In the aftermath of the twelve-day war and the suspension that has cast a shadow over Iranian society and daily life, we spoke with Dr. Parvaneh Salahshouri—sociologist and former member of the Iranian Parliament—to ask her about the government’s handling of the war, her analysis of Iranian society—often regarded by many sociologists as a movement-oriented society—and the restrictions imposed after the war and their effects. In her responses to Peace Mark Monthly Magazine, this member of the tenth Islamic Consultative Assembly emphasized the need to rebuild public trust, avoid political adventurism, and reinforce the republican nature of the system, while examining the various impacts of the recent twelve-day war on Iranian society.

In her conversation with Peace Mark Monthly Magazine, the sociologist and politician referred to the people’s role in preventing social collapse, spoke about the vulnerabilities of security infrastructure and the role of women in crisis management, and offered a cautionary outlook on the future should the security-heavy environment and suppression continue. According to her, continued hardline responses, growing distrust, and unanswered social demands could lead the society toward an unstable state. For this reason, reforms such as the release of political prisoners, reduced pressure on civil activists, nationalizing state media, attention to people’s livelihoods, and a revision of vague constitutional principles are among the measures that, according to Ms. Salahshouri, could signal the government’s willingness to change and help prevent another flare-up of public dissatisfaction.

The full interview with Dr. Parvaneh Salahshouri follows.

In your opinion, was the government prepared for the crisis of the twelve-day war? What is your assessment of how the political system responded to this crisis?

In my view, the power structure was not at all prepared for such a war, and fundamentally didn’t anticipate that a war would break out. As evident from the interviews given by government officials—ranging from members of parliament to the Supreme National Security Council and even officials and experts speaking on state TV—none had predicted the possibility of such a war. Therefore, when there is no prediction, preparedness is certainly lacking. Even so, military forces in every country—especially ours, which has been in a constant cold war with the U.S. and Israel—should have the necessary readiness for such incidents.

How do you think the regime faced this situation?

In fact, the regime was confronted with this situation—it didn’t anticipate it. So it wasn’t the regime that assumed this would happen; it was forced to face it. As we saw, unfortunately, a large number of experienced military personnel were killed on the first night. We also saw the extent of the damage to national infrastructure during the twelve-day war. In addition, we witnessed issues with the country’s air defense systems. One might say this was due to outdated equipment. Those of us living in Iran saw that the military personnel gave their all, but due to a lack of sufficient equipment, Iran’s skies became such that the [Israelis] could come and go wherever and strike wherever they wished. These are events that the regime itself publicized, and the people witnessed them.

During your time in Parliament, were there discussions or mechanisms for dealing with military scenarios like this?

In public sessions of Parliament, such discussions were rare. But certainly in the relevant committees, these matters were raised. I wasn’t a member of those committees, so I can’t comment or judge. The National Security Committee is very specific and one of the most important committees, and I wasn’t part of it at the time. These matters also seldom arose in open sessions.

Last year (1403) and years before that were filled with protests and social movements. How do you think the wartime or suspended situation affects social movements and protests in Iran? What’s your analysis of the current state and your prediction for the future?

In 1403, we didn’t experience a large-scale social movement like those of 1396, 1398, or 1401. But we did witness smaller, sectoral movements—teachers, retirees, nurses, and the like have been and remain active. However, now it seems that due to wartime conditions, people prefer to avoid such matters. The regime is pleased with this, as it appears that a kind of national unity has formed around the war. In sociological theories, war is said to foster national solidarity. We are currently seeing this, and solidarity has indeed formed in the country. Of course, there were and are shortages, but people tolerated them. For instance, after a water pipe in Tajrish was hit, we didn’t have water for several days, but people showed great patience and understood the wartime situation. Contrary to hostile foreign media reports, the shortages weren’t as dire as claimed. For example, food was widely available.

Given these social theories on solidarity during war, what do you think may happen by the end of this calendar year?

We know that power sociology is not highly predictable. What we say is based both on personal experience and theoretical frameworks. I believe the issue must be examined on two levels—international and domestic. Internationally, I believe Iran’s diplomacy should, firstly, be dignified, and secondly, not adventurous. That is, we must seek direct negotiation with the U.S. and aim to achieve something through diplomacy. Furthermore, just as the regime sends positive signals to the U.S., it should do the same for the people. To move toward a more successful path, the government must, at a minimum, take actions such as releasing political prisoners, nationalizing the state broadcaster, and addressing people’s livelihoods. Social pressures must also be reduced, and civil liberties granted—not curtailed. We are now facing heavy filtering and even satellite TV signals are jammed. There is pressure on political and social activists. If the regime cannot shift course and meet societal demands, it will face trouble with a society that—by your own observation—has already seen widespread protest and movement.

