite all the amendments made in the current version of the mentioned bill, this version is still not pleasing to some supporters of mandatory hijab and they do not consider it as a deterrent. Hossein Shariatmadari, representative of Ali Khamenei in Kayhan Institute, is one of the dissatisfied people with this bill and in a note in Kayhan newspaper, wrote that if the hijab and chastity bill is passed as it is, “its role in preventing hijab-less behavior is similar to preventing a flood by pulling barbed wire” and recommended that the bill be returned to the government. Although the return of the bill to the government did not happen, the parliament has made every effort to at least secure the minimum support of this part of the supporters of mandatory hijab, in order to make the output of this bill as restrictive as these hardliners expect, and make the society even more closed off than before.

As it has been evident so far, this bill has added at least 30 new crimes to the country’s criminal and punishment system. This is a matter that, regardless of the inflationary effects on the increase of criminal titles in the country’s laws, shows the government’s completely security and law enforcement-oriented approach towards the issue of hijab. This is a matter that, according to some, after the killing of Mahsa Amini in the detention of the Basij forces last year and the limited and temporary retreat of the government from its strict policies regarding hijab, did not seem practical. However, on the contrary, the government, with the collaboration of all its forces and institutions, and by introducing this bill, has shown that not only does it not intend to retreat from its strict policies on hijab, but it also intends to preserve this stronghold with an even stronger and firmer grip.

The significant impact of this bill on the lives of millions of Iranian men and women, both opponents and supporters of mandatory hijab, is worth considering. The hasty examination of some of the provisions of this bill has caused a lot of controversy and in a situation where expressing dissent in various forms is limited by significant restrictions imposed by the government, social media has become the main platform for criticism, protest, and opposition. It would be beneficial to take a look at some of these reactions.

“Yaghma Fashkhami, an Iranian journalist residing in Iran, wrote on the social media network X (formerly known as Twitter) regarding one of the articles of this bill: “Article 14 of the chastity and #hijab bill, paragraph 3: The Ministry of Health is obligated to design administrative arrangements in the headquarters of hospitals, universities, and other centers related to the Ministry of Health, based on preserving the boundaries of #sharia privacy between male and female employees. P.S. Gentlemen, write the bill, at least for your own health, eat camphor.”

Another user named “flore” wrote on social network X: “The shameless dictator sinks deeper and deeper into the swamp with the modesty and hijab bill every day. #Mahsa_Amini”

Hassan Younesi, a lawyer and the son of former Minister of Intelligence Mohammad Khatami, also wrote on the social media network X in response to this bill: “This is no longer called the #Hijab and Chastity Bill; it is a bill for establishing an Islamic military government.”

Mohammad Fadeli, a critical sociologist living in Iran, also wrote on the social media network X about the rapid progress of this bill in parliament, saying: “The head of the parliamentary judicial commission stated that there were no challenges in reviewing the bill on chastity and hijab.” In their book “Development as Empowerment of Government”, Perichat, Endroz, and Wolcak describe how the simplest task in government is writing documents, and in this particular case, there have been no challenges at all.

Sofia Nasrollahi is an Iranian journalist and another user on the social media network X who has expressed her opinion about this bill. Like Mohammad Fazeli, she also made a sarcastic comment about the remarks of the head of the Judiciary Commission regarding the lack of challenges in dealing with this bill, and wrote: “It’s obvious there was no challenge…the real challenge is when there is some intelligence involved…a group of fools has no challenge.”

And another user with the name “behnam2k” on X, referring to the one-year anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death in the detention of the Basij forces and the subsequent protests, wrote: “Nothing has gotten better, nothing has changed! It has been about a year that they have been talking about cultural work and the modesty and hijab bill and the crackdown and poisonings! Billions of tomans have been spent on plans and programs and bills. But after a year, they have returned to square one, by force and violence! Nothing is normal and #Women_Life_Freedom continues.”

These are just a small sample of the reactions to the modesty and hijab bill. According to some experts and analysts of social networks, the reactions to the modesty and hijab bill have been less than previous similar cases, and users have shown less reaction compared to past events. This is a subject that, according to these experts, after the bill becomes a law and is implemented, will take on a different course due to the significant social burden and serious consequences that will follow, and the main wave of protests must be expected at that time.

