The season of oppressors’ failure.

First, it is necessary to mention that when the writer decided to write this article, the conditions were different in two ways. First, it was difficult to predict the continuation of protests for more than two weeks, but this happened for various reasons, similar to many events that have puzzled the world and Iran during recent protests. Second, the way the government dealt with the issue of internet shutdown and the method of imposing restrictions in comparison to previous protests, especially in November 1998, and the lack of accountability of official authorities and institutions that are expected to provide answers, was more interesting in the early days of the protests than it is now. However, during the time that has passed since then until the writing of this report, the government has opened doors of violence and suppression that perhaps it was thought more time was needed to open them. Now, in a situation where the oppressive forces welcome elementary school students with tear gas and there are no wise listeners, talking about the responsibility of the Ministry of Communications

Where is the difference?

The internet shutdown during the recent protests was different in several aspects compared to the November 2019 protests. During the November 2019 protests, the internet was completely cut off, meaning that it was not accessible at all, contrary to what the Islamic Republic officials believe. Only internal networks, known as the national information network, were available, and sometimes it was referred to as the “national internet,” which is a contradictory term. However, during this period, the shutdown was not implemented unilaterally and with a specific pattern. Instead, a general internet shutdown was replaced by a widespread filtering of social media networks, starting with Instagram and WhatsApp, and later targeting Skype, LinkedIn, Viber, and others. It even reached a point where the government began filtering computer games that had chat capabilities, and also blocked access to VPNs (virtual private networks), meaning that app stores like the App Store and Google Play were also filtered. In addition, mobile internet was disrupted for almost a month, and

Another tool that the government used to prevent people’s access to the free internet was to combat anti-filtering. Since the beginning of its activity, the Ministry of Communications of the Islamic Republic of Iran has faced disruptions in the country’s internet and there was almost no day that people were not confronted with a normal internet, even with Islamic Republic’s scales. This internet war was also about cutting off anti-filtering until it reached its highest level with the recent protests. Blocking anti-filtering brought the work to a point where “Digito”, a specialized technology website in Iran, wrote on October 16th: access to VPNs became almost impossible. It was the same day that the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology announced that, in addition to filtering Instagram and WhatsApp, all internet restrictions had been lifted. It only took a few hours for the lies of the Iranian Ministry of Communications to be proven.

National Suppression Network

One of the main differences between the current Minister of Communications, Eisa Zar’epour, and the former Minister of Security, Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi, is their approach to authority. Azari Jahromi was a government minister who had control over certain aspects of the government. One of these points of contention was the national information network, which was always a source of complaint for higher authorities such as the Supreme Council of Virtual Space and the Ministry of Communications of the previous government. He emphasized his own special policies in the corridors of power to develop the national information network and even defended it by denying any connection to the outside world through this network, while at the same time trying to counteract the media space. The young Minister Hassan Rouhani even said, “A national internet is not possible and is a betrayal.” (Etemad newspaper, November 2019) The national information network, or the domestic internet, tries to strengthen domestic platforms so that the government can reduce

Hello Instagram.

Instagram can be considered the largest market in Iran. Some estimates indicate the presence of 400,000 Iranian businesses on this platform. “Meta”, the parent company of Instagram, although voluntarily closed the Explore section of Instagram completely in response to the protests of the Iranian people and did not allow any content related to it to be displayed, but the officials of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran decided to filter it again. The head of the Electronic Commerce Development Center of the Ministry of Industry of Iran announced the daily financial turnover of Instagram to be sixty-five billion tomans, which has suffered a seventy-five percent loss in the most optimistic scenario by filtering this social network. Some estimates have also considered the livelihood of nearly ten million people in Iran directly and indirectly dependent on Instagram. The statements of the Minister of Communications of Iran that he has no responsibility for removing the filter on this social network show that the authorities have no intention of reopening it. In addition, Zarifpour and many government officials have said during

Suppression of Infertility.

Filtering Instagram in Iran, according to what officials of the Islamic Republic say, is due to the coverage of protests in Iran and, as they put it, “riots”. The policy of filtering Telegram has shown to be ineffective. It had only been ten days since Instagram was filtered when the video of the protest song “For…” sung by Shervin Haji Pour, reached forty million views in less than three days on the filtered Instagram, despite widespread disruption of filtering software. The song became so popular that the government decided to arrest the singer and after a few days, Shervin Haji Pour was forced to make a forced confession on the same filtered Instagram.

Instagram was filtered to combat the spread of news, but it remained far from achieving its main goal. In practice, Iranian visits to Instagram and tracking of protest news were pursued in a desirable manner, but the businesses of individuals, many of whom were from the middle class, faced serious problems. Islamic Republic officials, as in the past, have proven that by filtering, they only make access more difficult. Behrouz Mahbobi, the representative of Sabzevar, had said about the filtering of the most popular social network in Iran: “Undoubtedly, the government will not lift the filter on WhatsApp and Instagram, because their platforms are under the supervision of the enemies of the country and we cannot pursue violators on them.” Cutting off the bread of Instagram merchants will definitely lead to increased dissatisfaction. Filtering also did not prevent people from accessing news, as the Islamic Republic had hoped. This is where we can see that the system is even unable to suppress virtual activities.

Zigzag path suppression.

Despite all these characteristics, the disconnection of people in this period has a fundamental difference with previous periods; in this period, the dominant pattern did not follow a specific and unified approach to cutting off the internet. Some days, the mobile internet was cut off from the morning, sometimes the fixed internet was also nationalized, and sometimes the internet of a specific operator was disconnected. The method that the system used to cut off the internet was so confusing that it bewildered people; of course, as mentioned, virtual suppression did not achieve its goal, and people still found ways to bypass filtering and publish the truth on the internet. The zigzag path of virtual suppression in this period may have been due to false trust in the system’s reliance on the national information network or confusion in the implementation method, it is not clear. What is certain is its inefficiency.

In recent years, the Islamic Republic has attempted to implement a Chinese model of the internet and exert more control over this space, fearing the influence of online activists. However, the difference here is that China enforces its dictatorship through a powerful and efficient government that leads the world’s second largest economy. It can replace popular Western platforms with its own efficient alternatives, so that the absence of Western platforms is not felt. While the Islamic Republic is struggling to secure its cyber infrastructure and is lagging behind, it wants to establish an Iranian version of China in the Middle East. However, as always, it appears to be much better in slogans and pretense than in action.