Sadeq Zibakalam is one of the academic figures and opinion leaders who, despite his outspoken words, may be best known for his resilience in the political conditions of Iran in recent years. This strength has made him an influential, knowledgeable, and fearless figure in the eyes of his supporters, and a government theorist and, as a result, a figure of fear for his critics.

I contacted his office at the Faculty of Law and Political Science at the University of Tehran for this conversation on a summer afternoon in the eventful month of Mordad in 1392. He was surprised that I was lucky enough to catch him before he left for “prayer” two minutes later. Zibakalam believes that a proper diagnosis has not been done to discover the reasons for the failure of Iran’s hundred-year journey to democracy, but he says he has come to the conclusion that the biggest reason for this failure is the tendency of the elite to say “camel”, which is apparently a combination of “Zibakalami” to mock the unjustified grandiosity of the Iranian elite during times of relative openness in our contemporary history.

Thank you for the time you have given to “Peace Line”; with your permission, let’s start the interview with a fundamental question: What is the definition of “civil society”?

There are several classical and historical definitions in political science regarding this matter. Civil society means a society in which there is an intermediary and a barrier between power, political power, sovereignty, government, and the people, in which with the help of these intermediaries and barriers, the people can be protected from the power of the government and act as a shield to defend themselves against the government. Any society that has such intermediaries that act as a mediator and a barrier between the government and the people can be considered as a civil society.

Very good, now considering the definition you provided, are there any elements or components that can be considered as distinguishing features of civil society in Iran and other countries of the world? In other words, are such definitions compatible with the composition of Iranian society?

Yes, in Iran there is a tradition that says imagine this definition that exists about “class” is true about Western societies, or the definition that exists about “revolution” is about Western societies, these theories that exist about Western societies and we do not have such definitions in Iran. Or for example, this pattern that political science experts present, this pattern does not match and is not compatible with Iranian society because Iranian society has its own coordinates, whether cultural, religious, historical, or civilizational. The audience also says it is a reasonable argument. For example, Swedish society has its own background, history, and civilization, its religion is different, many of its social beliefs are different, so someone who says such things is right and the definition – whatever it may be – does not fit Iranian society. That is why many in Iran are looking for an “Iranian-Islamic” pattern: the Iranian-Islamic pattern of development, the Iranian-Islamic pattern of happiness, the Iranian-Islamic pattern

We are exactly looking for this distinguishing feature. What is this thing they say makes us different?

I think that as far as it relates to civil society, we cannot talk about distinct features. It is not right at all. Iranians also love democracy, free elections, the rule of law, and are also against despotism, dictatorship, and police systems. Swedes are the same, and so are the people of Mars! Who is not like this?… See, my point is that there is no difference between civil society in Iran, Sweden, or Afghanistan. Civil society is civil society. I want to say it’s like “Coca-Cola”. Coca-Cola is the same in Iran, Sweden, and Afghanistan, and people in all three societies love it. You cannot say that Coca-Cola was created in the West and is a Western concept, we have tea in Iran, we have coffee in Iran, we have sherbet, we have milk, but we don’t have Coca-Cola in Iran. On the contrary! Whoever brought Coca-Cola to Iran did a great job. The

Can the difference be attributed to the fact that the historical development of civil institutions and components of civil society in these countries, as mentioned in your example, has reached a certain level, while in Iran the process has been different?

From this perspective, it is not possible to claim a difference. Because the political and civil development that has occurred in Western societies has not been hindered by a historical background and is not due to the differences of Iranians with others. My point is that ultimately it is Iran that becomes like democratic societies, and they do not become like Iran. In fact, if you look at the past hundred years, the democratic institutions that took root in the West gradually sprouted in Iran as well, but the political, economic, and social conditions have been such that they have not been able to grow and develop. I do not think we have societies that are “more Eastern” than India or Japan; but you can see that all the democratic mechanisms that have been created in the West have also been fully implemented in India and Japan. Well, these were Eastern societies.

In Arab countries, these systems and methods did not exist, but gradually they are finding their place. For a long time, the governments in Arab countries were military, and all figures and symbols were military: from Gamal Abdel Nasser to Hafez al-Assad, Abdul Karim Qasim, and Muammar Gaddafi. But now, when the military has come to power in Egypt and wants to intervene in politics, society is pushing them back. This is not limited to Islamists, even non-Islamists are not happy with the situation where the army is in the middle of the street.

My point is that we should not be fooled into thinking that because of our cultural and civilizational background, or because of our religious differences, we should set aside certain things and say that they can only exist in Western countries and only have relevance there, not in the Islamic Republic of Iran. No! If you look at the past hundred years, you will see that our political and social behavior is becoming more and more similar to that of democratic societies.

Of course, I don’t know in what way you are talking about comparing India and Japan with Iran…

From this perspective, some people in Iran say that we are Easterners, and our culture, history, and religion are very different from what exists in the Western world. By this, I mean that this can also be said by Indians and Japanese.