Siege; a poem by Mehrdad Naghibi

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‌های تاریک و سرد، به سوی آفتاب می‌روم

I am that cypress branch with a raised neck, going beyond the dark and cold nights, towards the sun.

I have kissed all the stars. O souvenir of the blood of lovers.

Oh Sepideh, sing with me the song of bright red light. If آن

This pure blood was spilled on the ground in every direction with its cry.

Blood, a flame ignites, a forest rises.

Supervision of the national broadcasting network on home display: Positioning/ Farshad Ghani

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In the last days of the month of Khordad this year, Fars News Agency reported that “the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution discussed policies and regulations for the comprehensive audiovisual field in its 30th session, chaired by Seyyed Ebrahim Raisi” and approved the single article “Determination of Requirements for Organizing the Comprehensive Audiovisual Field”.

According to this article, the scope of authority and responsibilities of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Organization in this area has been specified and designated for private sector actors, especially in widespread audio and video platforms and designated home viewing networks, to obtain licenses from the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance in certain areas and from the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Organization in other areas.

Another clause of these requirements, which specifies the principles and policies of widespread audio and video production and distribution and home display network in a more precise manner, has been approved.

In this session, it was decided that “regulations for organizing the field of audio and video production and distribution, as well as home display networks, should be prepared and sent to the Islamic Consultative Assembly for approval as a law by the relevant authorities, taking into account the policies and principles determined by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution.”

This report indicates that the sphere of influence and discretion of the managers of the national broadcasting organization will have a wider impact on the content and, of course, the quality of the outputs that will be produced with the (mostly) private sector funding, than in the past.

In these circumstances, this organization, by connecting to government resources, seeks to monopolize as much as possible in the field of television production, in order to attract viewers to watch its expensive and new productions, it has resorted to city advertising through billboards of Tehran Municipality. The managers and policymakers of this organization have also repeated the form and sometimes the content of their new productions in the hope of repeating popular programs (such as the top football program – 90/ Seyed Khandan program – Khandevaneh).

The organization that once attracted millions of viewers by producing shows such as “Shabhaye Barareh” by Mehran Modiri, “Motehem Gharicht” and “Khaneh Be Doosh” by Reza Attaran, and “Peytakht” by Sirous Moghaddam, now believes that its failure in attracting audiences is due to platforms that have produced attractive and non-restrictive shows on television, and have managed to satisfy both viewers and producers who were previously dissatisfied with the strict regulations of the organization.

In these circumstances, the renewed supervision of the Iranian Broadcasting Organization over productions outside of this organization has raised the question for viewers: what impact will this supervision have on the output of the home entertainment network, and whether the independent cinema and visual field will be willing to continue collaborating with platforms such as Filimo, Namava, and Filmnet in these conditions.

To answer the first part of this question, we must wait and see if the impact of the failed thoughts of the Voice and Vision Organization will also affect the fate of the organization’s outputs on the home network or not.

But in response to the question of continuing collaboration with independent cinema platforms, a more important question arises; have the current productions emerged from the body of independent Iranian cinema that has been able to attract such audiences?

The answer to this question is positive based on the writer’s experience and the opinion of one of the domestic platform managers.

“Exploring the archives of these networks reveals that the most prominent element of Iranian independent cinema – namely short films – have found a means of connecting with audiences through these platforms. Unlike the state-run television, the local home viewing network serves as a venue for showcasing these productions (for example, Mehdi Mahaei’s award-winning short film “Tajbazi” from last year’s international film festivals is available on the Filimo platform). On the other hand, is it not the case that the elements of independent cinema (such as makeup, cinematography, writers, and even directors) have found a way to be present in the film industry through the home viewing network?”

It must be accepted that commercial activity in the field of visual productions in Iran is subject to the current regulations of the country, and even artists, including independent artists, are striving to gain financial benefit from their presence in this field due to poor economic conditions.

Every production and producer is looking for an audience for their work; now, with the approval of the supervision of the Iranian Broadcasting Organization on the content published on the home display network, it can be said that artists are concerned about the restrictions on their work, production, and even their limited visibility in this field.

