The Tabas mine disaster, which claimed the lives of 52 hardworking individuals, brought the term “miner” and the concept of “hard labor” into the spotlight for a while in the minds of the public and the media. Following the incident, as videos of the victims’ families circulated, a crucial question became even more prominent: Why must a worker, with minimal wages, live either in fear of imprisonment or fear for their life?

Now, a month after the incident, with no definitive cause officially announced yet, more questions are emerging among labor experts and activists. The resolution of these questions may depend on the final findings of the incident’s cause. Questions such as: Can we call something that could have been prevented an accident? Specifically, which institutions and organizations should be held accountable for the deaths of 52 workers? Can we even hold these institutions accountable? After such incidents, how can we expect a worker to risk their life in a mine when workplace safety is absent?

To find appropriate answers, Peace Mark Monthly Magazine spoke with Ebrahim Rahimian, head of the Workers’ House in Tabas. It’s worth mentioning that Rahimian himself lost a brother in a similar accident in 2012. Below is his analysis of the causes of the Tabas mine disaster and the working conditions in the mine.

The Incident Was Exactly Like Previous Accidents

This labor activist initially agrees with the premise that the accident was a repetition of past mistakes that could have been prevented. He says, “Although the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the incident at the Tabas mine was similar to the previous one in 2012, I can’t say anything with absolute certainty. It depends on what is officially stated as the cause of this incident. In the similar 2012 incident, which I witnessed, the evidence was the same. From what I and my colleagues investigated through on-site presence, the incident was exactly like the previous ones, except that in 2012, the gas came from the worksite itself, not from behind it.”

Regarding whether the necessary infrastructure and technology existed to prevent this disaster, he comments, “The necessary infrastructure was fully present. For example, there was oversight. My guess regarding the cause is related to the collapse of the zone or the failure to collapse the extraction zone in the workshop. Probably the collapse zone was about 10 or 20 meters, and it was supposed to sink behind the workshop, but suddenly the upper wall and a significant part of it, along with the upper coal layer, collapsed, releasing a massive amount of gas, which led to the accident.”

He adds, “The infrastructure, such as proper ventilation at that temperature, could have been in place, but what caused this tragic event was the sudden release of gas from the upper layer during the collapse, which should have been managed in advance. In mining terminology, initially, the upper wall of the coal layer gently releases itself and then settles calmly. The gaps between the layers fill slowly and gradually. The infrastructure existed, but a lack of management caused this incident.”

The Fourth Side: The Worker

Ebrahim Rahimian believes that holding higher-ups accountable is impossible because the workers themselves must answer to them. Therefore, it is essential that the worker be considered as the fourth element in the engineering system: “When the worker is the one answering to the supervisor and employer, it’s impossible to hold them accountable. I suggested to the Ministry of Labor and the Engineering System that we define a fourth element—presence of the worker.”

He continues, “In the similar 2012 incident, workers said they were forced to work. When we said we wouldn’t work because the workshop had issues, they told us to pack up and go home if we didn’t want to work. This lack of job security forces the worker to accept the job because they have no other choice. If one side is safety, one is engineering oversight, and another is the Ministry of Labor, then the fourth side, which is the worker, must also be considered. If in this recent incident the safety manager had said not to work and shut down the workshop, maybe the accident could have been prevented. I run a small company myself, and when I see there’s a problem, I immediately stop work until the contractor fixes the issue. But here, even the safety manager doesn’t have the authority to stop work because they are dependent on the contractor and employer for their livelihood. At best, they’ll be tolerated for a week, and then they’ll be fired the following week for stopping the work.”

Is It Economically Feasible to Exploit These Resources?

Mines similar to the one in Tabas are considered dangerous due to the nature of their walls and the amount of methane gas trapped in the layers, according to experts. At the same time, mining these resources is said to be economically viable. However, these expert opinions don’t consider the human dignity of those working in such environments. Ebrahim Rahimian points out that the coal in Tabas is “gas-prone” and believes that mining these resources has been, is, and will be profitable, but coal prices need to be reformed: “With proper ventilation and safety measures, secure extraction can begin. A state-owned company faced a similar incident a week earlier, with a large gas release, but because they had good ventilation systems and well-trained workers, the accident was controlled. Workers need to be trained. Sometimes workers are given rudimentary training and aren’t fully informed about the equipment they carry, so they can’t act properly during an accident.”

He adds, “Where the accident happened, 22 people were present, and they were the main victims of the incident. But due to mismanagement, carbon monoxide gas leaked into another block, killing another 30 people and poisoning others. The accident occurred in Block C, and by the next morning, we were still recovering bodies from Block B.”

Regarding the quality and importance of mine inspections, Rahimian states: “It was said at the time that an inspection was conducted on May 20th, but the day after the accident, a report was published indicating another inspection had been done in August, and issues were noted. Why weren’t these issues addressed? If the problems had been resolved, why did the accident happen? This is why I emphasize defining the worker as a parameter in safety and engineering oversight. This way, the worker has a reason to say, ‘The engineering and safety authorities told us there are unresolved issues, so we won’t work.’ This could save lives or at least reduce the number of casualties.”

Rahimian also attributes the lack of proper training as a factor but not the main cause of the accident: “Maybe a small percentage of the cause was due to a lack of training, but that’s not the main issue. It mostly comes down to a lack of safety. The safety officer also died, so it’s hard to pinpoint who’s at fault. Training is the least of the problems.” He adds, “Madanjo is a reputable company that’s operated for 27 years with few accidents. Saying there were no accidents is an outright lie because I remember two cases of paralysis and one fatality with full names.”

Will There Be Volunteers to Work in Mines After the Tabas Incident?

In closing, Ebrahim Rahimian highlights the hardships of working in a mine and the impact of repeated tragic accidents on the “culture of mining labor.” He says, “One thing I strongly believe in is that in such incidents, not only do human lives and equipment get lost, but the work culture also deteriorates. Right now, mining companies will struggle to find workers after this incident. In job placement offices, when we offer mining jobs, people say they no longer want to work in mines. No one dares to work in mines anymore.”

He adds, “The destruction of work culture isn’t easily repaired. Even if no accident happens for 3 or 4 decades, mining might regain its strength, but then another accident occurs, and the effort to build a work culture is ruined again. These accidents must be prevented. Right now, many of the surviving workers in the company where the accident happened are unwilling to continue working in the mine.”

What we can conclude from this interview is that the Tabas mine explosion was not merely an “accident,” considering its similarities to previous incidents. Additionally, it’s clear that the qualifications of mining companies need to be reexamined to ensure continued operations meet safety, engineering, financial, and technical standards. These points raise the alarming question: Will future disasters like the one in the Tabas mine happen again?