The early days after the revolution are in Bahman 57. The country is in turmoil and people’s forces are protecting the newly achieved revolution in the streets. With the success of the revolution, their categories become clearer. It is time for group competitions. The streets are filled with the presence of people’s forces. The people’s forces who were mobilized in support of the revolution are still standing together.

The main supporting force of the monarchy regime in Iran – whose declaration of neutrality led to the victory of the revolution – is the army. An army that had sworn allegiance to the last Pahlavi king and on February 11, 1979, with its declaration of neutrality, dealt a final blow to the previous regime and put an end to the era of kings in Iran. However, neither Lieutenant General Houshang Hattam, who wrote the declaration of neutrality, nor General Qarabaghi, the last chief of staff of the army, knew that after this day of neutrality, many high-ranking army commanders, including Lieutenant General Hattam himself, would be handed over to the revolutionary courts and executed. The army, which was purged up to its top commanders after the revolution, stood tall and fought against the invading enemy during the Iran-Iraq war. Recent years have been filled with memories of soldiers (from television interviews on the anniversaries of the 8-year

But in the days after the revolution, no one trusted the army. Many of the revolutionary forces who later became opponents of the post-revolutionary regime wanted the army to dissolve and were looking for a revolutionary, unified and classless army. An army that even they themselves did not know how it could be an army and how an army could not have a hierarchy and chain of command.

Furthermore, later on, the opposition forces did not trust the revolutionary forces who supported Ayatollah Khomeini in the army. The revolutionary forces in the streets, who were mostly organized by the mosques, had become a base for them to both show the power of the clerical movement, symbolized by Mr. Khomeini, and to have a reliable military force in case the existing army attempted a coup or any other action. The Basij website quotes a report from a journalist of the Sahar-e Sadegh newspaper (the internal publication of the Revolutionary Guards) from a person named Rahmani, which seems interesting: “We had meetings in Najaf with some of the seminary students and Imam’s followers, discussing the Shah’s government and the popular protests. Hojat al-Islam Shahid Mohammad Montazeri was also present in our group. The conversation was about the victory of the revolution. Does Imam want to preserve the revolution with this army loyal to the Shah and

The revolution in Bahman 57 (February 1979) ends in victory and on the 5th of Azar 58 (November 1979), when the Islamic Republic government is announced, Ayatollah Khomeini speaks among the members of the Revolutionary Guards in central Tehran (the Guards themselves had been formed in Ardabil in Bahman 58). He says, “If a nation whose youth are equipped with not only religious and spiritual beliefs, but also with material weapons and have been trained to use them, they will not be helpless when handed a gun. They must learn and teach their comrades. Teach the youth. And everywhere should be like this, so that after a few years, a country with 20 million youth will have 20 million armed individuals. 20 million soldiers. And this will not be a vulnerable nation. And now, thanks to God, it is not vulnerable. Now, our support is from God. And we have risen for Him. We

This idea of a “twenty million army” on 30 April 1980 was changed to the “National Mobilization Organization” in the Revolutionary Council and the decision of the Revolutionary Council is sent to the Ministry of Interior for implementation.

The complete text of the legal draft for the establishment of the National Basij Organization is as follows:

”

Article 1: In accordance with the orders of the Supreme Leader of the Revolution and the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to create, educate and mobilize a twenty million strong army to prevent and confront any political, economic, cultural and natural disasters, an organization called the National Mobilization Organization is formed under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and affiliated with the Ministry of Interior.

Article 2: The duties, structure, and organizational positions of the National Basij Organization will be prepared with the approval of the Organization of Administrative and Employment Affairs of the country.

Article: The executive regulations of this law will be prepared by the Ministry of Interior and the Organization of Administrative and Employment Affairs of the country and will be approved by the Council of Ministers.

With the attack of Iraq on September 22, 1980, the country enters a state of war and this newly formed Basij, which until now has been the arm of the ruling forces in the process of seizing all power and eliminating opponents, sends forces to support the fronts. In fact, it is the forces that support the leader of the system and the main power within the system. On January 18, 1981, Mohammad Ali Rajai, the then Prime Minister, announced in a letter to the parliament: “The law regarding the merger of the National Basij Organization (the oppressed) into the Revolutionary Guards Corps, which was approved in the session of the Islamic Consultative Assembly on January 18, 1981, and has been confirmed by the Guardian Council and has been sent to the Prime Minister’s Office through letter number 16/Q/M dated November 21, 1981, is attached for implementation.” (4)

And in this way, Basij was recognized as a part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and operated under the name of Basij Resistance Force until October 2009.

