Crimes against national security have always been regarded among the most sensitive and severe areas of criminal law. In all legal systems, governments consider the protection of secrets, classified information, vital facilities, and security structures to be among the fundamental elements of their political and sovereign survival. For this reason, espionage is recognized as one of the most significant crimes against the external security of states. Yet the importance of national security can never justify the negation of the foundational principles of criminal law; principles grounded in the “legality of crimes and punishments,” “strict interpretation of criminal laws,” “the necessity of a material criminal act,” and the “prohibition against punishing mere thoughts and intentions.”

In Iranian criminal law, crimes related to espionage are primarily addressed in the first chapter of Book Five of the Islamic Penal Code, under the title “Crimes Against the Internal and External Security of the Country.” The most important provisions in this regard can be found in Articles 501, 505, and 508, as well as scattered regulations concerning cooperation with hostile governments.

According to Article 501 of the Islamic Penal Code and Ta’zirat: “Anyone who knowingly and intentionally places maps, secrets, documents, or decisions concerning the country’s domestic or foreign policy at the disposal of persons lacking authorization to access them, or informs them of their contents in a manner constituting a form of espionage, shall be sentenced to imprisonment.”

Likewise, Article 508 stipulates: “Any person or group that cooperates in any manner with hostile foreign states against the Islamic Republic of Iran shall, if not deemed a mohareb [enemy of God], be sentenced to one to ten years’ imprisonment.”

In the traditional structure of Iranian criminal law, as in many classical legal systems, the realization of a security-related crime required the existence of a specific and objective material element. In other words, mere mental inclination, political preference, or even intent to commit a crime—without external manifestation and entry into the stage of execution—was generally not considered sufficient to establish a crime. Put differently, criminal law does not gain the right to intervene unless the perpetrator’s conduct enters the social sphere and creates a real threat against public security.

On this basis, a fundamental distinction exists between concepts such as “criminal intent,” “attempted crime,” “completed crime,” and “incomplete crime.” Criminal intent, so long as it does not manifest in external conduct, is merely a mental state and is not punishable in most criminal justice systems; because punishing intention and thought is considered contrary to the fundamental principles of individual liberty and judicial security.

Nevertheless, recent developments and the intensification of political, security, and regional crises within the criminal justice structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran have moved the system toward widespread securitization, such that criminal law is employed not merely to confront actual criminal conduct, but also as a mechanism for political control, preventive security measures, and the suppression of dissent. Broadly speaking, this can be viewed as a sign of the expansion of criminalization within the sphere of security law. One of the most controversial aspects of this legislative trend was the adoption of the “Law on Intensifying Punishment for Espionage and Cooperation with the Zionist Regime and Hostile States Against National Security and Interests” in 2025 (1404), through which criminalization based on mere suspicion, the existence of intent to cooperate, or even mental inclination has paved the way for criminal intervention and punishment. In this law, expansive and interpretable concepts such as “cooperation,” “assistance,” “communication,” “action toward cooperation,” and even certain preparatory acts have been brought within the scope of criminal intervention—an issue that, from the perspective of modern criminal law, raises serious questions regarding the limits of criminalization and the legitimacy of state intervention in the realm of individual freedoms.

What has made this law particularly controversial is not merely the intensification of punishments, but rather the expansion of criminal liability into the realm of “intent to cooperate,” even without the realization of a criminal result. In some cases, the distance between “criminal thought” and “criminal conduct” has been dramatically reduced. This development may be regarded as a sign of a gradual shift from “act-based criminal law” toward “intent- and motive-based criminal law,” an approach that criminal law scholarship often describes as “enemy-oriented criminal law.”

From this perspective, examining the new law on intensifying punishment for espionage is not merely an analysis of a security law, but also a study of the limits of the state’s punitive power, the relationship between security and liberty, and the degree of the legal system’s commitment to the fundamental principles of fair trial and human rights—particularly given that many of the concepts employed in this law face serious legal challenges in terms of clarity, predictability, and susceptibility to broad interpretation.

In classical criminal law, the principle is that no one may be punished merely for holding a belief, mental inclination, or internal intention unless a specific and provable criminal act has been committed. In other words, the criminal act itself must be proven, not merely suspicion or security-based interpretations directed at a person. In newer laws that increasingly move toward enemy-oriented criminal law, individuals are prosecuted and punished not on the basis of committed acts, but rather based on affiliations, inclinations, or security perceptions. Thus, mere possible contact, expression of opinion, communication with foreign media, civil or political activity, or the interpretation of security institutions regarding a person’s intentions and tendencies may become grounds for prosecution—even in the absence of any concrete criminal outcome. For this reason, criminalizing “intent to cooperate” without the realization of effective external conduct can shift the criminal justice system from one based on criminal acts to one based on individuals’ personalities and mentalities; a danger that ultimately weakens citizens’ legal security, the presumption of innocence, and fundamental freedoms, while paving the way for arbitrary and legally unsupported confrontations.

