Conversation with Simin Rouzgar.

Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari, a writer, researcher, and religious scholar, is the first representative of the first term of the Islamic Consultative Assembly in Iran. His speech at the Berlin Conference caused a lot of controversy; after the conference, Mr. Eshkevari was arrested and initially sentenced to death by the Tehran clergy court. This sentence was overturned in the court of appeals.

From Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari, who was known as a “revolutionary cleric” before the revolution, numerous works including “Striving for Freedom” and “Intellect at the Feast of Religion” have been published so far.

Given the subject of the special issue of the Khat-e-Solh magazine, we have approached this religious scholar and examined the views of the clergy before the revolution regarding the feudal system and the reasons for their opposition to the land reforms of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi – which are referred to as the “collapse of the feudal system” -.

The land reforms of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi – which led to the abolition of the landlord and peasant system – faced opposition from religious authorities, particularly Ayatollah Boroujerdi. This opposition was so serious that the Shah of Iran and his government suspended the project until the death of Ayatollah Boroujerdi. As the first question, it can be asked that considering the fact that the abolition of the landlord and peasant system should have been a positive step (regardless of other positive or negative aspects of the White Revolution), why did the clergy oppose these reforms at that time?

In response to your question and the reason for the opposition of scholars and clerics to the land reforms project at that time period, three points should be mentioned as reasons.

The first reason for the opposition of scholars to land reforms is the sanctity of ownership in Islamic jurisprudence and law. In Islamic jurisprudence and law, which took shape in the second and third centuries (something that we at least know today as Islamic law) and in the minds of scholars, the issue of ownership is very serious, important and central, and as I mentioned, the issue has even gone beyond and become a sacred principle. For this reason, even in jurisprudence, there is a rule called “the rule of possession” based on the hadith “people are in control of their possessions”, meaning that whatever a person possesses, as long as it is not proven otherwise, is considered part of their possessions. For example, if I have a book in my possession, as long as you see that book in my hand or in my library, the rule is that you should consider it my property, unless someone comes and complains and proves that the book is not mine

Of course, some Muslims, and even Muslim clerics, in the past sixty to seventy years have not considered the rule of ownership to be so sacred. For example, Dr. Shariati had a completely different interpretation of this hadith. He believed that “al-nas” as a plural noun, means that society and people, as a collective identity, have control over their possessions, not individuals. This is, in any case, a leftist and socialist interpretation and has emerged in opposition to the traditional legal rule in the past few decades. But as I mentioned, scholars and jurists considered this rule to be very sacred and for this reason, during the land reform, they saw it as contrary to the principles of jurisprudence, Sharia, and Islam, and opposed it. When they saw that the government intended to redistribute ownership and take away lands that were in the hands of certain individuals or families through inheritance, they took a stance against it and said that according to the rule of

The second factor that opposes the land reform bill is the preservation of the clergy and the tradition of maintaining the current state. In general, regardless of the first rule, Muslim clerics, both Shia and Sunni, especially the Shia who emerged in the fifth century during the Al-Booyeh dynasty, have always been linked to governments and states and have been guardians of the current state. Therefore, although they did not have a direct role in the executive and legislative bodies, they were one of the members of the ruling council. This situation was even strengthened during the Safavid era, when they became closely linked to the institution of power and monarchy. Of course, such forces are conservative because they do not want to change and do not want the current situation to change. Our clerics during the time we are talking about were also very conservative, with the late Ayatollah Boroujerdi at the forefront as the inheritor of a long-standing Shia intellectual and jurisprudential tradition. Naturally

The third issue is the class link between scholars and clergy with the upper classes, including owners, merchants, and rulers. This class link naturally protects the interests of the clerical class, and when scholars and clergy saw that a significant change was about to happen, they opposed it. This was because they saw their own class interests being threatened by these radical changes.

You mentioned a good point about the connection between the clergy and the ruling class. Based on this, and considering that at that time there was a clear system of masters and subjects and obvious exploitation by the upper classes, can it be said that the clergy never separately and openly demanded an end to this system and the exploitation of the people?

