Photos, especially those taken during historical events, are one of the best storytellers in their silence. From February 1, 1979, and the arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, dozens, if not hundreds, of photos have been captured. The diversity and variety of the attendees, both politically and in terms of lifestyle, can be seen with a brief look at the photos. Women, with their various types of clothing common in the country, play a significant role in that protest reception. Those photos are a reflection of the political, social, and cultural diversity of the forces participating in the 1957 revolution. But it doesn’t take long for that passionate image to become blurred. The remaining photos of gatherings, celebrations, and national or religious programs after 1959 remind the viewer of a great change: everything in the photos is constant except for the veils of women. The image of women in photos after 1959 is vastly different from the image of women

The mandatory hijab policy in Iran did not start in 1978. Several years before the mandatory hijab, the law on unveiling was passed on 17 Dey 1314 (January 7, 1936). According to this law, the presence of women and girls in public spaces, government institutions, schools, and universities was conditional upon wearing a hat and coat, and the government prevented the use of other customary coverings. With the passage and implementation of this law, a large portion of Iranian women practically lost the chance to participate in society and contribute to social and economic life.

The government’s insistence on being the institution of political power, enforcing a specific dress code for women – whether it be mandatory hijab or unveiling – is an example of the government’s clear control over the body and the selection of individuals. Such a policy, in the context of suppressing diversity of expression and opposition, not only reinforces gender roles, but also sees “woman” not as a human being, but as a battleground for political and ideological conflicts. Reza Shah’s boots put into practice secularism, while the turban of the Islamic clergy begins to Islamize society, starting with imposing a dress code on women. Although these two approaches may have different results, they share the same nature: removing agency from the body, selecting women, and turning the female body into a field of ideological conflict.

In such a context, the issue of compulsory hijab became a fundamental topic in the revolutionary society from the month of Bahman in 1357 (February 1979). Although the transformation of hijab into a law lasted until the month of Mordad in 1362 (August 1983), for Ayatollah Khomeini, who had managed to seize all political power in a short period of time, the “law” was a marginal issue. In fact, in the month of Esfand in 1357 (February 1979), when he was residing in Qom, he brought up the issue of compulsory hijab in the Islamic government among the Qom seminary students. For the newly arrived enforcers of the oppressive power in the revolutionary committees, their leader’s speech was more significant than any document or law. As a result, the suppression of women to impose hijab began immediately after Ayatollah Khomeini’s opinion on this matter was

The public reaction to the compulsory hijab issue was not just limited to protests and unwillingness. A large portion of society believed that the promised virtuous city could be built by the new rulers in various dimensions. Additionally, the revolutionary nature of the society, which included hatred towards the previous era, allowed the new rulers to popularize the idea that not wearing a hijab was equivalent to supporting the previous government. Therefore, a significant portion of society, influenced by these emotions and sentiments, even if reluctantly, complied with the compulsory hijab in the early years of the revolution.

The change of societal norms in an issue like clothing is not a short-term problem. It is not possible to suddenly force half of the population of a country with a population of tens of millions to wear – or not wear – a specific type of clothing. The sword of oppression came into play in such an environment to accelerate the enforcement of hijab. From slapping women who were not wearing hijab, to cutting their legs, these are the most well-known examples of this historical oppression. Imposing hijab on cinema and television and removing images of women from the public sphere were less violent, but more widespread and pervasive forms of oppression. Therefore, contrary to the claims of yesterday’s rulers, the use of the sword of oppression to impose hijab was not the work of “radical and extremist forces”. There was a serious intention to impose hijab and oppression was an inseparable part of this intention.

The sound of protest against this imposition, although weak, was traceable from the early days. The demonstrations on March 8, 1979, in commemoration of International Women’s Day, were probably the most famous manifestation of this protest. Although a considerable amount of time had passed since the revolution, the imposition of the hijab had already begun in government offices, schools, and universities. During this time, a significant number of female employees were prohibited from going to work. In addition, after years of banning ceremonies commemorating International Women’s Day, the first Women’s Day after the revolution was a historic opportunity to raise women’s demands during the Spring of Freedom. As a result, on March 8, 1979, large demonstrations were held in central and northern areas of Tehran, under continuous snowfall. These protests continued with smaller dimensions in the following days. They considered the delay in making the mandatory hijab a law as one of the achievements of these protests.

