The capacity that water has gone.

One of the most important challenges facing humanity is the scarcity of resources in general and water resources in particular. This scarcity does not necessarily mean a crisis. What turns water scarcity into a water crisis is poor governance and management, which can turn the serious challenges of resource scarcity into opportunities for improving human livelihoods. The way resources are managed and governed is limited. Managing and governing these challenges requires a holistic and innovative approach to ensure the sustainability of natural resources, provide adequate services, and ensure well-being for all.

While our country has been located in the dry and semi-dry belt of the world, instead of planning for optimal water consumption, officials are prescribing rain prayers and paying no attention to the Japanese who are sitting on the earthquake belt and not reading earthquake prayers or anything else; but they have been able to adapt and reduce the damage to zero with proper planning and action. It is not clear if some managers are asleep or have put themselves to sleep; they have forgotten that the average annual water consumption in the country is about 96 billion cubic meters, which is now about eight percent more than our total renewable water resources (89 billion cubic meters). The Middle East has been suffering from open water tensions for years, to the point that the leaders of countries are now recklessly talking about water and water wars in this region, and there is no need for us to search for this issue among foreign ministers’ emails with a magnifying glass.

In the meantime, Iran has not been exempt from this important issue and has always seen the management of its shared water resources with neighboring countries as a risky matter, to the extent that some disputes have even led to verbal confrontations and accusations against leaders. The shared waters between Iraq and Iran, and before that between Turkey and Iran, have suffered the most damage due to political conflicts and some decisions that go against international laws, as well as their long borders with each other. The shared water resources between Afghanistan and Iran have also not been immune to these disputes; experts believe that the Afghans, due to their extensive cultivation of poppies and increasing need for water for agriculture, have not allocated the upper rights to Iran in the Helmand River, contrary to international treaties, which has caused the drying up of the Hamoun wetlands and the destruction of agriculture in Sistan. Compared to some of its neighboring countries, Iran is generally at a disadvantage in terms of water resources, which makes the issue

Experts believe that Iraq today is allied with Iran. Pakistan has a good friendship with our country. On the other hand, Iran and Turkey are also close to each other. Armenia, depending on its conflicts with its neighboring countries, is seeking more serious relations with Iran, and Turkmenistan, which is under Iran’s influence, follows this rule. Afghanistan, due to some conflicts with Pakistan – which may decrease with the Taliban’s rise in the region – has always preferred to maintain reasonable relations with Iran, and all of these are potentials that should be considered in advancing the country’s diplomacy and policies in common relations with its neighboring countries; especially the mentioned neighbors who share a common water border with Iran.

The importance of water diplomacy.

According to some indicators, countries with a per capita renewable water resources of less than 1700 cubic meters per year are in a state of water stress, while countries with a per capita renewable water resources of less than 1000 cubic meters per year are in a state of water scarcity (crisis). Based on this index, two countries, Iran and Pakistan, are in a state of water stress, while the rest of Iran’s neighboring countries have a suitable situation in terms of water resources; because Iraq is above the 2000 line, Armenia and Turkey are above the 2500 line, and the Republic of Azerbaijan is above the 3500 line of cubic meters per year. (1).

There are multiple international theories regarding shared waters and their utilization; theories that allow the upper country to use the shared water in any way it wants without considering any harm to the lower country, or other theories that suggest that coastal countries can use shared water resources, as long as they do not alter the natural state of their own country in a way that would harm the territorial integrity of the lower country. There is also a third theory that is a compromise between these two, allowing both upper and lower countries to use shared resources without causing harm to each other.

In any case, the importance of water diplomacy in Iran’s foreign policy towards its neighbors is increasing day by day, considering the droughts and climate changes that are taking place. With Iran’s long borders with its neighbors and its shared basins with Iraq, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, it becomes more and more apparent that considering an interactive approach towards countries that have a higher level of access to water resources than ours is crucial. This can have a greater impact in political negotiations.

Some experts refer to the 21st century as the “water century”. They believe that global conflicts over water usage will intensify in this century. Despite the fact that Iran ranks third in terms of renewable water resources per capita in the Middle East, after Turkey and Lebanon, it is facing a water crisis at its borders. However, it seems that with proper management and control, we can not only improve our own situation but also have a positive impact on regional interactions.

