Dowry has always been a contentious issue in Iran, both legally and socially. In recent years, with the worsening economic situation, it has become even more important and complex. Rooted in religious and historical traditions, dowry has now—amid social changes and economic crises in Iran—turned into a legal battleground and sometimes a source of tension within families. One proposal, aiming to reduce pressure on the judiciary and decrease the number of financial prisoners, suggested limiting the enforceability of dowry to just 14 gold coins. From the outset, this plan faced serious and widespread criticism from legal experts, women’s rights activists, and even some members of the government.

The proposal, introduced in the Judiciary Committee of the Iranian Parliament, sought to lower the criminal liability of husbands regarding dowry from the current 110 gold coins to 14. However, the considerable legal and social ambiguities surrounding the plan led to a halt in its review, and it effectively stalled in both Parliament and the administration—particularly after Zahra Behravazad, Vice President for Women and Family Affairs, publicly called for its suspension. She stated that the plan lacked sufficient expert consultation and only increased concern among women while triggering more dowry-related legal claims. Behravazad stressed that if reforms in this area are to take place, they must address all family-related elements—such as contractual stipulations, divorce rights, child custody, and women’s financial independence—rather than isolating one part of the system. Consequently, the administration officially requested a review and temporary suspension of the proposal so its consequences could be properly evaluated.

In this highly sensitive and complicated climate surrounding family legislation, fundamental questions arise: Is this proposal legally enforceable? Has it been thoroughly studied by experts? And most importantly, can such changes ensure justice in family relationships, or will they undermine women’s rights?

In the following interview, Peace Mark Monthly Magazine seeks answers to these questions through a conversation with Iman Soleymani, a senior attorney with 25 years of experience in various legal fields, including family disputes. Mr. Soleymani asserts that in his view, the proposed plan and its potential legalization will not solve the existing issues in family law, particularly in dowry-related claims in Iran. In this interview, Peace Mark Monthly Magazine aims to provide a clear picture of the current challenges, the possible consequences, and the legal requirements needed to reform dowry regulations in Iran.

Below is the full interview with Iman Soleymani, senior attorney and member of the Iranian Bar Association:

From a legal and practical standpoint, how feasible is the implementation of the proposal to limit dowry enforcement to 14 coins? Has there been adequate expert consultation?

What’s currently being discussed is still in the form of a draft and has not yet become law. Parliament has shelved it due to various criticisms from women’s rights activists and human rights defenders. It’s now stuck in the bureaucracy of Parliament and the government, and given the recent developments—like Israel’s attack on Iran and the wartime atmosphere—I don’t think it’s a legislative priority at the moment.

But to answer your question directly, from my 25 years of experience as a practicing lawyer handling many cases, including divorce and dowry disputes, I can say that even if this proposal becomes law, it will not solve the problem. Whether dowry is a thousand coins or 14, it does not guarantee the sustainability of a marriage. And as those familiar with legal principles say, any legislative proposal must be comprehensive and exclusionary—it should address all aspects and be written in such a way that no one can exploit or ignore it. In my opinion, this draft still needs more expert work. As is, they can’t pass it. Of course, what I say is just my opinion. In Parliament, they often do whatever they want. Experience shows that our lawmakers aren’t even familiar with the ABCs of law and legal writing. They are not in touch with society. For instance, the members of the Judiciary Committee have never practically worked in this field, never been in courts, never dealt directly with people. So even if this gets passed, its legal gaps will remain. Dowry in our legal system is derived from Islamic jurisprudence. Our Civil Code is dual-faceted, and mostly rooted in religious law. Article 1082 of the Civil Code is very clear about a woman’s ownership of her dowry. We don’t know what the outcome will be, but I don’t believe this law can resolve current family court issues, especially in dowry cases.

So, is it even practically enforceable?

This current draft says that dowry up to 14 coins can be enforced. That is, during marriage, a woman can have 2,000 or 3,000 coins as dowry—there’s no limit on that. But only up to 14 coins will have criminal enforceability. So a wife can demand those 14 coins and use the criminal justice system.

If the law is passed, can a wife still seek seizure of assets for the remainder of her dowry beyond the 14 coins? Or will this also be restricted?

No, it won’t be restricted. The aim of this proposal and law, based on my earlier review and colleagues’ assessments, is to reduce the number of people jailed for dowry-related debt. The prisons don’t have space for such inmates. They also want to reduce the volume of cases and eliminate imprisonment for dowry. To your question—yes, the wife can still seize the husband’s assets for the remaining amount. The 14-coin cap only removes the possibility of imprisonment. Enforcement through asset seizure remains intact.

If passed, will the law apply to marriages conducted before its enactment? In other words, will it be retroactive or only apply to new marriages?

According to general legal principles in Iran, newly enacted laws are retroactive if they benefit the defendant—unless the legislator explicitly states otherwise. This draft says nothing about retroactivity, and that’s one of its flaws. But generally, laws benefiting the public are retroactive unless explicitly prohibited. So currently, lawyers are asking Parliament and the Judiciary Committee whether this law will be retroactive. They’ve remained silent. In my view, since the law would benefit jailed men, it would be retroactive—unless it is expressly denied.

Under current law, can a husband still be jailed for failing to pay dowry up to 110 coins?

Yes. For instance, if the dowry is a thousand coins, the wife can enforce up to 110 coins and have the husband jailed for failure to pay. For the rest—above 110—she can only seek seizure of assets. She can’t request an arrest warrant.