It is the same. Clerics and scholars from the 1920s to the revolution, fundamentally did not have any opposition to the ruling system, and clerics were a part of the ruling council, although they were not part of the government structure. Of course, it is necessary to mention that by clerics, we do not mean the entire group of clerics, meaning those who were considered conservative, but rather the upper class of the clergy. In any case, not all clerics are in the same category, and by my intention, I mean the religious authorities, first-class scholars, especially the great scholars in cities like Qom, Isfahan, Tehran, Shiraz, and Mashhad, who had an influence both in their city and province, and in the whole country.

Even from the time before the Constitutional Revolution, when the winds of change were blowing in Iran and some intellectuals, merchants, and individuals under the influence of the West wanted to create a series of changes or reforms in the social and political system of the country, the clergy always stood firm against these changes, except on the brink of the Constitutional Revolution when some clerics like Seyyed Mohammad Tabatabai, Seyyed Abdullah Behbahani, Seyyed Jamal Va’ez Esfahani, and Sheikh Mohammad Va’ez in Tehran gradually joined in with these reforms and changes, and later on, people like Nayini and Akhund Khorasani also joined them in Iraq and Najaf. In fact, because they came and joined, the Constitutional Revolution was victorious. Until the time of the revolution, the situation continued in the same way, and in this particular case, not only were the clergy not in favor of changing the existing situation and the feudal system, but they

Of course, I should also add that the ugliness and badness of the feudal system or the exploitation issue were not things that were present in our Iranian-Islamic or Shia culture. All of these concepts emerged during the Constitutional period and especially after September 1320, when the Tudeh Party and leftist movement became active in Iran and were influenced by modern leftist thinking. Therefore, the clergy were not familiar with these terms and literature; but since these ideas were introduced, most of the clergy opposed them. The reason for this was that they saw these thoughts as communist, atheistic, and anti-Islamic. In the 1940s and 1950s, when I was in Qom, I witnessed the stance of the clergy against Islamic leftist ideas, which had emerged in the 1920s through the Socialist God Worshipers Party and later through Shariati, Mojahedin, and Jamaat-e Bab. Of course, there was also a small group of clergy who

Some researchers have attributed Ayatollah Boroujerdi’s opposition to the land reform bill to the potential harm it may cause to endowments and the removal of remaining endowments from the control of scholars and jurists. What is your opinion on this matter?

Here, a general ruling cannot be issued in this manner. As I mentioned, one of the reasons for opposition was truly theoretical, ideological, and religious. This means that since the scholars considered themselves as defenders of religion and Sharia, they opposed it due to the contradiction of land reforms and the removal of ownership from owners with religious criteria. In fact, when they saw that the government, which should be the defender of ownership and also the supporter of Sharia, was violating these laws, they felt responsible and in order to prevent it from going against Sharia, they opposed it.

In the past, until the time of Ayatollah Khomeini and specifically in the year 1348, none of the scholars claimed monarchy for themselves; they accepted the concept of “Velayat-e Faqih” (Guardianship of the Jurist) but did not interpret it as a form of monarchy. From the early Safavid era and during the reign of Shah Tahmasb, the scholar Muhaqqiq Karaki also mentioned the concept of “Velayat-e Faqih” as a form of ruling, but did not claim that we have the right to rule ourselves. They believed that the position of the ruler has its own place and our job is something else. In fact, they considered the management of the country and religious affairs as the right of the rulers, but with the condition that they follow the scholars in religious matters. We can see the peak of this theory during the reign of Shah Fath Ali, in the book “Awa’id

I have mentioned all of these points to emphasize that while the issue of class interests that I have referred to is important, we must not forget that all of these oppositions were not solely driven by self-interest or personal gain. In fact, one of the main factors was the issue of ideology and beliefs that was mentioned. In the 1940s and 1950s, the opposition and lack of support from scholars and jurists of that time, such as Ayatollah Golpayegani, Ayatollah Khansari, and Ayatollah Sharifmadari in Iran, as well as Ayatollah Khoei and Ayatollah Hakim in Iraq, towards Ayatollah Khomeini, who was in radical opposition to the Shah’s regime, also stemmed from this ideological foundation. The purpose of my discussion here is not to evaluate or judge whether these oppositions were good or bad; my point is that the Shia clergy is conservative and opposes any kind of radical