From this perspective, Iran has shared basins and important border rivers such as Arvandrud, Hirmand, Harirrud, Atrek, and Aras with its neighbors Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Additionally, out of the total of approximately 100 billion cubic meters of water available in Iran, six billion cubic meters enter the country and approximately the same amount is exported.

Climate change has also greatly affected our work, as floods and droughts are two sides of the same coin. As a result of climate change, the majority of the sediment that enters our dams is from floods, and it is these flood sediments that make up a significant portion of the inflow to our dams with high flow rates.

It is important to know that there is a significant difference between not having water stress and having water security. It is possible that in the short or medium term, no city may experience water stress, but it is possible that even major cities may not have water security. This is unfortunately the prevailing mindset among most officials, who are more focused on short-term solutions to alleviate water stress rather than long-term water security.

In managing floods and droughts, we should be more concerned about policies and policymaking rather than just projects and solutions. We must remember that flood management is a process, not just a project. With the current situation of water and land subsidence and existing agricultural and horticultural methods, agriculture will soon become extinct in a large part of the country.

Neglecting the issue of water in development plans, especially in the sixth development plan, has led to serious weaknesses and deficiencies in water policy. The structural approach and emphasis on supply management instead of focusing on demand management methods have perpetuated a fundamental weakness and problem in the country’s overall water policy.

That is why the problem of Khuzestan cannot be solved with billions of budgets, deforestation, and embezzlement, and the same goes for wasted money. Therefore, we must think about water management, reviving wetlands and underground water tables, and finding a way to turn floods into blessings.

Iranian Diplomacy and Water Tensions.

Water is a natural and valuable resource on a global level that has always been a source of competition and tension among human groups, societies, and countries. The major conflicts that arise between countries over water resources are in shared river basins, and finding a reasonable mechanism for fair exploitation of these resources is a difficult task.

Given the strategic and vital role of water and its uneven distribution in different regions of the world, as well as the shared basins and water resources between countries, the use of diplomatic capacities is essential. Iran has always had disputes over the division of shared border waters and transboundary rivers with its neighbors, and the importance of diplomacy must be given more attention than ever before.

Alongside all internal dimensions, the challenge of water scarcity and the importance of implementing policies in line with current and future water resources conditions within the country, border and transboundary water diplomacy is considered as a necessary tool, taking into account Iran’s strategic geographical position. It can be seen as a complementary link for universal mobilization in managing water crisis and adapting to problems caused by water scarcity in the country; a tool that is not limited to neighboring countries in a shared water basin, and all countries that are directly or indirectly affected by water scarcity are currently utilizing this tool effectively to reduce critical consequences, which the international community sees as a threat to world peace and security.

In general, it should be said that we recognize the combination of political management and social management of water as water diplomacy. Water diplomacy in the country has been deficient; both general and internal water diplomacy and its social management, as well as foreign water diplomacy and its political management, have fundamental weaknesses. The country needs a water diplomat, someone who can focus on water and environmental crises at the highest levels and obtain necessary privileges.

The water war in the Middle East has not taken place militarily, but has started through legal means and some countries, including Iraq, have filed lawsuits against neighboring countries in international courts. If we do not take water diplomacy seriously, we must expect water wars. The actions of neighboring countries in dam construction and water and environmental issues have negative effects on Iran, which we can see in the form of dust storms in Khuzestan.

Unfortunately, water diplomacy does not have a special position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and as a result, the country has experienced irreparable damages. Many border rivers of the country, such as the Hamoun, are a collective memory of all Iranians, but unfortunately, due to the weakness of social water management, we have not been able to keep this collective memory alive.

After Russia, Iran is the second country in the world with the most number of neighboring countries on its land and sea borders, and approximately 22% of Iran’s shared borders with its neighbors, which is 1918 kilometers, is formed by rivers. In the west, Iran shares five rivers, namely Aras, Tigris, Euphrates, Sarisu, and Qarasu, directly and indirectly with Turkey. Iran is considered a downstream country for the rivers Aras, Tigris, and Euphrates. Relations between Iran and Turkey, as two influential countries in West Asia, are influenced by various environmental factors, with one of the most important being water resources. The location of Iran and Turkey in a dry and semi-dry region of the world has added to the importance of the issue and has led to challenges between the two countries. Numerous development projects in Turkey, such as dam construction on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, have caused

The problem of forgetfulness and breaking promises of the neighbor.