The role of religion in these two countries is different from Iran. But now, regarding the Arab countries that you mentioned, which one do you consider to be a more successful and pioneering model in terms of civil society?

Arab societies are moving towards a direction where governmental and political structures that started about 150-200 years ago in Europe are being adopted. This means they are implementing things like voting and moving towards those systems. In reality, all of these changes boil down to the fact that the removal and installation of governments must be done by the people. The government does not have absolute power and its power is limited to what is allowed by the law…which is something that is difficult to achieve in many countries. But let us remember that even in Europe, it was not easy for liberal democracy to become established gradually. The same goes for Arab countries. We cannot expect them to make a hundred years of progress in one night.

Now among these Arab societies – which have more similarities to Iran compared to India and Japan – which one do you consider to be a more successful model?

I do not agree with this question because we do not have different models in Arab countries to say which one is more successful. What we can say from a political science perspective is how the situation is during growth, evolution, and transition to democracy. Just as we can say how the automotive industry is in Egypt, Libya, or Syria, we can say where they stand in comparison to the automotive industry in the West, and when Egyptians will reach the level of the West. In my opinion, democracy and civil society are the same. You can say when the Islamic Republic of Iran, Egypt, Libya, or Tunisia can reach a political model called “liberal democracy” that is dominant in the West today and also in Japan, India, Brazil, and Argentina. Some are behind and some are ahead; Saudi Arabia is far behind, but Kuwait is far ahead of Saudi Arabia. The United Arab Emirates is far behind Kuwait, but ahead of Saudi Arabia. Egypt is far ahead of all of them.

Okay, let’s go back to Iran today. Considering the eight-year legacy of Mr. Ahmadinejad’s government, do you think the election of Mr. Rouhani as president will bring about a change in Iranian civil society?

Definitely!… Definitely creates. See, the space has become much more open now that Mr. Rouhani’s so-called government has not officially been established and has not started working. Let me give an example: I wrote an open letter [to Mr. Rouhani] saying that many people in Iran ask why we should have enmity with America. On the other hand, some say that we should have enmity with America and list their reasons. I have been thinking for a long time that Article 59 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran says that important matters of the country can be decided through a referendum. Let’s have a referendum on “enmity with America, yes or no?” If half plus one of the people say that enmity with America should continue, Mr. Rouhani should continue enmity. If they say no, well, we should think about it. Whatever democracy means, if the majority of the people of Iran say that

Today, I was at my publisher’s office, at “Roozaneh” publications, and they told me that two of my books that did not have a publishing license will definitely receive one in the next few days. Such changes and developments… well, this is what civil society means, having institutions that act as intermediaries between the people and the government.

In order for the government not to be in a hurry and for people to be able to pursue their demands, what solution do you think there is, considering the developments of the past 16 years?

“Even if you go back and say, 34 years after the revolution and 100 years after the constitutional revolution! Look, here I want to speak as a teacher and a researcher of the political developments in Iran, and all I have to say is that one of the reasons for our failure, the failure of civil society in Iran, the failure of transition to democracy in Iran, and the failure of political development in Iran, is exactly this. We have had many periods in contemporary Iranian history where there have been political changes and transformations in society: we had it after the constitutional revolution, we had it after the fall of Reza Shah, during Ali Amini’s time, the years 40-39 were also a time of political openness, we had it during the revolution, we had it during the second of Khordad, but the question that arises is why it doesn’t continue? The question is complicated and we have never gone towards seriously addressing such questions. Some general answers have

But one of the reasons that I personally have reached it is that when more desirable political and social conditions are established in Iran, our elites, intellectuals, and writers, because they have come out from under a heavy political pressure, want to shout. I figuratively say they want to say “Shutur!” and they want to say something big, which makes that space unable to continue. Like a person who has been sick for a while and you want to give him soup and fruit juice during his recovery, instead on the first day when his fever breaks, you give him chicken and meat and kebab and sherbet and cream, he won’t recover well. So I hope this time we don’t really say “Shutur.” This time let’s try to defend and irrigate the very big transformation that happened in our country on June 14th and let it grow.

How can people help? What is the practical way to approach it?

The people here are not idle. The elites, political activists, writers, and sincere speakers should take action now. My address is to the sincere speaker, that we should not give in, we should not scream, and we should not have unrealistic expectations. Let’s not do anything that would make the right-wing and conservatives, or fundamentalists, – or whatever we call them – think that everything is falling apart and we have no solution but to suppress. It is very important how we behave in this moment, and by “elites” I mean us.

So, what is your opinion about movements like the “Rouhani Meter” website, which has been launched to track the people’s demands, and the claim made by Mr. Rouhani that they can solve problems within 100 days?

I strongly disagree, not with that website, but with the fact that we tell Mr. Rouhani that you promised to solve all problems and issues within 100 days of the election. I explicitly express to you that if Mr. Rouhani cannot make any progress and achieve success in the deadlock between us and the “1+5” group regarding the nuclear program, it seems unlikely to me that he can succeed in other areas. In my opinion, the first lesson of his success is to come out of the crisis of negotiating with the “1+5” group.