The issue of endowments, which you mentioned, is very important. Endowments, which had increased significantly during the Safavid era in Iran, were under the control of the clergy until the time of Reza Shah, the monarch of the Qajar dynasty. According to the concept of endowments, the responsibility for managing them was usually given to the local clergy. For example, the endowments of the Holy Shrine of Imam Reza, which are currently under the control of the Supreme Leader, were previously managed by the clergy and later by the Shah and his court. These endowments naturally brought many benefits and, according to Islamic law, they should have been used for the same purpose for which they were endowed. However, there were major reasons for opposition to this, as it should be noted that limiting the political, economic, social, and cultural power of the clergy had started during the reign of Reza Shah, and one of its manifestations was the establishment of the

How much did the establishment of the Endowment Department, as you mentioned, weaken the economic interests of the clergy at that time?

See, since they were always one of the main sources of financial support for the faithful clergy, the government usually did not provide much assistance to the clergy; however, in some cases it could help. For example, in the 1940s and 1950s, the endowment administration provided financial assistance to some of the religious authorities or students, but especially in the 1950s when the struggles intensified, no student dared to take money from the endowment administration and if anyone did, it was done secretly; because in the seminary of Qom, it was believed that such a student was an “endowment” and as a result, he did not have any protection and it was very likely that he would be beaten in the streets. In fact, the students who followed Ayatollah Khomeini, as we have seen, became revolutionary after the revolution and have been ruling with that ideology and method for thirty-eight years now, and at that time they were also subject

Of course, also consider that at least during the time that I witnessed it, the financial resources of the clergy were not from feudal lords, but mostly from merchants, middle classes, or some religious factory owners who were believers and religious. And of course, for example, a hundred to two hundred years before the feudal system was much more prevalent, the story was certainly a little different and the large landowners had a much more prominent role in providing financial resources for the clergy. In fact, after the constitutional period and before the implementation of land reforms, the feudal system was in decline. I want to say that these land reforms were not by the will of the Shah himself, but under the influence of external pressures and the US democratic government, and to create a security belt against Soviet infiltration and the Tudeh Party and the left, he was forced to give in to it. On the other hand, the continuation of this feudal system did not bring them much income and was not profitable.

It means that you believe that the land reforms had no real impact on dismantling the feudal system and did not weaken the financial structure of the clergy?

The system of feudalism officially existed, but according to Marxist thinkers, its historical period had ended in the 1930s and 1940s, and the era of feudal lords was almost coming to an end. With the arrival of Reza Shah, the country had become modernized, and in the West, the feudal system had almost collapsed. As a result, in Iran, the feudal and feudalistic system could no longer continue. The feudal era had turned into a bourgeois system, and the bourgeoisie, in a historical process, had to become a capitalist system. If you look at the factory owners in Iran in the 1940s and 1950s, most of them were old feudal lords or their children. On the other hand, these sons of feudal lords had often gone to Europe and had received a Western education (or at least had studied at Iranian universities). Anyone who had gone to Europe, despite being from a noble family, no longer shared the same thoughts as

Consider Reza Shah himself, who, despite being a simple Kazakh and unknown (as it is said, he was a child of the road), reached the throne. When he became the Minister of War and even ascended to the throne, he had nothing. But fifteen years later, when he was deposed and exiled outside of Iran, he became the greatest feudal lord in Iran because he had taken over many of the lands of these same families. However, his son, Mohammad Reza, was educated in the West and did not have the same character and temperament as his father. He saw that he could not keep all the lands that had been passed down to him from his father, so he took the lead in dividing the land. Of course, even from an economic standpoint, maintaining this system was no longer profitable, and due to the arrival of a new style of agriculture and mechanization, it was not possible to maintain the lands in a traditional way. As a result,

See, when the system of masters and subjects changed, it is true that the subjects became landowners, but the same old masters in the village took their money and came to the city and became factory owners. Because, in exchange for their lands, they would receive a small amount of money from the people and the government – which, of course, was not a large sum. In this regard, the king would take ownership documents and go from one city to another. A commotion had also arisen and the people were on the move, thinking that the king wants to make us landowners and save us, but these clerics wouldn’t allow it. The king’s regime also spread propaganda that these clerics had taken money from the landowners and later it was said that, for example, they had started the revolution on June 5th with the money of the landowners (which I don’t believe, or if they did have a role and there were instigations, at least

