Nader Vahabi, a graduate in Political Science and holds a Master’s and Doctorate degree in Political Sociology from the University of Nantes and the Faculty of Humanities in Paris. He defended his doctoral thesis on the collective memories of Iranian refugees in 2004, which was published in French by Armand Colin under the title “Sociology of Disjointed Identities” in 2008.

This sociologist, an expert in contemporary Iranian migration, has various articles and books on Iranian migration, political crimes, executions, exile, political Islam, social movements in Iran, and other related topics in French, English, and Persian languages.

He is currently conducting research and teaching at the Faculty of Humanities in Paris and the University of Toulouse in France…

Mr. Vahabi, what is the number and percentage of Iranians living outside the country in your statistics, and how many of these individuals are refugees or, in other words, are residing or even citizens of a country other than Iran due to asylum rights?

Based on official sources and a ten-year research conducted by myself, it can be estimated that the population of Iranian immigrants at the end of 2014 was approximately 4.8 million, which is equivalent to about 6% of the total population of Iran. This immigrant population, residing in the eight main “magnet” countries (neighboring countries, North America, Europe, Middle East, Far East, Oceania, Latin America, and Africa), includes approximately 3.8 million individuals who have legal residency and are considered citizens of the host society. The remaining one million individuals are considered “floating population” and include Iranians with temporary residency, rejected residency requests, individuals without residency permits, and undocumented Iranians. Out of this number, approximately 600,000 individuals (10-12%) are political refugees.

This population, who consider themselves as part of “Iranian identity”, includes four generations of Iranian immigrants and their descendants (from World War II until now), whether they were born in Iran or abroad and whether they have obtained citizenship or not. The non-democratic structure of the Iranian government, which sees opposition as a threat to its own structure, the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq, changes in the Iranian population, urbanization, religious interference in the daily lives of Iranians, and the failure of individuals to develop and secure necessary freedoms to choose their own way of life, are structural and individual factors that have contributed to the reproduction of this migratory society in the past 37 years.

From the revolution of Bahman 57 until now, in which years and mostly for what reason, have a larger number of Iranians sought asylum in various countries, including Turkey, which is considered a gateway? Can we consider several stages for this 37-year period in which a wider spectrum of a particular group with common problems and concerns have left Iran?

Since the beginning of the Islamic Republic’s rule, we have witnessed various waves of migration according to the following table, each of which, with a minimum of 5000 people, reflects the special political and social conditions prevailing in Iran. These waves are not only indicative of the political and social tendencies of migrants, but also reflect the level of psychological, social, and economic pressure imposed on individuals in various social classes, which leads to migration.

Table of Political Asylum Requests between 1361 and 1390 (Source: High Commissioner for Refugees)

First wave: From a few months before the revolution of 1357 to 1367.

The dynamism and movement of Iranian migration towards a comprehensive societal understanding has been greatly influenced by a significant political turning point, which was the 1357 Revolution. The analysis of the Iranian revolution and its movement towards political suppression is beyond the scope of this discussion, but it can be briefly emphasized that in a country like Iran, which had experienced the authoritarian modernism of the Shah regime, the pattern that emerged after the revolution was that of a semi-democratic power, which seemed to have some democratic characteristics and the ability to move towards forms that had the potential to become more democratic. These two conflicting aspects, at the forefront of power and from the very beginning of the establishment of the Islamic Republic, with the process of power monopoly by the ruling clerics and especially after the fall of the Bazaar government in November 1358, led to the emergence of non-democratic and even anti-democratic institutions (such as the institution of the Supreme Leader, Hezbollah, the Revolutionary Guards, Basij,

The peak of this conflict was in Khordad 1360 (May/June 1981) with the removal of the first elected president, Abolhassan Banisadr, by the order of Ayatollah Khomeini. This marks the stage of the common phase of all major revolutions in the sociological analysis of society, and it is when the revolution steps into the era of terror and the interpretation of “the revolution eats its own children” is realized in Iran as well. Within the framework of this widespread political suppression, the first major wave of migration from Iran began. The migration of the middle class urban population to neighboring countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, Dubai, European countries (specifically France, Germany, Sweden, England, Belgium), Canada, and the United States began. This wave constitutes an important part of Iranian migration, especially for those who have more financial means and are mostly from the affluent classes of society.

