Radical members of parliament, the spokesperson for the Pezeshkian administration, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, members of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi, and many other names—while differing significantly in their political approaches and perspectives on managing the internet in Iran, they all share one thing in common: beating the drum of the VPN mafia. When the term “VPN mafia” is used, it likely refers to a group of influential individuals within decision-making bodies who allegedly profit financially from selling VPNs and thus seek to maintain the filtering system.

This article examines whether such a mafia, as claimed, actually exists, and if so, whether VPN sellers are the real force sustaining the filtering system in Iran.

The author believes that in a rent-based economy like Iran’s, the existence of a VPN mafia is neither surprising nor unlikely. However, emphasizing the role of this shadowy mafia may serve as a distraction from identifying the deeper security-driven roots of filtering in Iran—often propagated by proponents of filtering themselves.

This Mafia Is Not That Mafia

Hamid Rasaei, a member of Iran’s Parliament and a senior figure in the hardline Paydari Front—arguably one of the staunchest opponents of internet freedom in Iran—posed a warning-laden question during the parliamentary review of the fourteenth administration’s cabinet nominees. Addressing the proposed communications and IT minister under Pezeshkian, Rasaei asked, “Are you the actual minister, or are those I won’t name?” (1) Rasaei’s cryptic reference was likely aimed at Azari Jahromi, whose potential shadow influence over the Ministry of Communications worried him even before the administration had officially begun.

Rasaei stated during the session: “We need to hold VPN sellers accountable. With the current state of filtering, we’re only reaping its backlash.” He described Iran’s filtering policy as “an ostrich policy” and added, “If you can’t fully block the internet, then lift filtering altogether.” (2) While he acted swiftly to erase any traces of Jahromi from the Ministry of Communications, Rasaei nevertheless shared a common concern with Jahromi over addressing VPN sales.

Consider these remarks by Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi in September 2019 in Parliament:
“No action is being taken against the VPN trade, despite it being clear who is behind it. How is it possible not to know who in the country is profiting from selling VPNs? The response I receive as the Minister of Communications is that there’s no law to address VPN sales. They tell me to block VPNs, but if it disrupts people’s lives, it’ll be on me to answer for it.” (3)

These remarks were made during a period when filtering in Iran was nowhere near as extensive as it is today. Yet even then, Jahromi firmly believed in the existence of a likely internal mafia within this domain. Meanwhile, Hamid Rasaei, from an opposing political faction, voiced similar rhetoric, insisting that VPN sellers must be held accountable.

The purpose of highlighting these two examples is to show that the loud voices within Iran concerning VPN sales or their so-called mafia stem from vastly different motivations. Rasaei and others like him aim to fulfill the objectives of filtering—namely, cutting off Iranians’ access to free information. On the other hand, Jahromi’s concern lies in the potential fallout for internet users if their access to VPNs is hindered. Both viewpoints are far removed from the ideals of internet freedom, yet they converge under the umbrella of the “VPN mafia” narrative.

How Much Does the Mafia Make?

It is crucial to reiterate that while the existence of a VPN mafia is highly plausible, many government officials and even private entities lack a clear understanding of its true nature. This is evident in the wildly differing claims about the size of this market, with estimates varying significantly and likely far removed from reality.

For instance:

• Ezzatollah Zarghami, a member of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, recently claimed that the VPN market generates a staggering 20 trillion tomans annually. (4)
• Earlier this summer, the Tehran Electronic Commerce Association estimated the market’s turnover at 5 trillion tomans, (5) marking a 15 trillion toman discrepancy with Zarghami’s claim.
• Nazila Daneshvaran, a lesser-known figure in the digital business sector, estimated the market at 25 trillion tomans in summer 1403 (2024), a figure that garnered considerable attention. (6)
• A year earlier, in July 1402 (2023), when VPN costs were slightly lower, Fararu reported that users spent 1.8 trillion tomans monthly on VPNs, equating to an annual 22 trillion tomans. (7)
• Another MP, Hassan Asafari, claimed in May 1402 that the revenue and turnover of the “filtering profiteers” reached 50 trillion tomans annually, while also lamenting the lack of taxation on these individuals. (8)
• Private companies have also joined the speculative fray. For instance, Yektanet reported that the VPN market’s annual turnover is between 25 and 30 trillion tomans. (9)
• Sattar Hashemi, the fourteenth administration’s Minister of Communications, provided an even broader estimate in October 1403, suggesting that VPN revenues range between 3 and over 20 trillion tomans. (10)

