In the turbulent transition of the fifth decade after the 1979 revolution, Iran is facing a fundamental challenge in the field of public order and security that can be called the “erosion of the authority of the law.” The increasing statistics of street fights and personal conflicts in recent years only reveal the tip of a huge iceberg, the main body of which is the increasing desire of citizens to “personally administer justice.”

When trust in the efficacy of formal institutions wanes and legal pathways seem so costly and lengthy that they are given to those who encounter them, citizens are forced to become judges and executioners. This phenomenon, which sociologists call “vigilantism,” is less rooted in cultural or moral weaknesses than in the inevitable response to structural deadlocks; a response to survival in a situation in which the law is no longer a safe and quick refuge for litigants, and justice must be enforced not by argument but by force.

Progressive society, backward state

In his famous theory, Samuel Huntington argues in his book Political System in Changing Societies that societies that are rapidly modernizing—that is, those that are experiencing growth in education, urbanization, literacy, communication, and social awareness—are faced with increasing demands for political participation and social justice. If the political and judicial institutions of these countries fail to keep pace with these developments, instability, violence, and insecurity will result.

Huntington believes that institutions that can be flexible in the face of social change, have complex and differentiated structures, are independent of the influence of individuals and groups, and have high internal coherence are able to manage the increasing demands of society in a peaceful and law-abiding manner. However, in societies where political institutions do not have such characteristics, increased participation leads not to political development, but to chaos and widespread tensions. In such conditions, widespread protests, public distrust, tension and reactions outside the official mechanism, systematic corruption, and people taking to the streets as the only means of political influence will be common phenomena.

If we examine the situation in Iran from the perspective of legal and judicial justice within the framework of Huntington’s theory, we can show why vigilantism has become more prevalent in recent years. In Iran, structural issues in the judicial system, along with increased awareness and demand from citizens, have created conditions that pave the way for various forms of personal justice seeking. In recent decades, Iranian society, due to the expansion of education, the growth of the media, familiarity with the concepts of civil rights, and widespread communication, has come to expect efficient, fast, and impartial justice from official institutions more than ever before. Today’s people are more sensitive to the legal and judicial situation, they follow up on cases, understand the opportunity cost of judicial delays, and recognize global standards of justice and transparency. However, in contrast, the Iranian judicial system faces instability in the implementation of laws and differences in the way proceedings are conducted. This gap is the same gap that Huntington refers to as the source of instability and non-institutional reactions.

When illegal behavior becomes profitable

Robert Merton explains how social structures push individuals towards illegal behavior. When society legitimizes goals such as financial security, economic growth, or debt recovery, but blocks or renders ineffective the institutional means of achieving them (courts and police), individuals are pressured to resort to illegitimate means such as violence and force.

In Iran, where the multiplicity of laws, the complexity of bureaucracy, and administrative corruption have made legitimate means slow and costly, society has been pushed toward a state of “anomie” (anomaly) and social norms have weakened.

For example, in Iran, rampant inflation (over 50 percent) and economic instability have created enormous pressure to preserve the value of assets. But when the judicial system imposes a two-year and costly process to collect a bounced check, the rational citizen, according to Merton’s model, becomes innovative and resorts to illegitimate means (extortion, bribery, personal revenge) to achieve his legitimate goal.

The inefficiency of the judicial system has effectively raised the “opportunity cost” of using the law to such an extent that illegal behavior becomes economically “more cost-effective.”

Justice as a commodity in the hands of the powerful

French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu sees society as composed of different fields (economic, judicial, cultural), each with its own capital. In a healthy system, the “judicial field” should operate independently of the “economic field” and court rulings should not be negotiable. Otherwise, justice is no longer a public right, but a luxury good offered on the black market. Those who have “economic capital” (the ability to pay bribes or legal fees) or “social capital” (having party affiliation and connections with people in power and influence) can change rulings in their favor.

This situation excludes the lower classes, who lack these assets, from the sphere of formal justice. A deep sense of structural injustice and discrimination creates a latent anger that, in moments of crisis, erupts in explosive and blind violence. When the law is negotiable, the moral legitimacy of obeying it is lost.

When people believe that the legal path is slow, uncertain, or discriminatory, they gradually develop the mindset that rights are to be earned and that people must work to achieve them. This mindset is what Bourdieu calls a “habitus” or mental habitus: a set of dispositions for action that are shaped by lived experience.

An Iranian citizen who has repeatedly experienced turning to official institutions, often with disappointment, internalizes a habitus based on distrust of the system and self-reliance. When this habitus is activated in a moment of crisis (accident, fight, harassment), the individual unconsciously takes action themselves instead of calling the police or relies on their personal networks; family, friends, and acquaintances for support and revenge.

The collapse of the monopoly of violence

According to Max Weber, in every modern nation-state, the cornerstone of order and security is based on the concept of a “social contract.” Citizens give up their personal right to personal violence and revenge and delegate it to a superior institution called the “state.” In return, the state undertakes to resolve disputes and ensure security and justice through legal channels by establishing an impartial, efficient, and just judicial system.

Max Weber defined the state as an institution that has a “legitimate monopoly on the use of force” within a given geographical territory. This monopoly is the red line that separates civilization from barbarism and order from chaos. Hence, the stability of a society depends on no group except the official police (and that too within the framework of the law) having the right to use violence.

However, in contemporary Iran, this monopoly has collapsed in two fundamental ways, and the social contract between the nation and the state has been distorted:

-Multiplicity of institutions for the application of force: The existence of parallel security and military institutions has distorted the concept of “unity of sovereignty.” Plainclothes forces, which often operate in the form of informal but organized networks, have a dual function for the government: creating fear and terror while simultaneously providing the government with the possibility of “denial” in international forums. The presence of these forces in suppressing protests and interfering in people’s lifestyles sends a devastating message to the collective unconscious of society: “To administer the justice you desire, you do not need a uniform, a court order, and accountability; all you need is force.”

Another example is the “Fire at will” decree issued by the leadership of the Islamic Republic to students in 2017 (1396). This decree was in effect a license to bypass the state bureaucracy and to act on the whims of loyalist groups. From Max Weber’s perspective, this is a dangerous moment for the state. When the leader of a political system calls on his supporters to act independently of official structures, he effectively undermines the monopoly on legitimate violence.

-Leaving violence to the citizen : From Weber’s perspective, the state should punish the criminal on behalf of society in order to break the cycle of violence. However, in Iranian criminal law, in crimes against physical integrity (murder and assault), the right to life and death has been removed from the public sphere (the state) and transferred to the private sphere (the guardians of the soul). Here, the state only plays the role of an “agent” of the private will of individuals. This legal structure, systematically and institutionally, sanctifies and legitimizes the concept of personal revenge and reproduces the endless cycle of personal revenge under the umbrella of the law.

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A review of various theories suggests that the spread of vigilantism in Iran is not simply the result of individual emotional behavior, but rather the product of a long process of institutional erosion and declining public trust. When the law is perceived as slow, costly, or discriminatory; when judicial mechanisms are unable to respond to the demands of society; and when citizens see that informal groups or influential individuals can exercise power outside the framework of the law, the ground is prepared for the formation of personal justice.

The phenomenon of vigilantism should be seen as a sign of the diminishing role of the state in the just management of conflicts; a sign that warns that the system of governance, in order to maintain social order, must return above all to rebuilding trust, increasing transparency, strengthening judicial independence, and restoring the legitimate monopoly on violence. Only in such conditions will citizens feel that they do not need to personally intervene in the arena of conflict resolution and the law will become a valid authority for resolving disputes.