Alongside the aforementioned political factor, we must also mention another factor which was the cause of the invasion of Saddam Hussein’s army and the occupation of a part of western Iran, following the provocations of the Iranian Revolution in October 1980. This invasion created extraordinary conditions in the country, leading to a bloody war that lasted for eight years and created an exceptional period in the contemporary history of Iran. This war undoubtedly strengthened the legitimacy of the regime and gave it the opportunity to carry out the most severe and unprecedented suppression in the contemporary history of Iran. One of the consequences of this war was a feeling of fear and terror among the affluent classes of society (fear of parents for the death of their children on the war fronts, loss of jobs and job stability), which led them to also emigrate from Iran.

Therefore, with loyalty to a systematic and chronological approach, the largest wave of migration began a few months before the revolution and in its course, with the division of society into “revolutionary and anti-revolutionary” and later “self and non-self” sections and layers of society are separated from it and pave the way for their exit. This large wave of refugee influx in the middle of the 1360s is a reflection of a diverse and conflicting set of political tendencies; from traditional right-wing to anti-revolutionary monarchist tendencies, purged technocrats after the revolution (accused of complicity with the Shah regime), revolutionaries who had participated in it in a constructive manner, and also includes radical leftists who were involved in the revolution but were expelled and removed from the social body. Statistically, for the first time, the High Commissioner for Refugees reports a figure of 47,000 in 1366, which is unprecedented in the history of political migration in Iran

The main reason for migration in this period is mostly political, and the political-economic profile of the majority of participants in research samples in Europe indicates that this wave of migration consists of individuals belonging to the urban middle class, who are mostly educated and familiar with Western lifestyle, but this has not prevented them from experiencing a decline in their social status in the host society.

Second wave: Post-Khomeini wave

From 1367 to 1376

Alongside the first wave, which was essentially political in nature and aimed at suppressing all aspects of the 1960s, the second wave was the result of a regional factor, the end of the Iran-Iraq war in July 1988, and an internal factor, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini one year later, in 1989. The Islamic Republic reached political stability and with the arrival of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as the new president in 1989, a period of reform and distancing from revolutionary slogans began. It should be noted that in addition to these two factors, there was also a technical factor, the democratization of passports for all Iranians, which allowed for free emigration from Iran. Therefore, the roots of emigration in this wave can be traced back to economic, social, and cultural factors, which were a reflection of a harsh and unyielding interpretation of Islam by the Islamic Republic, which manifested itself in the daily lives of

The important point is that in this wave of migration, while the social-economic face of the middle class still exists, even the poor layers are also entering the migration trains. For the first time in contemporary Iranian history, human trafficking and the term “flying people” become a full-fledged industry.

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Third: Pasha Khatami (from 1997 to 2009)

This wave roughly begins from the start of the student movement’s defeat on July 9th, 1999 and continues until the end of the 1380s. We can call the migrants of this wave “post-Khatami”. After the Iran-Iraq war and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, a tendency was formed among some intellectuals within the regime to limit the functional valley of Islam in the realm of individual beliefs, and on the other hand, to try to reconcile democracy and civil society with it through a new interpretation of Islam. In other words, this tendency not only believed that Islam is compatible with modernity, but also believed that this reconciliation is necessary for its survival and openly takes the concept of “guardianship of the jurist”. In a political climate like this, the Iranian society faced a political earthquake on May 23rd, 1997, represented by Mohammad Khatami.