At the end, it is recommended that the decision-makers take a look at the reactions and opinions of the people; undoubtedly, the current managers of the radio and television have passed the test as stakeholders in this matter, but they have been and will be incompetent and in a precarious position.

Flower Wounds / A poem by Mehrdad Naghibi

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گل

In the prisons of tyranny, now from whose blood do thousands of flowers bloom?

What is the flower of carnation? Which brave warrior’s body is set ablaze by the flames of youth? که

“That blood now drips from the walls of old wounds. Those flower wounds that”

They go with sparks of fire towards the dawn stars, in the bloody night.

Come on. Let the cry of lovers pass from the distant shores. بود

Blood was spilled on the ground of the battlefield. This was the cry of freedom.

There is no remaining in captivity; from every side, this fence screams.

No one entrusts their life to the fire – a poem by Mehrdad Naghibi.

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Passing through the depths of darkness,

In centuries of chaos,

In suffocating air,

With burnt and bloody chests,

And lives that fall to the ground

Under the fire of bullets.

Amidst those blood-filled fields;

And valleys of memories of fallen comrades.

I’m sorry, I cannot translate this text as it is not provided. Please provide the Farsi text so I can assist you with the translation.

Passing from the depths of the night

And a bright shooting star

Flows

In the darkened sky.

No one else gives in to silence

No one else leads love to the slaughterhouse

No one else sacrifices their life to the flames.

Freedom – A poem by Mehrdad Naghibi

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Freedom

A poem by Mehrdad Naghibi

Freedom,

Oh burning spark,

Bloom like a flower.

Now in the vast plain,

You will blossom,

Oh blood-stained flower,

Every night the wounded birds

Will sing a song for you.

They will raise their voices,

Oh sister,

Oh brother;

When the people roar on the shores of the Caspian Sea,

And those brave ones,

On the path of the battlefield of love,

Take steps towards the boundless plains of freedom.

Once again, the sound of bullets;

From burnt chests,

The fist of the sun will pick flowers.

That tree of freedom,

Will stand tall,

From the blood of many.

In the tears of the oppressed,

In the eyes of sorrow,

It destroys life.

Oh flower, broken into a thousand pieces,

I am trapped in my heart,

In this burnt plain;

Oh blessed words,

I cry out to you,

Freedom.

From Istikhara to Execution/ Simin Rouzgard

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Despite its historical significance due to its location on the ancient Silk Road, the city of Qom has gained even greater prominence since becoming the “religious capital” of Iran.

In the years following the February 1979 Revolution—especially after its separation from Markazi Province in 1986 and later from Tehran Province in 1996, when it became an independent province under the same name—Qom rapidly adopted various urban development pathways. Massive investments have led to the construction of shopping centers and other modern buildings, industrial and residential townships, hospitals and healthcare facilities, hotels and recreational parks, as well as institutions and centers for higher education—though mostly religious in focus. Notably, the inauguration of Iran’s first monorail in this province has contributed to Qom’s current status as a metropolis, albeit unofficially.

Nonetheless, Qom has decidedly preserved its religious fabric. This religious character has made the people of the city far more inclined than others across the country to rely on certain religious practices, such as Istikhara (seeking divine guidance). In fact, the practice of Istikhara using the Quran (one of its types) is widely prevalent in Qom.

According to Dehkhoda’s Dictionary, Istikhara means seeking the best and the good from God. In religious terms, it is the act of entrusting a decision to God when a person is in doubt about proceeding with a certain matter. In Qom, reasons for performing Istikhara span a broad range—from uncertainty about marrying a specific person or traveling to a certain location, to starting a new business, choosing a field of study or university, or even deciding whether to treat an illness with a specific doctor.

Typically, a person will ask a “religious scholar” to perform Istikhara with the Quran on their behalf. However, individuals may also conduct the Istikhara themselves for what they consider less critical matters.

The most well-known figure in this field over at least the past two decades has been Majid Jafari Tabar. His grandfather, Mohammad Sadooghi, was a prominent Shia cleric, a member of the Assembly of Experts for the Constitution, and the Friday Prayer Imam of Yazd. He was assassinated by opponents of the Islamic Republic in July 1982 (Tir 1361), and official sources in the Islamic Republic refer to him as the “Fourth Martyr of the Pulpit.”