But let us hear another account, confirming the above statements from another source, about the formation of the Revolutionary Guards and, as a result, the mobilization of the oppressed. This time, the account comes from an individual who is now the Secretary-General of one of the oppressed ruling parties. Engineer Mohammad Tavassoli, Secretary-General of the Iran Freedom Movement, in an interview about the formation of the Revolutionary Guards, raises the issue of creating a national guard and states that they were afraid that another coup (by the army) would not take place. And due to the negative mindset of the people towards the word “guard” (as it reminded them of the issue of the Shah’s guard), they decided to choose another name, which was the name of the Revolutionary Guards of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. (5) Of course, in this interview and in another interview, they also say that it was planned for this national guard or Revolutionary Guards to operate until the formation of institutions like the

According to the two aforementioned narratives from two separate movements that have never been associated with each other, the formation of the Basij and its higher rank, the Sepah, was actually the establishment of an institution by revolutionaries. This was done in response to the lack of trust in the army and its organization (which had control over all aspects of the country in the previous era, from national defense to city management, gendarmerie, security and intelligence forces). The goal was to create a trusted force for the new rulers, so that in case of an attack or invasion, they could defend the country with their trusted force. Additionally, they could also use this force to confront opposing groups who were aligned with the revolution but did not accept the new hegemony of the ruling class and their new ideology, and remove them from the scene.

From the formation of Basij until the end of the war, the commanders of this force, who were active under the supervision of the Revolutionary Guards, were in order three clergymen named Amir Majd, Ahmad Salek, and Mohammad Ali Rahmani (from 1983 until the end of December 1989).

After these three spiritual leaders and with the death of the founder of the system, the command of the Basij also passed to the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards. Alireza Afshar was in charge from Esfand 67 until the end of 76, and after him, Seyyed Mohammad Hajazi was the commander of the Basij until the end of the command of Seyyed Yahya (Rahim) Safavi. With the appointment of Mohammad Ali Jafari, known as “Aziz”, as the commander of the Revolutionary Guards and the implementation of the transformation plan in the Revolutionary Guards and the establishment of provincial Revolutionary Guards, the new commander of the Revolutionary Guards took over the command of the Basij and Hossein Taeb, the deputy commander, became the commander of the Basij. The Basij areas and regions were merged into provincial Revolutionary Guards and were directly under the command of the overall commander of the Revolutionary Guards and continued their mission. In the Bas

The leader of the Islamic Republic system, in his decree on October 3, 2009, appoints him to the presidency of the Basij Organization for the Oppressed and brings all branches of the Basij under the command of a unit in one organization. Basijis are divided into three general categories: “ordinary”, “active” and “special”, which is mentioned in the employment regulations of the Sepah.

The current commander of the Basij organization, who is also at the forefront of this organization today, is “Sardar Sartip Pasdar Gholamhossein Ghaibparvar”, who was appointed to this position on December 8, 2016. In his decree, the leader of the Islamic Republic writes for Ghaibparvar: “The promotion of the organized presence of the people (especially the dear youth) and the elevation of the Basij in the necessary fields of the Islamic Revolution (such as knowledge, culture, defense, and services), the creation and organization of thinking and monitoring groups at all levels, especially at the Basij headquarters, for strategic planning and monitoring of activities and prevention of enemy infiltration, the establishment of a definite mechanism for strengthening cooperation and coordination with relevant institutions is expected.” (7)

The Basij force, both during and after the war, was not only a popular body for confronting the enemies of the people and the country, but from the beginning it was transformed into a force under the control of the new government to carry out the actions of the government in the smallest social cells. In fact, Basij, which in times of war had gained honor and social credibility by sacrificing many martyrs for the defense of the homeland, became an intelligence and security force both during and after the war. By being present in all parts of the country, from villages to small and large cities, from offices to schools and universities, and in short, everywhere, it provided intelligence and security support for the ruling system and naturally introduced any suspicious individuals to the security apparatus. According to what is mentioned in “Sahifeh Imam Khomeini”, the permission for such actions was also issued by the leader and the ideological base of the system. The founder of the system says on this page:

This very basis and foundations, and justifying any calamity upon the opponents and those who were against Islam, Islamic government, the rule of the jurist, and Muslims (and in many cases, they themselves were also believers), caused this force to not be a supporter of the people, but rather a tool for suppressing the people and in fact, to have a function that is even against what it claims to be.