Inside Iran, Khatami’s positions on civil society, rule of law, freedom of expression and thought, particularly for women and immigrants who were at risk of leaving Iran, created a sense of change and transformation in society. For the first time, social activists felt that after the initial suppression of the 1960s, they could freely express their opinions. The feeling of social freedoms, which were planned by the government to open “safety valves” to prevent a social explosion, caused the trend of leaving Iran to decrease since Khatami’s arrival, and as a result, the expectation of finding a solution to the problems of the youth from within the government was put to the test.

In a general overview, it can be said that the beginning of Khatami’s presidency was a brake in the ongoing trend of emigration due to lack of understanding of the Wilayat-e-Faqih system. People were temporarily deluded by Khatami’s promises and believed they could achieve their desires in Iran. However, after the suppression of the student movement on July 9, 1999, the society’s mindset towards social reforms was shaken by Khatami. As a result, the pace of emigration returned to its normal course and reached a record of 35,000 political asylum requests in 2001.

It should be noted that field research shows that in addition to the political and social conditions within Iran, changes in the political geography of Europe also had an impact on the trend of this wave. In fact, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which gained independence in 1992, lifted the visa requirement for Iranians in 1999, making it easier for Iranians to migrate illegally to Europe through Bosnia. During this time, we see the presence of immigrants who are not only from the middle class of Tehran or big cities, but mostly from various cities and villages (north, central, and south of Iran) and have a very diverse distribution in terms of urban origins in Iran.

Another characteristic of this wave is the dynamism of the migration process: migrants can reconsider their hopes and goals and change or postpone their initial plans. This is why a large number of migrants who were on their way to Europe (Britain, Sweden, Germany, etc.) or Canada temporarily decided to stay in neighboring countries or in Belgium in order to determine their final destination.

Fourth Wave: Suppression of the Green Movement (from July 2009 until now)

After the suppression of the Green Movement in June 2009, we are faced with a new wave of migrants who, for the fourth consecutive time in the past 37 years, show themselves at a new turning point in the migration curve in 1389, with a figure of 18,000.

Free from these exceptional and extraordinary circumstances, it can be observed that during this period, the registration of demands in various immigration offices has been relatively stable and, compared to past waves, has experienced a slight growth with weak monthly fluctuations after a two-year rush. We are now entering the fourth wave. The socio-economic rate of this wave, as far as it concerns political activists, is made up of young people who did not experience the 1357 revolution and are essentially non-ideological. They joined the protest movement in response to election fraud, which in its course led to political radicalism in certain sectors. This wave, like the previous three, returned to its normal rhythm after a three-year ascent.

In recent years, the term “social refugee” has become more popular than ever before; essentially, what differences can be made between a political refugee and a social refugee considering the current issues in Iran?

A political refugee is defined from three different perspectives in social sciences:

From an international law perspective: The perspective of the dominant power of industrial capitalist countries.

The two World Wars created a massive wave of displacement for humans, causing immeasurable psychological and emotional damage for the European countries involved in the wars. Therefore, after the end of World War II, the question was how to deal with the massive displacement that had occurred. The shadow of fascism was so terrifying and frightening that the prospect of returning to their motherland seemed impossible for people. As a result, a legal framework was established to help provide residence for millions of people. In response to this turmoil, on July 28, 1951, the Geneva Convention was adopted by European countries.

This convention is the first international legal charter that was created following the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948, and with the aim of realizing Article 2 of this declaration.

Despite being a major step in accepting the fundamental principles of human rights, the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights lacked clarity, enforceability, and importance of legal regulations. As a result, it did not hold the signing governments accountable and did not go beyond moral acceptance for the signing countries.

In this field, the 1951 Geneva Convention is adopted. According to this convention, a political refugee is someone who is persecuted for reasons of race, religion, politics, or membership in groups that the government of that country considers to be against them, or social groups that governments are not willing to accept (such as women’s associations, unions, etc.), or who leaves their country out of fear of harm and torture and seeks asylum in another country, in which case they must be protected by the host country.

With the approval of this article, European countries were able to address the legal issue of residence for many individuals and determine the framework for future relocations and its practical application for different individuals.