Most importantly, during the 1940s and 1950s, there was a strong economic connection between the clergy and the market (although this connection existed even before the constitutional revolution). This class paid a significant amount of religious funds to the clergy. I remember that Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani, in the early months after the victory of the revolution, in his speech at the Feyziyeh School in Qom, described the market as coming and kissing the hand of the Imam and receiving a message in return. This statement was a reality, as the merchants not only kissed the hand of Mr. Khomeini, but also the hands of other religious authorities, and gave them money and received messages. At one point, Mr. Asghar Aulaadi correctly said that the market is the club of the clergy. Essentially, who funded the expenses of Mr. Khomeini and his followers during that time? Well, the merchants did! Who even funded the budget

You mentioned in your conversations that the clergy was essentially a defender of the ruling system and its subjects, and you also mentioned various reasons for this. If we consider the subjects as some sort of slaves during that period, can we say that the clergy, based on the seven famous narrations in Islam, including “a slave is born from slaves”, believes in the legitimacy and position of slavery?

Yes, what is certain today is that in Islamic jurisprudence and law, the system of slavery has been accepted. This issue can be traced back to the Prophet’s tradition, as well as various verses in the Quran regarding the rules of slaves, concubines, mukatabs, and war captives who are divided as spoils of war among the Muslim fighters. However, this short answer is not sufficient and requires further explanation. In my belief, from an ideological and worldview perspective, buying and selling human beings cannot be justified. Even multiple verses in the Quran reject earthly servitude and slavery, and since terms like “abd” and “mawla” are also used in Shia jurisprudence, this kind of servitude can be rejected because it ultimately belongs to the state of God. Iqbal Lahori has a long poem addressed to Imam Hussein that begins like this: “Whoever makes a covenant with the Existence of God, his neck is freed from the

“Good, on one hand you say that slavery is accepted in jurisprudence and sharia, but on the other hand you consider it illegitimate. How do you resolve this contradiction?”

My response to this question or contradiction is that what I said was from an ideological and worldview perspective, which is an idealistic matter or, in other words, abstract. This means that in the Islamic and Quranic anthropological system, there is no place for slavery in terms of values and thoughts, and the explanation that women and children are considered as war spoils among the fighters is not compatible with such a fundamental belief. However, when this system wants to be implemented in society, there is a long way to go until reaching that ideal and abstract system.

It can be said in a general sense that the Prophet of Islam, like all prophets and social reformers, did not intend to create a new society in a burnt land and educate a specific group of people. He was sent to a particular society, in the seventh century AD, in the Arabian Peninsula, where there were specific requirements, laws, and regulations in all matters. The Prophet did not bring any new laws in many social, legal, and regulatory areas, such as family, economy, and politics. All of these, as mentioned in jurisprudence, are part of the secondary laws of Islam that require detailed discussion. For example, imagine that cutting off the hand of a thief or many other laws and regulations existed in the past and Islam has also accepted them and tried to reform them; just as women did not have the right to own property according to the laws of pre-Islamic Arabia and were deprived of inheritance, Islam has considered these rights for women (even though the inheritance of

Based on this, the issue has been the same in regards to the system of slavery. The economic system among the tribes of Quraysh, especially in Mecca, was essentially a system of slavery and slave trade was a common practice at that time. After taking power, he could not suddenly overthrow the system of slavery. In fact, at that time, the system of slavery was dominant in the whole world and in no country, not even in America – which had such a system until the past century – could they overthrow such a system.

However, in Islam, measures were also considered to gradually abolish the system of slavery. Unfortunately, in practice, this did not happen and the process of change and developments in the Islamic caliphate went in a way that not only did the system of slavery not disappear, but it continued with even more power and may have even been strengthened. Even later, the scholars were in agreement with the rulers and worked towards expanding and developing this system, as under the shadow of the Islamic caliphate and conquests, it was necessary to maintain the legitimacy of the system of slavery. As a result, the honor of abolishing slavery did not become our share as Muslims.

Thank you for the opportunity you have given us in the monthly magazine of “Peace Line”.