If the new law passes, what changes in this process?

The cap of 110 coins will be reduced to 14 coins.

If a husband claims insolvency but the court rejects it, how does the enforcement process proceed? Will he be jailed, or is there an alternative mechanism?

Under current law, whether the dowry is 14, 110, or a thousand coins, the husband can file for insolvency. The court then examines the claim. If the wife brings evidence that he is capable but evading payment and the court rejects his insolvency claim, he will be jailed until he pays.

Currently, only imprisonment and travel bans are used in such cases. In the proposed law, they want to replace imprisonment with electronic ankle monitors—so the man would remain under surveillance but not behind bars. Their rationale is that imprisonment is unproductive. Instead, he would be monitored electronically and barred from leaving the country while working to pay off his debt.

This proposal raises concerns about weakening women’s financial rights. What alternative or supplementary legal tools—like division of assets, conditional dowry clauses, or marriage stipulations—can be included to protect women?

Even with this 14-coin cap, couples can stipulate any conditions in their marriage contract—as long as they don’t contradict the essence of the marriage. The Civil Code says this. So, if a couple includes valid, enforceable conditions, they are legally binding.

Older marriage documents included “payable upon demand” clauses (i.e., ‘ind al-talab), and couples can now choose “subject to ability” clauses (‘ind al-istita‘ah), meaning the woman must prove the husband has the means to pay. This creates challenges. The law should offer women peace of mind and strengthen marriages, but such legislative efforts miss the mark.

Couples can stipulate child custody rights, travel permission, partial property ownership, or even a Hajj trip. But let’s be realistic—if a man can’t afford 14 coins, how will he fulfill these other promises? These remain empty words. The law must be both comprehensive and practical, grounded in societal realities and Iran’s traditional structure.

Dowry is both a traditional and religious institution in our society. But yes, stipulations that don’t violate the essence of the contract and are executable can be included.

Upon a husband’s death, is the dowry paid from his estate? How is it prioritized among other debts—like bank loans, another wife’s dowry, burial expenses, etc.?

If there’s an estate, yes—dowry is paid from it. It’s classified as privileged debt. This includes dowry, alimony, and wage compensation owed to the wife. It takes precedence over inheritance division and other debts. The proposed law doesn’t alter this. Once the wife files a petition, her share is immediately secured before any estate is divided.

If the husband has no estate, is this debt transferred to his father or grandfather? Or is it nullified?

That’s a separate matter. If the husband dies before his father, he won’t inherit anything. But if he dies after his father, and inherits assets, the wife can seize those. But the debt doesn’t transfer to the husband’s father or grandfather unless there are inherited assets.

Given societal changes, could dowry eventually become symbolic or obsolete like the now-defunct concept of shirbaha (bride price)?

I doubt it. Dowry and shirbaha are fundamentally different. Shirbaha has never been part of our legal system—it’s customary in tribal areas like Khuzestan or Isfahan. Dowry, however, has legal and religious basis and won’t fade easily.

That said, it has certainly lost much of its past value. But at least the law supports it. In many cases, men with considerable assets transfer them before a dispute to avoid payment. Women are then forced to waive their dowry just to get a divorce.

The new draft does have some merits. For instance, if a woman lives separately from her husband for a year or two—without sexual or emotional relations—she can file for divorce citing hardship (‘usr wa haraj). This is already in existing law but rarely granted. The proposal touches on this issue. How it plays out in practice remains to be seen.

Dowry still holds value—it represents financial independence and peace of mind for women. But due to economic hardship, it no longer functions as it once did. These days, women go to court to claim a quarter coin every few months—or even every year. Such token enforcement hardly helps someone who’s lost everything.

Lawmakers must consider both sides. Reducing prison populations is valid, but what about the woman’s life? That’s why women’s rights activists and experts argue this can’t be seen through a male-centric lens. All aspects must be considered. Based on my 25 years of experience, I don’t believe this proposal will help solve the issue.

Last question: You emphasized legislation. If we compare Iranian law with other modern civil law countries, has our system overstepped its bounds? Has it interfered too much in what should be left to the couple?

The law steps in only when the parties can’t agree. In Iran’s current Civil Code—though many criticize it for being outdated and based on religious jurisprudence—if couples thoughtfully agree at the time of marriage and state everything clearly, there’s no problem. The problem arises when they go into it blindly, brushing issues aside with sayings like “who ever really gets the dowry?” and fail to document expectations or evaluate capabilities. That’s when courts must step in and sort it out.

Right now, Iranian courts are overwhelmed with family cases. You see couples and children lost in court corridors. These conflicts consume court time and emotionally damage families—especially children. The law doesn’t want to interfere this deeply. But when the marriage contract is vague, courts must intervene based on civil and procedural codes.

In countries like Canada, everything is defined upfront. For example, if there’s a house or car, it’s jointly owned. We have similar laws in Iran—the marital asset division clause. But in practice, it’s hard to prove. The process is long and complicated, and courts must resolve the disputes. That’s their role.

Any final thoughts?

Only that hardship-based divorce (‘usr wa haraj) remains crucial. According to this draft, a woman can file for unilateral divorce under hardship. That’s a positive point. We’ll have to wait and see how things evolve.

Thank you for your time and for speaking with Peace Mark Monthly Magazine.