The Hirmand River is one of the most important rivers in Southwest Asia and the Middle East, with a length of 1,150 kilometers. It originates from the rugged and harsh Hindu Kush mountains and brings the Himalayan climate to the eastern border of Iran, passing through the borders of Afghanistan and China. On average, the annual flow of this river is about 8 billion cubic meters, which is a testament to its greatness. To put this into perspective, the most famous central river in Iran, Zayandehrud, has an annual flow of 800 million cubic meters, meaning that the Hirmand River has 10 times more flow than Zayandehrud. This is the average flow of this river.

This river has had a flow of up to 20 billion cubic meters in some years. For this reason, it has a very large catchment area, which has turned over half a million hectares in the Sistan plain, Hamun Pozeck and Saberi and Hamun Hirmand in Iran into the world’s granary. However, with the progress and use of development tools in Afghanistan and the introduction of motor pumps, the amount of water taken from the Hirmand River has been facilitated; especially when water enters the plain in the Herat province.

The first conflicts and problems also date back to 150 years ago during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah, when the situation became very serious and the first warnings about water scarcity, especially during times of drought, were raised. Eventually, the British tried to mediate and we reluctantly accepted to give up Herat in exchange for a stable border with Iran.

Until a few years ago, the situation was good until the Americans established a large dam (Kajaki Dam) in that area in 1959. The volume of the Kajaki Dam is 2.8 billion cubic meters. Keep in mind that the volume of the controversial Cheshmeh-ye Chaharshanbeh Dam in Iran is 2.3 billion cubic meters, and this was a very large project 60 years ago. However, when they built that dam, it was actually a huge shock to the Helmand River, and the first big wave of migration – where many people left the Sistan and Baluchestan region and moved towards Golestan, and their ancestors are still in this area – began after the construction of this dam.

Due to the problems that arose in the government of Afghanistan at that time and the security conflicts that occurred, the construction of the second meter of the dam, which had a significant volume, was never completed and the emergency gate of the dam was never built. During this half-century, none of the Afghan governments had the opportunity to complete this dam. If this dam had been completed, the disaster in Sistan and Baluchestan would have been much more serious. However, this issue led the Iranian government at the time of Hojat to enter into more serious negotiations with the Afghan side in order to obtain a relatively acceptable share for Iran. In the end, they reached 820 million cubic meters, which was almost the same size as the Zayandehrud dam, and it was agreed that it would always belong to Iran.

The condition of the agreement was that in a year when the river flow was normal, the Afghans would give 820 million cubic meters of water to Iran. Fortunately or unfortunately, from their perspective, because they had not built enough dams and reservoirs and there was no Ministry of Energy in Afghanistan to manage all the rivers, almost always more water than this amount would reach Iran. In some years, so much water entered the Hamoun Lake that it filled the entire area and they were forced to disrupt the wetland ecosystem and dig a large channel to divert water into the Zareh Goud border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. As a result, we had income from fishing and mat weaving, and on the other hand, the soil erosion was also controlled and agriculture flourished alongside it.

But after the central government gained some power in Afghanistan, with the escort of Americans, the “Kamal Khan” dam, which took 40 years to build, was created. The Taliban themselves even attacked several times to destroy this dam so it wouldn’t be built, and if it weren’t for the Taliban’s guerrilla operations, this disaster would have happened much sooner. But in any case, in the year 1400, they were able to open the dam and Ashraf Ghani, the former president of Afghanistan, announced in his famous speech that if from now on the Iranians want more than their share (contract 1351), they must give us oil in return.

But the story was that they did an astonishing job. The peak of the crisis and danger was here, when they diverted the mighty rivers that had been flowing in this path for millions of years, towards the “Goodzareh” marsh, which is considered a genocide and war crime according to the laws governing the United Nations, and could change the way of life for hundreds of thousands of people in the Hirmand watershed.