Protesting against the compulsory hijab did not only manifest itself in demonstrations. What is now known as the “everyday struggle” in the analysis of social movements, has its roots in the resistance against the mandatory hijab in the early years of the revolution. A large number of women, despite the clear dangers of resisting the law, refused to comply and risked their lives. However, the continued pressure and unified political power in imposing the hijab led to the emergence of various styles and forms of expression that allowed women to follow the requirements while still asserting their agency.

The unity of political power in imposing the veil is not limited to the government. Despite the existence of a serious and persistent social body against the imposition of clothing, no serious political force in the opposition represents this social body. The protests of political organizations and parties against the forced veil – if there are any protests at all – do not go beyond a few mild articles. The patriarchal mindset dominating the political sphere of Iran at that time did not give any importance to the issue of women and the elimination of women from the social sphere. The issue of compulsory hijab in such an atmosphere was insignificant and had no weight in the political arena.

On the other hand, contrary to recent times, the imposition of hijab in the early years of the revolution also sparked international reactions. While some international institutions explained the issue of compulsory hijab as a “cultural feature of the country,” the issue of warning about compulsory hijab in Iran during those years was not traceable except in the productions of a few feminist institutions outside the country – for example, the International Women’s Rights Action Watch (IWRAW). International reactions to human rights violations in Iran, including compulsory hijab, date back to later years; a time when the relationship between the Islamic Republic and the West became more complicated and hostile.

Apart from the dichotomy of “imposition and resistance” in the political space, the policy of imposing mandatory hijab in the early years of the revolution had profound social consequences that significantly changed the role of women in Iranian society. One of the immediate effects was the restrictions imposed on women’s participation in public life and their access to various social spheres. The obligation to observe hijab in public spaces limited the mobility and social presence of women and assigned them more limited roles in society. The ultimate goal of the policy of imposing hijab was to remove women from the social sphere of Iran, although it did not have the opportunity to be implemented in the face of civil society.

In addition, the implementation of mandatory hijab policy strengthened patriarchal structures and traditional gender roles in Iranian society. Women were expected – and to some extent, still are – to adhere to strict standards and the newly established government’s notion of “modesty and piety,” with hijab serving as a visible symbol of their conformity to societal expectations. These beliefs perpetuated male dominance and control over women’s bodies and behavior, pushing women to the margins of public life, especially in the early years of the revolution.

In addition, the policy of mandatory hijab had consequences for women’s access to education and job opportunities in the early years after the revolution. Discrimination and harassment based on dress codes were reported in educational institutions and workplaces, creating barriers for women seeking higher education or employment. Different generations of Iranians have terrifying memories of “selection committees” as specialized institutions for inspecting beliefs and controlling individuals’ personal lives. Although these institutions still exist, their influence has decreased compared to the early years of the revolution. In these committees, the issue of “hijab or no hijab” was no longer relevant. Even the thickness of a woman’s veil could be a problem for the responsible selection committee and deprive a talented and capable young person of a simple job. This unequal situation in education and employment has intensified gender inequalities and hindered women’s ability to fully participate in economic and social life.

Although the imposition and pressure of the stormy early years of the revolution came to an end in the first decade, the issue of mandatory hijab still persists as one of the main signs of discrimination against women. Social reactions and resistance against this imposition have had an upward trend in these years, although this rise does not bring about a significant change in the behavior of the government. If we consider the period of reforms as a period of government retreat from increasing pressure regarding hijab and lifestyle, with the emergence of Ahmadinejad, the guidance patrols – an updated version of committees – take to the streets. The challenge, which still continues due to its clear relationship with the nature and essence of the Islamic Republic, has become the central focus of the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement, with the issue of discrimination against women and mandatory hijab as its clearest example.

The city of Fazelah is a part of the leaders of the Islamic Republic in relation to hijab, the atmosphere of the early years of the revolution. At a time when they could command women with swords, whips, and punches, and society accepted that hijab could be mandatory. However, history is ruthless in proving its rules – including the irreversibility of some processes. With recent social changes – which have even made a large part of the religious community skeptical of mandatory hijab – the force of belief in imposing hijab will eventually have to accept a transformation in the values and norms of Iranian society and preserve its belief in its memories. This is the tradition of history and the nature of social changes.