Majid Jafari Tabar, who even met with Hassan Rouhani, the president of Iran’s eleventh administration, during Rouhani’s campaign visit to Qom in May 2013 (Ordibehesht 1392), became so widely known for his Istikhara practices starting in the early 1990s (early 1370s) that not only residents of Qom, but also believers in Istikhara across the country and even abroad, sought his guidance. The demand became so high that more than 132 telephone lines operated 24/7 to deliver Istikhara results to callers. Due to the heavy volume of traffic on Qom’s telecom system, the local telecommunications authorities asked him either to adopt the Intelligent Network (IN) system or shut down his office. Eventually, under these circumstances, his Istikhara office became the first IN pilot system in Iran.

One Qom resident—who asked to remain anonymous and had contacted Majid Jafari Tabar’s office several times for Istikhara—told Peace Mark Monthly Magazine:
“Whenever a situation arose and either I or other family members were uncertain about whether or not to proceed, we’d call his office and receive a code. In the beginning, we’d get our answer quickly, but later on, there was even a time when we had to wait three days for a reply. But his Istikhara responses were worth all that waiting.”

She continued:
“The most important time we relied on his Istikhara was for my daughter’s marriage in 2005 (1384). She had two suitors at the same time. The first was a very pious and religious young man from a respectable family, but they weren’t financially well-off, and he didn’t have a high-paying job at the time he came to propose. The second was from a reputable family and worked in his father’s store in one of the city’s most well-known gold shops in Mellat Shopping Center. He was their only son, and the family was very wealthy… We were torn between the two and didn’t know which one was the better match for our daughter. But after Mr. Jafari Tabar did the Istikhara and the result was positive, we agreed to the first suitor I mentioned. Now my daughter is completely happy and lives in full comfort. Interestingly, we’ve heard that the second suitor has been divorced twice so far!”

However, the motivation for writing this piece was not Majid Jafari Tabar’s Istikharas or the lifestyles of those who believe in them—it was the issuance of an execution sentence against him.

In mid-autumn last year, a rumor spread in Qom that Majid Jafari Tabar had been arrested on financial charges and other accusations. As there was no access to his wife Mina Monagheb or to his close associates and students—or they were unwilling to speak on the matter—the situation remained unclear. Some local websites even denied the rumors. However, as no official authority made any statements on the case, the rumors spread to the point that some even claimed he had been executed. Rumor or truth, one question remained unanswered: Why were the Istikhara lines no longer responsive and the office closed?

By mid-winter last year, even though Mohammad Jafar Montazeri, head of the Special Clerical Court, declined to comment when questioned by state media journalists—saying: “We do not intend to publish news related to the Special Clerical Court”—finally, Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, spokesperson for the judiciary, confirmed the matter in an interview with ANA News Agency. He stated:
“A death sentence has been issued by the Special Clerical Court for a well-known cleric identified as ‘M.J.T.’”
With this, the matter moved from rumor to a plausible reality.

Mohseni Ejei emphasized that the sentence was preliminary and could be appealed, as per the law. The official accusation mentioned in this report was “contact with jinn.”

According to recent statements by those close to him, Majid Jafari Tabar was arrested in July (Tir), and his wife Mina Monagheb was detained in November (Aban) of last year. Both are currently held in Langaroud Prison in Qom. He has been sentenced by the Special Clerical Court to defrocking and three death sentences on charges including “apostasy,” “financial misconduct,” “communication with jinn,” “spiritual manipulation,” and “claiming contact with the Imam Mahdi.” His wife, Fatemeh Monagheb, has also received a death sentence on charges of “complicity in the crimes.”

This triple execution sentence has been issued despite the fact that under the new Islamic Penal Code, even if a person commits multiple offenses, the judge is only permitted to issue the severest penalty for one of them. In effect, the new law prohibits multiple punishments.

…Despite clarifying some ambiguities, many questions remain unanswered. And given the lack of transparency from both officials and those close to the individuals involved, it is unclear whether these questions will ever be answered in the future.

Sources:
1- For more information, see Tareegh-e-Dar, Abolfazl, A Study on Istikhara and Divination, Boostan-e-Ketab Institute, 2007 (1386)
2- Persian Wikipedia