To clarify the above issues, it is necessary to draw a fundamental distinction between concepts such as “criminal intent,” “attempt,” “completed crime,” and “incomplete crime.” Criminal intent, so long as it has not manifested in external conduct, remains merely a mental condition and is not punishable in most criminal justice systems; because punishing intention and thought is contrary to the fundamental principles of individual freedom and judicial security. The mere formation of an intention to commit a crime is not sufficient to establish criminal liability. In classical criminal law, criminal intervention should not begin until criminal intent manifests itself through objective and external conduct. Accordingly, legal scholars distinguish between the various stages of criminal realization, from criminal intent to completed crime. The importance of this distinction becomes even greater in security-related offenses and newer laws that move toward criminalizing preparatory acts and individuals’ intentions.

Criminal intent, or mens rea, refers to the mental state and will of the individual to commit a crime. At this stage, the offense has not yet entered the realm of external conduct and exists solely in the perpetrator’s mind. In modern criminal law, the principle is that criminal thought alone is not punishable, because punishing individuals on the basis of their thoughts and intentions conflicts with freedom of thought and the presumption of innocence. In other words, if a person merely decides to commit a crime but undertakes no concrete executive action, criminal liability has not yet arisen. This principle constitutes one of the most important guarantees of individual freedoms within the legal system.

Once the perpetrator moves beyond the stage of criminal intent and enters the execution stage, but the crime is not completed due to circumstances beyond their control, the issue of attempt arises. Therefore, in an attempted crime, mere intention is insufficient; executive operations must have begun. Because attempt creates an objective danger to public order and the rights of others, criminal law intervenes. Consequently, the basis for punishing an attempt is not merely criminal intent, but the external manifestation of danger and the entry of criminal conduct into the execution stage. This distinction is one of the most important safeguards of individual freedoms in modern criminal law, because it prevents the state from prosecuting individuals solely due to their inclinations or mental intentions.

With the establishment of all legal, material, and psychological elements, the crime is realized and the legislator’s intended result is achieved. Under such circumstances, the offense has moved beyond the stages of intent and preparatory acts and has fully materialized. As previously stated, there exists a fundamental and highly significant distinction between criminal intent and criminal conduct. Although security-oriented criminal policy seeks to expand criminal intervention into the earliest stages of perceived danger, extending criminalization to the level of intent to cooperate—without the realization of a specific material act—can challenge the principle of strict interpretation of criminal laws and the necessity of a material element in crime.

New security laws in certain countries, including Iran, have moved toward expanding preemptive criminalization; meaning that even before actual cooperation occurs, before any harm materializes, and even where the result may never be achievable, individuals may still face criminal prosecution. Considering all the foregoing analyses, the expansion of criminalization from completed crime to attempted crime, and then to areas approaching impossible crimes, reflects the growing tendency of security-oriented criminal policy toward preemptive intervention. If implemented without precise legal standards, this approach can erase the boundary between genuine threats and mere suspicion or security-based assumptions, thereby placing individuals’ fundamental rights at risk.

The criminalization of “intent to cooperate” and the expansion of criminal liability into the realm of vague, preparatory, and unrealized conduct is not merely a simple legislative change. From the perspective of criminal law theory, it can lead to the weakening of some of the most fundamental principles governing criminal justice—principles that have, over decades, been recognized in domestic law and international human rights instruments as essential guarantees against arbitrary intervention by the state’s punitive power.

A) Conflict with the Principle of Legality of Crimes and Punishments

The principle of legality of crimes and punishments is one of the foundational principles of modern criminal law. According to this principle, no conduct is considered criminal unless it has been clearly and explicitly defined as such in advance by law. This principle, recognized in various legal systems and international instruments—including Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—serves as a safeguard against arbitrary punitive power by the state.

The philosophy behind this principle is that citizens must be able to predict with certainty the boundaries between permitted and prohibited conduct, and the state must not prosecute individuals through broad or security-oriented interpretations of behavior lacking clear criminal boundaries. However, the new law, by employing broad and undefined concepts such as “action toward cooperation,” “intent to cooperate,” “creating grounds for cooperation,” or “communication for the purpose of cooperation,” has effectively expanded criminalization from objective and concrete conduct into the realm of mental states, perceptions, and suspicions. Under such conditions, the criterion for determining criminality is shaped not by clear material conduct, but by the interpretation of security or judicial authorities—something that directly conflicts with the essence of the legality principle.

B) Conflict with the Principle of Certainty and Clarity in Criminal Law

One of the essential requirements of criminal laws is that they possess “certainty,” “clarity,” and “predictability.” Criminal law must be sufficiently clear for individuals to recognize the legal consequences of their conduct and understand the limits of criminal liability.

Ambiguity in defining the elements of a crime not only weakens citizens’ legal security, but also creates the conditions for discretionary enforcement, contradictory interpretations, and political misuse of the law.

In the new law, concepts such as “cooperation,” “effective communication,” “action toward cooperation,” or “potential cooperation” lack clear and objective criteria. The law does not specify:

• What type of communication constitutes cooperation?
• Where is the boundary between professional, media-related, academic, or human rights-related contact and security cooperation?
• By what criteria should “intent to cooperate” be established?