Iran was the only country that had procured the necessary cement to build the Kamal Khan Dam. At a time when no one else was doing this, we ourselves cut off the very branches we were sitting on and brought the disaster to its current stage. The worst news is that now they want to build 20 more dams and dams on the Hirmand River. In even worse news, they have expanded agricultural land by using this technology and importing motor pumps from China and India, increasing it to one hundred thousand hectares, and in a large part of these lands, they are growing poppies, which consume twice the average water consumption in the agricultural sector; that is, at least one and a half billion cubic meters.

In any case, this situation will lead us to consider bargaining with any government that is stationed in Afghanistan. Of course, the water is the right of Iran, but we must seek alternative sources of drinking water based on non-military defense – especially for people in the eastern part of the country, whether in Mashhad and Khorasan or in Zabol – until we enter into negotiations and bargaining with them so that they do not extort us. If our opponent feels that we are heavily dependent on this water and if the water does not reach us, we will face a flood of migration, they may take advantage of us even more.

The regions of Fararud, Hirirud, Hirmand, Goudzareh, and Hamoun are the largest sources of dust and soil production in the area. Currently, the countries of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are seriously affected by this issue. The famous 120-day winds of the region, which have now turned into 160-day winds, have affected the livelihood and quality of life in these regions in all three countries. If Iran can control the sources of dust and soil production by using the water resources that flow towards Hamoun and satellite wetlands, it will be a win-win situation for all three countries. Afghanistan is a country that is in dire need of energy, electricity, and fuel, and we can use the conversion of the 120-day winds and the vast desert area in the east of the region to generate solar and wind energy and provide it to our eastern neighbor in exchange for water. In fact, we are the only main gateway for Afghanistan to access

Zahra Ghoreishi, a water diplomacy expert, who has focused her studies on Afghanistan’s behavior towards the Helmand River in recent years – both in terms of commitments to Iran and domestic planning – believes that the new rulers of Afghanistan are pursuing a policy of establishing a new population in the provinces of Helmand and Nimruz. She says, “What has received a lot of attention in the public discourse is the ambiguous issue of the Kamal Khan Dam and Afghanistan’s diversion of the Helmand River towards the Gudzareh Valley and wetlands. But that is not the main issue and in fact, it is much broader than it seems and so far, no official has provided any explanation on these matters.” (3).

The Qureshi believes that with this program and its implementation, we will witness an increase in population and water usage in Afghanistan during the day, and what is important is not the event itself, but the consequences that will be out of our control. He suspects that in the future, there may be a “reverse migration” at this border. This means that if Afghans are now coming to Iran, Iranians will go to Afghanistan for work and life.

Turkey; a neighbor with a longing for blue domination.

Turkey, given its unique location between the Caucasus, Iran, Arab countries, and Europe, especially after 2003, sees itself as playing a significant role in the political, economic, social, and ecological dynamics of the region. One of Turkey’s sources of power is its control over the border rivers, particularly the Tigris and Euphrates. Iran, on the other hand, is considered a downstream country in relation to Turkey, as it relies on the Tigris, Euphrates, and Aras rivers. Therefore, any interference or control by Turkey over these rivers can have a significant impact on Iran’s access to these water resources.

Turkey’s actions and activities in the Tigris and Euphrates river basin have an impact on Iran’s water resources. The importance of paying attention to this river basin becomes clear when we know that nearly 40% of Turkey’s water resources are shared, with 80% of that coming from the Tigris and Euphrates. Therefore, the Tigris and Euphrates are considered the most important external sources of water for Turkey.

According to expert estimates, Turkey is currently facing fundamental challenges in managing and developing its water resources, and the Anatolian project planning and implementation is in line with this. Turkey, in order to justify its need for fresh water, has undertaken the design of this massive water project and, according to the announced plans for this project, allows a maximum of 500 cubic meters of water per second to flow towards Syria and Iraq. The Ataturk Dam and Hydroelectric Power Plant, as Turkey’s largest dam, has been built within the framework of the GAP project for irrigation and electricity production on the Euphrates River. Turkey is currently constructing, studying, and implementing 22 dams on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in 9 Kurdish regions. The GAP project includes 22 dams and reservoirs and 19 hydroelectric centers in the Tigris and Euphrates basin system and 9 regions in southeastern Turkey, covering an area of 75,358 square kilometers

Despite the efforts made by neighboring countries, especially Syria and Iraq, to establish fair and equal interaction with Turkey regarding the division of shared rivers, Turkey is determined to fully utilize its position as a dominant country. It seems that this country is not willing to divide its absolute sovereignty over the rivers that originate from its territory.