Moreover, as Mir Hossein Mousavi mentioned in his statement, a second step could be to establish a constituent assembly. Back in 1397, I said in a speech that a referendum should be held to align the contradictory principles of the Constitution and reinforce the republic aspect of the system. The key is to stabilize the system’s republican nature. I’ve said after this twelve-day war that we must seize the opportunity created by the ceasefire and move in this direction. Of course, we don’t expect immediate change, but even moving toward this goal would send a positive signal and show that the regime has plans for change.

Just as a referendum was held ten years after the Revolution that greatly empowered the principle of Velayat-e Faqih, now another referendum could resolve issues with the Guardian Council and vague constitutional principles. For example, Article 27 of the Constitution states that gatherings and marches are allowed, provided no weapons are carried, but the article also contains a conditional “if”—such ambiguous clauses allow broad interpretation by the Constitution’s interpreter, which is why no permit for a public protest has ever been granted since the Revolution, as it’s always deemed contrary to Islamic principles. In this environment, rogue groups can act with impunity, while ordinary people are denied their rights. We must also ensure party freedoms and aim for a structure where major political parties exist. Political development must eventually occur, but in my view—as someone with a social and cultural background more than a political one—the social foundation of Iranian society must evolve. Political transformation without stable social change will not endure, as history post-Revolution has shown. Unfortunately, today’s social conditions in the country are such that—even in a small sample like cyberspace—we see how people treat each other.

Before the twelve-day war, Iranian society was seen as a movement-oriented society. What effect do you think this war had on that characterization?

Dr. Asef Bayat, Dr. Saeed Madani, and many other sociologists working especially on political sociology and social movements, consider Iranian society a movement-based society. Since at least 1378, we have witnessed recurring movements in Iran, with shorter intervals between them. Going back to the Constitutional Revolution, we have experienced two major revolutions. Alongside them, over the past 120 years, we’ve seen both small and large-scale movements, like the women’s movement. This shows that Iran is indeed a movement society. These movements may be suppressed, like in 1388, 1396, or 1398, and thus appear dormant. Movements succeed when there is no strong military will to crush them—this is one key factor. Regarding 1401, I believe the failure of the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement was due to the opposition abroad fighting over power while people inside were being imprisoned and killed. This led to people retreating. From 1388 onward, change has been brewing in Iranian society. In another interview, I said Iranian society is like a dormant volcano—it may be quiet now, but a small spark can cause it to erupt.

This dormant volcano—by your description—has now also faced war. What impact has the war had on society?

I hope this war ends here, because our country cannot bear another war. We sincerely pray that Iran’s rulers act rationally. Of course, this is not just on Iran’s side—unfortunately, Israel’s survival depends on war. After this twelve-day war, you saw that it attacked Gaza. Israel—and especially Netanyahu—feed off war to survive. The Middle East has always been the victim of such conflicts. I hope our officials and the global community realize that these wars are harmful to the entire world and stop Netanyahu’s adventurism. On our side, the regime must also block war and stop those beating the war drums. Only then can we reach a lasting peace. If this happens—and internal reforms follow—we can be hopeful. But if the stubbornness toward the people continues and the same harsh tactics are used, predicting the future will be difficult.

Currently, the security atmosphere and the discourse of resistance dominate Iran. How much do you think this discourse can be used to justify violence and suppression inside the country?

Such suppression cannot continue indefinitely. Of course, the system is at war, and it’s natural to be sensitive. The regime itself, the global community, and even Israel have admitted the vast extent of infiltration. In such a situation, the regime must figure out where the breaches were—which is understandable. But such crackdowns should not target ordinary people. Ordinary individuals do not have access to sensitive information—that level of access must be investigated elsewhere. On the other hand, trust must be built among the people. Personally, my heart burned when I saw photos from Iran being sent to Persian-language media abroad. Israel forbade any journalists from taking photos and monitored strictly, yet our people were sending photos. If people trusted the government, seventy thousand citizens wouldn’t have messaged them. This distrust led to such events. The regime must now trust the people and build trust on a national level. Only then will the public heed warnings that, for example, sending photos could endanger their own lives. So the regime must focus on trust-building.