The 17-trillion-toman range in Hashemi’s estimate and the stark discrepancies among claims highlight a glaring truth: many of these so-called experts lack any real understanding of this market and inflate figures to draw attention to a “mafia” they barely comprehend.

Security or Profit: Which Matters More?

Overemphasizing the economic motives behind filtering risks overlooking the Islamic Republic’s explicit security concerns about free access to information—a worry that its leaders have repeatedly and openly voiced. For example, in November 2022, during protests following the death of Mahsa Amini, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned:
“Officials must act responsibly and understand why the enemy targets specific words or names and spreads such a massive volume of lies on cyberspace. They must address and counter this. This is their duty. They try to implant falsehoods in people’s minds through constant repetition.” (11)

The author argues that, in most critical moments, the Islamic Republic has consistently prioritized security concerns and survival over economic interests, even at the expense of its own oligarchic elites’ profits—at least in the short term.

For example:

• In 2012, the state-owned RighTel attempted to launch video call services, a technology that could have generated significant revenue. However, opposition from conservative clerics citing moral concerns forced the service to be shelved, showing how ideological considerations outweighed profit.
• Similarly, during the November 2019 protests, the government imposed a ten-day internet blackout despite the financial harm to quasi-state telecom operators like Irancell, 49% of which is owned by MTN and the remainder by foundations linked to the regime. This internet shutdown caused an estimated 1.08 trillion toman loss to telecom operators. (12)

The 2022 protests saw even greater losses, with operators like Irancell and Shatel formally complaining about reduced bandwidth consumption and revenue due to filtering and outages. Irancell alone reported an 800-billion-toman loss during just one month of restricted internet access. (13)

Despite these grievances, the regime continued its stringent measures, prioritizing control over economic fallout.

Conclusion: Does the VPN Mafia Exist?

Yes, the VPN mafia exists—not as the sole reason for continued filtering, but as a real entity within a rent-seeking economy. Credible evidence points to significant financial benefits for companies involved in filtering, such as Yaftar, Douran, and Amn Afzar Gostaresh Sharif, whose activities and profits merit further investigation beyond the scope of this article.

Nevertheless, while the VPN mafia may play a role in sustaining filtering, the Islamic Republic’s security concerns and survival instincts remain the primary drivers behind its battle against a free internet.

References:

1. Rasaei’s opposition to the proposed communications minister, Donya-e-Eqtesad, August 17, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Jahromi: No action is taken against VPN trading, Alef, September 2, 2019.
4. Filtering market worth 20 trillion tomans, Ensaf News, November 14, 2024.
5. VPN market worth 5 trillion tomans, Ettelaat Newspaper, July 4, 2024.
6. VPN costs estimated, Eco Iran, June 27, 2023.
7. VPN market turnover, Fararu, July 12, 2023.
8. Filtering profiteers earning 50 trillion tomans, Student News Agency, May 20, 2023.
9. VPN market worth 25–30 trillion tomans, Farda-e-Eghtesad, August 28, 2023.
10. Hashemi: VPN revenues range from 3 to over 20 trillion tomans, Borna News, October 14, 2024.
11. Remarks during student meeting, Khamenei.ir, November 2, 2022.
12. Internet blackout cost telecom operators 1.08 trillion tomans, IRNA, December 4, 2019.
13. Operators’ leaked complaints to the Ministry of Communications, Peivast Monthly, December 24, 2022.
14. Filing against Filtering: High Costs on Telecom Operators, Zomit, December 5, 2024.