Turkey, in comparison to Iraq, has a smaller area in the Tigris and Euphrates basin (26% compared to 48% for both rivers), but due to its upstream location, it has the most control in this region (the Tigris and Euphrates basin). In this regard, the “Ilisu” dam in Turkey is the second largest dam in the country after the “Ataturk” dam on the Euphrates River, which was built to produce 1200 megawatts of electricity on the Tigris River, but its environmental effects on downstream countries, including sudden floods and even the submergence of the 12,000-year-old city of “Hasankeyf” in Turkey, have been ignored. According to expert statistics, the amount of water entering the Tigris and Euphrates rivers from Turkey towards Iraq and Syria has decreased by 50%.

An important point to note about Turkey’s water diplomacy in its interaction with Iraq is that the majority of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers’ resources are produced in Turkey, which has several times the capacity of water reserves and large projects such as the GAP project (with very large water reservoirs). However, in 2019, agreements were signed with the aim of strengthening friendly relations between the Turkish and Iraqi people and developing cooperation in the field of water issues with Iraq. Additionally, Turkey has established research centers, laboratories, and cooperation with Iraq. This agreement has portrayed a positive and acceptable image of Turkey for the Iraqi people and on an international level. The agreement is one-sided and entirely in favor of Turkey. Interestingly, Iraq has fully accepted this agreement.

Iraq and politics are like a roof with two sides.

Iraq is currently facing a severe water shortage and challenges such as poor water resource management, internal political conflicts, and even unequal relationships with neighboring countries, including Iran. The water dispute between Iran, Turkey, and Iraq over the rights to shared rivers continues. Iranian authorities claim that Iraq’s environmental water rights are being respected and water is being released downstream, but Iraqi authorities have accused Iran of violating the laws of shared waters with Iraq; in a way that, contrary to international regulations, Iran has violated Iraq’s water rights by building dams, changing the course, and reducing the flow of shared rivers.

In order to strengthen friendly relations between the people of Turkey and Iraq and develop cooperation in the field of water issues, the Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources signed agreements with the Turkish Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs in 2019, the contents of which indicate that they are completely in line with Turkey’s interests. It is worth noting that Turkey also coordinated with Iraq to build the Ilisu Dam, and when Iran protested this action by Turkey, Iraqi officials stated that it was done with their coordination. The greatest negative consequences of building this dam are for Iraq, but the issue is that Turkey has shown its willingness to negotiate by signing agreements with lower-ranking countries such as Iraq and Syria. Despite the fact that Iraqi gardens and lands have been greatly affected by Turkey’s dam constructions, Iraq is not willing to form a coalition with Iran and file a complaint against Turkey; instead, it is also cooperating with Turkey.

The blue projects in Turkey have greatly affected the countries of Iraq and Syria as two underdeveloped countries and have had destructive effects on their environmental and agricultural dimensions. With the construction of the Ilisu Dam in Turkey, it is predicted that the ecosystem of Iraq, which is already facing a decrease in water inflow, will witness extensive changes. The destruction of agricultural lands downstream of the Ilisu Dam in Iraq, due to the lack of allocation of necessary water rights and increased production of pollutants, is one of the consequences of this project.

According to available statistics and information, more than 85% of Iraq’s fresh water comes from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and their tributaries; of course, the water projects and initiatives of the Iraqi government in the Tigris and Euphrates basin have also had a significant impact on this situation. In fact, in addition to Turkey, Iraq and Syria have also built numerous dams on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. It should be noted that due to Iraq’s unique geographical and geotechnical conditions, the construction of canals, reservoirs, and dams in this country is very costly. This makes investment in water facilities by the government and private sector complex, technical, and difficult. According to Iraqi news sources, the design of a large dam on the Arvand River by an Italian company has been completed and this dam is expected to collect billions of cubic meters of water that flows into the Persian Gulf and prevent the movement of

Why has “water diplomacy” not been successful in Iran?