Currently, there is talk of a return to the 1980s. Do you think the people and the government are even capable of such a return?

No. Look, no matter how much you filter, people will still find access. Today’s conditions are incomparable to the 1980s. The government no longer has the same social base. Back then, if the state said someone was an infidel, people accepted it—most were regime supporters and would go along. You see in a video from that time a mother turning in her own child. We lived through that. Today’s conditions are not like that.

Given these circumstances, what future do you foresee for political prisoners and civil activists? Will the space become even more restricted?

We’ve seen that Mr. Mostafa Tajzadeh’s sentence was extended by five more years. Yet he has a strong social base, which the regime surely feels. Tajzadeh’s Telegram channel is active as he nears ten years in prison, and much has been written about him. His charisma, the support he receives, and the logical things he says all have an impact. One must ask whether those increasing his sentence or pressuring other political and civil prisoners have good intentions. It doesn’t seem so. The system must examine why someone like Tajzadeh, who has been consistently critical of war from the beginning and is clearly patriotic, is facing a longer sentence. These are important questions that must be addressed—especially if they hope to narrow the gap between the people and the government.

You were a critic of censorship and information restriction in Parliament. What impact has this war and its aftermath had on the free flow of information and media?

We are currently facing widespread filtering. Restrictions persist. For years we didn’t have satellite signal jamming, but now it’s back. I don’t know if this is just in our area or nationwide. On the other hand, no one trusts the state media. Most of our news comes from satellite networks. I hope that along with security measures, civil liberties are also granted. The enemies have access to everything—it’s the ordinary people who are in the dark. When they lack access to credible information sources, any fake news can spread and take hold. Officials must consider this, but sadly they haven’t—and we don’t even see positive signals in this regard.

Returning to the social sphere and the topic of war—how do you assess the role and position of women in these conditions?

One of the main reasons for the current calm is the women themselves. Even unmarried women possess maternal qualities. Motherhood is sacrificial and forgiving. Mothers not only mother their children, but consider the land their child and protect it. In this situation, women played a decisive role in safeguarding their homeland. This is crucial. We’ve always seen this in various movements—women have repeatedly set aside their own gender-based demands for broader national causes. That happened this time too. Women with voices—from Narges Mohammadi inside Iran to others abroad—spoke out against the war.

Some analysts have talked about social cohesion in Iran in response to the war. What do you think caused this? Did we even expect it?

One thing Israeli experts—who have a deep understanding of our society—had hoped for was domestic chaos following their aerial attacks. But this assumption proved entirely false. Those of us living in Iran know that such things don’t happen to our people. Despite their dissatisfaction with the government, people still care about the country. The current government is the Islamic Republic, but for our people, Iran matters. Any unrest could have led to collapse or disintegration. Even ethnic groups didn’t make any moves during the war. Not only were other protest movements inactive, but ethnic groups also remained still. We witnessed national cohesion in full. This proves that many of the prevailing theories and predictions turned out wrong. The Israelis had bet heavily on this—and were proven completely mistaken.

In wartime, governments often misuse religious or national sentiments. Do you think this is happening now? How can society resist such exploitation?

It’s similar to what happened with the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement—when the hijab bill was proposed, people feared renewed crackdowns, but society didn’t regress. I think the government now realizes we have two identity wings—religion and nationality—both are fundamental to our people’s identity and are valued. Believers of other faiths also joined the defense when the country was threatened. I don’t believe the use of these themes was exploitative. The regime has realized how important nationalism is. I hope this atmosphere continues and becomes the foundation for improving Iran’s future.

If you—as a sociologist and politician—were to offer one clear warning about the consequences of war, what would it be?

Given the nuclear facilities in our country, the biggest threat we face is nuclear explosions. This is extremely worrisome—not just for us, but for neighboring Middle Eastern countries as well. No one will be safe from such fallout. This is a key concern. Another is that our region is prone to conflict and instability. The global economy depends on our region’s oil. Any disruption to oil exports affects the world. Sometimes, wars start from small sparks and spiral out of control. Just look at how the world wars started. If this war continues, the risk of it becoming global is high. It’s unpredictable. Though unlikely, the Eastern Bloc could side with Iran and the Western Bloc with the other side, and a “trigger mechanism” could activate—all of which could lead to global chaos. If war does erupt, the Iranian people will be the main victims, and the country’s infrastructure will be devastated.

Thank you for the time you gave Peace Mark Monthly Magazine.