Basij was a place for ordinary religious people who had their hearts in the revolution and its founder and were not involved in disasters and eliminations. It was a pure, religious and faithful place where they could send their children for Islamic upbringing and be reassured that these children, mostly teenagers, would receive Islamic education. However, based on the experiences of those who spent their teenage and early youth days in Basij, what they encountered (whether in Basij mosques, schools, universities, etc.) was an environment full of lies, deceit and hypocrisy. Surely, what is being reported from these experiences is not a general rule. But this majority can depict the existing atmosphere.

The atmosphere that is created by the activists of the 1970s Basij, during the years when the reformist government was not yet in power, when the youth were hopeful for government reform, and neither the 18 Tir incident nor the Tehran University massacre had occurred, and before the bloody events of the post-elections of 1988, is one in which the higher the rank of these Basijis, the more deceitful they become. One of these individuals, who participated in a maneuver called “Imam’s Martyrs” in the late 1970s as part of the Basij’s resistance forces in the eastern bases and hills of Tehran, tells the story of the efforts of the younger members who had recently joined the Basij to carry out their assigned tasks, and the escape and abandonment of their older colleagues. In fact, it seems that the higher the experience, the greater the level of irresponsibility. And when such irresponsibility is even present in the

And all of these, we must also add the special privileges for Basijis. “Basijis who have a rank of combatant or higher and have at least 4 years of active Basij experience, have the right to use the special allocation for veterans to enter university.” Being a Basiji affects the length of military service, employment, project acquisition, participation in tenders, and overall aspects of life that involve government institutions, and in short, all aspects of life that involve the ruling authority. It is a well-known fact (based on the experiences of those who have been in this force for years) that many of the forces who join the Basij are not motivated by love for the Basij and its ideology, but rather for the benefits they can gain through it.

Personal clothing, white collars, self-proclaimed individuals, and perhaps these days, we can say self-righteous individuals, are other names for those who are part of the Basij, especially in the days after the war. With their self-imposed actions (apparently, but in reality, they were connected and commanded by the central power in the Islamic Republic), they made life difficult for the people, activists, intellectuals, and anyone who sought to think and live differently in Iran. Some of them, in addition to their Basij identity, also formed an organization called Ansar Hezbollah, which requires a separate discussion. In short, the cultural organizations of these Ansars (including the Yalasarat magazine) spent years theorizing how to deal with anyone who thought outside the hegemony of the ruling system. A cultural and security organization, which was in fact the offspring of the cultural organization and the security newspaper, known as the larger pseudo-cultural entity, Kayhan.

“In the beginning, it was planned that the Basij would unite twenty million people. But the formation of an ideological organization and the use of power and unity tools did not bring any unity. Instead, it caused division. The supporters of Hezbollah, with the slogan “If Hezbollah is with us, we are the victors,” only considered themselves as the party of God and sat in the place of God, judging and punishing the servants of God. This self-centeredness led them to believe that they were the center of the universe and superior to others, and they silenced any opposing voices by using the war that these very people had fought and defended. They made themselves the center and shouted over the people, using the power that they claimed was given to them by God to bring harm to their own people. The Basij transformed into a force that evokes the image of the black shirts of the Nazi party. If that path on the water was profitable for the self-serving Germans, this vehicle of greed

Notes:

1. Integrity, beauty, mobilization from the beginning until now, Basirat website, November 29, 1387.

2. 05 Azar | The Imam issued the order to form the Basij, and the Iranian History website.

3. طور که

   As
   

4. طور که

   As
   

5. The Chick Who Became Mayor; A Wise Conversation with Mohammad Tousi, Shargh Newspaper, September 4th, 2017.

6. Conversation between Hossein Dehbashi and Mohammad Tousoli, Raw Brick, 32nd shift, Online Date, October 7th, 2017.

7. Leader’s Office Information Base

8. Khomeini, Ruhollah, Imam Khomeini’s Sahifeh, Volume 15, page 116.