Ali Akbar Mehrabian, Minister of Energy of the Thirteenth Government, explains the importance of “water diplomacy” to the newspaper Donya-ye Eghtesad: “Water diplomacy is important from two perspectives; first, because most water crises are transboundary issues and their resolution requires a collective determination and cooperation among countries through joint and multilateral conventions. Second, international mechanisms regarding water crises should be based on considering the right to development for all stakeholders, as well as the principle of shared and differentiated responsibility among countries, in order to reach comprehensive agreements based on closer economic mechanisms.” (5).

By searching for the term “water diplomacy”, we will see that this term has been repeatedly mentioned and examined by politicians, experts, and analysts. However, the current situation of the country regarding border rivers shows that even if water diplomacy is employed to address water challenges, it has not yielded any results for the country. Despite existing agreements between Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iraq, the water tension continues and these agreements have not been able to prevent water crises in border river areas over the years. This indicates that these agreements do not have enough capacity to manage border rivers, and as a result, another mechanism should be put on the agenda, which can be “multilateralism” in the field of water diplomacy.

As water management in Afghanistan affects not only Iran, but also Turkmenistan through the Hari River, and with Turkey’s influence on water resources management in addition to Iran, Iraq, and Syria, it is imperative that we pursue a multilateral water diplomacy solution instead of a bilateral one in order to address the water crisis.

One of the obstacles facing diplomacy is also related to tensions between Iran and the West over water. The existence of sanctions and tensions in Iran’s relations with the West not only challenges the country’s use of domestic waters, but also hinders progress in regional multilateral diplomacy on border waters. This is because in addition to the fact that political cooperation with neighboring countries is dependent on reducing tensions with the West, neighboring countries also look at Iran’s relations with the West for advancing this issue. Therefore, water diplomacy cannot be evaluated independently from the overall conditions of the country in international relations.

The third factor in the issue of the failure of water diplomacy can be attributed to the lack of priority given to this matter in the country. As mentioned at the beginning of the text, the General Directorate of Water Diplomacy, which was under the Legal Deputy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had started its work. However, after Abbas Araghchi took over the position of Legal Deputy, it ended its work and it is not clear today whether any action has been defined in this regard in the diplomatic system or not. Having a designated person responsible for this matter can definitely contribute to the effective advancement of its goals.

Iran’s regional and hydro-political collaborations.

For a better understanding of the water collaborations of regional countries, understanding the concept of “water diplomacy” and Iran’s position in relation to its neighbors in the region, who are also Islamic countries, is important. In 1979, Anwar Sadat, the president of Egypt, said: “The only issue that can bring Egypt back to war is water.” Ten years later, in 1989, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the foreign minister of Egypt – who later became the Secretary-General of the United Nations – predicted that the next issue that would lead the Middle East to “war” would be water, not political differences. However, in 2001, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, in his famous speech at the General Assembly, introduced water as a factor for “peace and cooperation.” (6).

The Defense Intelligence Agency of America, in a report published in 2012, examined and analyzed various dimensions of the “threat to the security of the United States of America” caused by the endangerment of “water security” in regions including the Middle East. However, water is one of the issues that has not been properly addressed in terms of its geopolitical importance in Iran’s policies.

Although nowadays the issue of “water crisis” is one of the topics that is on everyone’s lips and there is not a day that the effects and consequences of it, such as drying up of wetlands and improper consumption and management solutions, are not discussed in terms of various aspects, the role of water from the perspective of regional and international perspectives has been overshadowed in major diplomatic decision-making or has been under the influence of other issues, including political and security considerations, of lower importance.

From an international perspective, Iran is located in regions where the issue of water, along with energy, holds special importance. For example, despite good cooperation between neighboring countries in the northwestern region of Iran in utilizing the shared Aras river, which originates from Turkey and is jointly divided between Iran, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, the political complexities between Azerbaijan and Armenia and Turkey’s activities in the source can potentially destabilize the existing stability and affect Iran as well.