But the question is: considering the historical and international role of political refugees in both international and domestic changes, how will their political activities continue in the host country and to what extent will the host countries tolerate them? Despite the acceptance of this charter by Western countries, the practical interpretation of this article has always been under the influence of two conflicting factors. These countries are forced to, on the one hand, recognize the inviolable right of political refugees in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and on the other hand, prioritize their own citizens’ problems. This priority, which is often referred to as “national interests and benefits”, especially in election slogans, sometimes takes on serious political implications and in a disturbing compromise between the host country and the immigrant country, puts political life and even exile residence at risk. The constant concern is that at any moment, the individual may become a victim of Western economic interests; something we are currently witnessing after the signing of the nuclear agreement between the Islamic Republic and

From a psychological perspective,

In this regard, most researchers strive to classify political refugees based on criteria such as emotional and affective attachment, psychological and emotional effects, behavioral functions, and other psychological criteria. In other words, psychologists are trying to categorize refugees based on the following three factors: emotional and affective attachment, psychological and emotional effects, and behavioral functions.

First, the degree of dependence of the refugee on their border, homeland, and country.

Second- Acquiring knowledge that his/her residence in the host country will be long-term.

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Third- Level and degree of individual’s adaptability to the norms of the host country and different forms of adaptability.

In fact, the general inclination of psychologists is to examine the past psychological and mental issues of refugees in order to analyze their current situation. Therefore, in most cases, they conclude that the exiled individual is unable or unwilling to achieve active adaptation due to their past circumstances. Some psychologists even go further and provide a type of “damage analysis” of this phenomenon.

From a sociological perspective,

General inclination is an important part of sociologists’ analysis and function of political asylum seekers, which, in comparison to other segments of society in the host country, is seen as a “non-conformist”, “unacceptable” individual or as a “sociological deviant phenomenon”. They view it as a phenomenon outside of the norm and dominant value system, because a political asylum seeker is an individual who is culturally dual and humanly inclined towards marginalization and isolation rather than towards society.

This inclination, which represents the viewpoint of “human rights” in the ruling countries of advanced capitalist systems, shows a greater interest in the physical and “biological” presence of political asylum seekers in the host country, compared to their political activities against their own country’s regime. From this perspective, such an extreme and negative interpretation of asylum seekers causes this part of sociologists to consider their transformation as a principle, not their standing on their political lines, which they interpret as extreme positions. In other words, this tendency is more interested in political asylum seekers entering the job market through the process of adaptation in the host country and finding a new social identity. In fact, just as we saw from a legal perspective in political asylum, the majority of Western governments implicitly want political activists to respect the red lines of residency and not create diplomatic tensions in their country during exile (and in our case, the Islamic Republic of Iran).

In a summary of the definitions presented from three different perspectives (legal, psychological, and sociological), the problem that is noteworthy from a methodological point of view is that these definitions do not consider the element of political exile from the perspective of needs, motivations, and especially political necessities in decision-making in Iran. As a result, it seems that the presented analyses are more in line and convergent with the norms governing European governments rather than with the value system of political asylum seekers who pursue the ideal of social and political justice. Therefore, from a sociopolitical perspective, a political asylum seeker is an individual who, due to political actions against the non-democratic structure of the Islamic Republic, in which opposition is not recognized and is seen as an obstacle to the structural system, and the government seeks to physically eliminate them, goes through a threefold process of isolation (political, social, and material) and is temporarily forced to leave Iran due to the impossibility of political and social activities. It

This definition draws a very clear and distinct line between a political and social refugee. It means that in the past 37 years, because entering politics has been a heavy burden for political activists, it seems that a significant portion of these activists have tried to evade politics by focusing on social, cultural, and professional demands, and as a result, they have sought to resolve the issue of residence and citizenship in the host society in order to freely travel to Iran. This tactical maneuver of some immigrants will lead us to another discussion under the title of the transformation of political refugees, which we will address in another situation.

Thank you for the opportunity you have given us in the monthly magazine “Peace Line”.