As a result, individuals may face criminal prosecution without being able to foresee in advance that their conduct falls within the scope of criminal prohibition. Such a situation is clearly incompatible with the principle of certainty in modern criminal law and with fair trial standards.

C) Conflict with the Principle of Strict Interpretation of Criminal Laws

According to the principle of strict interpretation, criminal laws must be interpreted narrowly and in favor of the accused, and no judicial authority has the right to expand the scope of criminalization through broad interpretation.

This principle is the natural consequence of the legality principle; because if criminal law is vague and open to broad interpretation, the distinction between legislation and adjudication effectively disappears, allowing judges to expand the scope of criminal offenses based on personal perceptions or political considerations.

The new law, due to its use of elastic terms lacking precise legal definitions, effectively creates the conditions for broad interpretation. Within such a structure, the following may potentially be interpreted as “evidence of cooperation” or “action toward cooperation”:

• International communications,
• Media activities,
• Academic collaborations,
• Human rights interactions,
• Or even the expression of political opinions,

without the existence of a clear and independent material element necessary for the realization of a crime.

Thus, the law departs from the narrow framework of criminal law and moves toward criminalization based on intention and perception.

D) Conflict with the Presumption of Innocence

The presumption of innocence is one of the most fundamental guarantees of criminal justice. According to this principle, every person is presumed innocent unless their guilt is established through clear, lawful, and definitive evidence.

In cases based on “intent to cooperate” or vague security-related concepts, the risk of shifting the burden of proof and undermining the presumption of innocence increases dramatically; because the core element of the accusation is not a specific material act, but rather a subjective interpretation of the individual’s intentions, communications, or motives.

Under such conditions, the accused is compelled to defend not against a specific criminal act, but against a “security interpretation” of their relationships, contacts, or activities. In practice, this transforms the presumption of innocence into a presumption of guilt—especially in systems where judicial independence is limited and security institutions play a dominant role in criminal prosecution.

Consequently, criminalizing intent to cooperate can seriously weaken the fundamental guarantees of fair trial and blur the boundary between criminal justice and security repression.

H) Conflict with Human Rights and Obligations Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

The criminalization of “intent to cooperate” and the expansion of criminal liability into the realm of intentions, communications, and conduct lacking criminal outcomes is not merely a domestic legal issue; from the perspective of international human rights law, it also carries serious and troubling consequences. This type of legislation—particularly when accompanied by broad, vague, and interpretable concepts—can conflict with a range of fundamental rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the Islamic Republic of Iran is also a party and whose provisions it is obligated to observe under international law.

Moreover, such regulations may violate Article 19 of the Covenant, which guarantees freedom of expression. In many authoritarian systems, criminalizing intention or unrealized communications effectively becomes a tool for suppressing opinions, academic relations, media activity, political engagement, or even civil activism. When individuals are prosecuted merely because of expressing opinions, corresponding with others, making contact, or being suspected of an “intent to cooperate,” the sphere of freedom of expression and information exchange becomes severely restricted.

Likewise, Article 17 of the Covenant, which protects the right to privacy and the inviolability of correspondence and communications, is also at risk of violation; because proving “intent to cooperate” typically requires extensive monitoring of individuals’ correspondence, messages, calls, and communications. This can lead to expanded security surveillance and arbitrary interference in citizens’ private lives.

Furthermore, extending criminal liability to the level of “intention” and “purpose” without the realization of tangible executive conduct also implicates Article 14 of the Covenant, particularly with respect to fair trial guarantees and the requirement of clear and objective evidence for attributing criminal responsibility. In such cases, the standard for proving crime shifts from material and verifiable conduct to subjective interpretations and security analyses, thereby increasing the risk of convictions based on suspicion, security reports, and unverifiable interpretations.

The criminalization of “intent to cooperate” cannot be viewed merely as a legislative expansion in the area of security crimes. Rather, this approach may fundamentally transform the nature of criminal law itself—from an exceptional tool for confronting realized criminal conduct into a mechanism for controlling individuals before the occurrence of any actual crime, based solely on probability, suspicion, intent, or security perceptions, and for politically managing citizens. When lawmakers substitute objective and provable conduct with vague notions such as “intent,” “creating grounds,” or “communication aimed at cooperation” as the basis for criminal liability, the boundary between genuine security threats and legitimate political, media, or civil activity becomes weakened, creating the conditions for broad and discretionary interpretation by security institutions.

The practical consequence of such an approach is the expansion of security-related prosecutions based on suspicion and opaque analyses, the weakening of fair trial standards, and the growth of security interventions in ordinary social and professional relationships. Under these conditions, academic, media-related, human rights, or international interactions may become subject to security interpretations and treated as indicators of cooperation, even where no specific material element of a crime exists.

Moreover, ambiguity in the scope of criminalization creates a pervasive atmosphere of fear, self-censorship, and legal insecurity, such that individuals regulate their conduct and communications not according to clear legal standards, but based on the possibility of security misinterpretation. Consequently, criminal law departs from its protective and justice-oriented function and becomes a tool for controlling the public sphere, restricting civil liberties, and psychologically managing society—something fundamentally incompatible with the principles of the rule of law, the legality of crimes and punishments, and human rights standards.