Turkey, as a neighbor in the northwest of Iran and influential in the western region of the country, has been mentioned as one of the leading countries in the world’s hydro-political space and, in a way, goes against the global cooperation-centered approach for fair and rational use based on the principle of non-harm to others. Turkey is among the countries that are considered a top-down country in terms of water resources. In 1980, the Southeast Anatolia Project, known as “GAP”, began its work based on initial plans that were formed by order of “Atatürk” in 1936. This is happening while countries like Syria and Iraq, which are located downstream of this basin, are deeply concerned about Turkey’s policies in controlling water resources and the effects of this project on their political, economic, and social future.

The behavioral pattern of Turkey in exploiting the Tigris-Euphrates basin, based on a hydro-hegemonic approach and realist policies, has led to a change in the hydro-political regime of this basin. With the emergence of the ISIS movement, Iraq and Syria have become secondary players in water diplomacy in the region, and the Kurds of Iraq and the ISIS group, due to political and geographical conditions, can potentially exert power and act as proxies for Turkey (in reducing political-water pressures) against lower-tier countries. Therefore, this policy approach of Turkey in the Tigris-Euphrates basin has put at risk the political and social structures that are shared and intertwined with Iraq, Syria, and the Kurdistan region of Iraq, as well as Iran.

Furthermore, Iraq in western Iran, which has long been a strategic rival from a political and economic perspective (especially in terms of oil), has become very vulnerable due to its major territory being located in the Tigris-Euphrates watershed and the resulting activities of upstream countries, especially Turkey, to control and manipulate water. This, along with internal wars and Saddam Hussein’s mismanagement and history of actions in the Mesopotamian marshes (mainly draining them for pressure on the Shia population or for oil extraction), has made the situation much more complex and critical. In addition, the water interactions between Iran and Iraq, which were formed based on the 1975 Algiers Treaty (considering its historical background), and its entanglement with political and border issues, are among other issues that make Iran’s hydro-political situation unique.

Afghanistan is also known in the east of Iran as one of the prominent countries due to its location at the source of Central Asian water resources, which can be a serious factor in creating water disputes in the region. This issue, considering the significant differences in economic development between this country and other regional countries, along with seemingly planned policies for “control” of shared and border waters, which are explicitly promoted by its officials, has created serious concerns within a susceptible geopolitical system and the “great game” of regional (India and Pakistan) and global powers (East and West) for the lower countries in the shared river basins with Afghanistan.

With a passing glance at Iran and, in general, in a larger view of Central Asia and the Middle East, the blue conflicts in occupied lands and Israel’s hydro-hegemonic policies for complete control of water (even collecting rainwater on the roofs of Palestinian homes on the western coast requires permission from the Israeli army) ranging from water disputes between Turkey, Iraq, and Syria to post-Soviet water conflicts between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, and Iran’s position in the center of this geography with its own serious water and environmental problems, all demonstrate the importance of Iran’s hydro-politics. This undoubtedly puts its geopolitical position under pressure and has a significant impact on the country’s overall diplomacy.

For these reasons, it is necessary to design and implement strategies for international relations among all countries in the region in various political, economic, and social areas in order to ensure the security and well-being of the people. These strategies should focus on increasing economic cooperation based on capabilities, values, and hydro-political features, as well as energy and food security indicators, with a focus on sustainable economic development and environmental protection in the region and country. Serious efforts should be made to redesign and implement these strategies.

The successful policy-making in shared border water resources not only provides the grounds for economic growth of the country, but also leads to convergence of regional interests and an increase in national and regional influence through enhanced cooperation and economic and political interactions with neighboring countries over water resources.

Notes:

1- Analyzing the current conditions and explaining the future situation of the water crisis in the country, Center for Parliamentary Research, February 9th, 2021.

2- The impact of Turkey’s external dams on the respiration of the people in the region, Mehr News Agency, 20 Farvardin 1401.

3- Quraishi, Sayedeh Zahra, and Mian Abadi, Hojjat, the role of power in water diplomacy, Iranian Water Resources Research Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 1398.

4 – The regional ecosystem is changing, Balance newspaper, 12 Shahrivar 1396.

5- Diplomacy of Water and Iran’s Role (Interview with Ali Akbar Mahrabian), Donya-ye Eqtesad Newspaper, February 20th, 2022.

6- Water War in West Asia, Tehran International Center for Studies and Research, 1st of Farvardin 1397.