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Shahed Alavi

About Black Monday in Sardasht, colorful balloons in the sky over the city in the morning and black fighter jets in the sky in the afternoon, about the day of death with the taste of lemon and bitter almonds, we have written, read, and seen very little today, 29 years after the tragedy. Except that we know Sardasht was the first city to be targeted by chemical bombing in the world, resulting in the death of 110 people and injuring 8000 others. What else do we know about this tragedy?

Why is Sardasht cold? Why are thousands of victims of chemical attacks in Sardasht still not receiving any kind of support or treatment? Why has the case of the chemical bombing in Sardasht not been brought to international courts? Why have European companies supplying Iraq with chemical weapons not been prosecuted? Why does even being “first in tragedy” not bring about any change in the fate and narrative of the endless suffering in our lives?

Why do we know so little about the atrocities of Sardasht? No, this question is not phrased correctly. We should ask how much do we know about the chemical bombardment of non-military areas and civilians in Iran? It is said that during the war with Iran, Iraq repeatedly used chemical weapons against Iran. And each time, this “repeatedly” is interpreted with a different number. Because there is no accurate statistics available on the number of times Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran. Like all other areas of political and social life in Iran, the most insignificant data are the statistics that are supposed to reflect our proportion with reality, a proportion that may be obtained through qualitative analysis. There is no reliable statistic, which means that even after less than thirty years, we still cannot provide an accurate number about an event.

But even these presented numbers, if the question is about the core of our problem, can guide us to a bigger question. According to the presented numbers, during the 8-year war between Iran and Iraq, the Iraqi army has used chemical weapons against Iran more than 300 times. It has been said that in 29 cases, the use of chemical weapons by Iraq can be considered effective.

Out of these 29 cases, in 6 cases, during the Operation Valfajr 2, Valfajr 4, Valfajr 8, Karbala 8, Khaybar and Badr, the Iranian military forces were targeted by bombs or chemical weapons. However, in the other 23 cases, the targets were residential areas and civilians: the cities of Sardasht, Nodushah, Sumar, Ashnoyeh and the villages of Nasardirah, Nasardirah Sofla and Shahmar Dirah from the Gilan-e Gharb district, Ghahlaaji, Nai, Dezli and Sehre Nijmar from the Marivan district, Alut, Bainjan, Galasuteh and Choman from the Baneh district, Zardeh and Babajan from the Dalahoo district, Malashikh and Bazileh from the Sardasht district, Kal

But what is the significance of these names? What connects these villages or cities that few people know about, except for Sardasht, and have never even heard their names? All the people living in these cities and villages, from Sumar in southern Kermanshah to Oshnavieh in western West Azerbaijan, are Kurds and were targeted by chemical weapons during the war, even though they were not the intended targets. As a result, “completely by chance,” out of every 23 cases where Iraq targeted non-military areas and civilians with chemical bombings, Kurdish areas of Iran and Kurdish civilians were also targeted.

Kurds with different customs and religious beliefs. For example, the people of Zardeh village in the suburbs of Dalahoo city in Kermanshah province follow the Yarsan religion. Zardeh is an important village for Yarsanis because it is home to the holy shrines of Yarsan figures such as Babayadegar, Hazrat Dawood, Sayed Darvish, Hanita, and the sacred Ghaslan spring. This village is also known for hosting one of the important religious festivals of Yarsanis, which was held in 1367 and a few days after the official announcement of the chemical bombing that supposedly did not include Kurds. More than 275 people were killed and over 1100 were injured in this festival.

Why is the Atashbas not included in the ceasefire? On the same day as the bombing of Zardeh village, during the days of Atashbas, the villages of Nasardireh, Nasardireh Sofla, and Shah Mar Direh in the districts of Gilan Gharb, Sheikh Saleh in the districts of Salas Babajani, Kalal and Dowdan in the districts of Paveh, and Babajani in the districts of Dalahoo were also subjected to a similar chemical attack. In addition to nearly 100 fatalities, thousands of people were permanently injured. Twenty days after the Atashbas, the Sheikh Osman area on the outskirts of Shnooieh was subjected to a widespread chemical attack, resulting in over 50 deaths and more than 2800 injuries.

Why in every 23 cases of chemical attacks on non-military areas in Iran, Kurdish areas are targeted? Despite the fact that not all of these areas are on the border with Iraq, it may be possible to attribute these attacks to the easy access of Iraqi aircraft to border areas and the weakness of air defense in these areas. However, this assumption does not make our question and other possibilities in response to it invalid. Why does the Iraqi army, after declaring a ceasefire and leaving hostilities with Iran, target non-military objectives that have no strategic or symbolic importance in chemical bombings?

In 1366, Iraq tested various types of chemical weapons by bombing the city of Sardasht, followed by Halabja, and earlier by bombing some non-military areas and different military targets in Iran. After the ceasefire was declared, there was no longer a reason to impose additional costs on itself. With the issuance of two resolutions by the United Nations Security Council in April 66 and April 67 condemning the use of chemical weapons by both sides in the war, Iraq should not have demonstrated to the world by bombing non-military areas with chemical weapons that it was the main violator of the Geneva Protocol and the main perpetrator of chemical attacks in the country.

The goal of Iraq and, of course, Iran in the air, missile, or artillery attacks on cities and civilian areas, or what was called urban warfare, was to increase the cost of war and break the morale of the people in the opposing country. However, chemical attacks, due to Iraq’s accession to the Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of the use of chemical and microbial weapons, were very costly and Iraq never accepted responsibility for carrying out chemical attacks. Therefore, after accepting Resolution 598 by Iran and declaring a ceasefire that Iraq had been waiting for for years, it is very strange that Iraq carried out a chemical attack on civilian areas.

It seems that the goal of targeting Kurds with chemical weapons by Iraq, both before and after the declaration of ceasefire, was aimed at sending two different messages to different audiences. Before the ceasefire, the goal of targeting Kurds in cities and Kurdish villages with chemical weapons, regardless of the practical test of the effectiveness of these weapons on civilian targets, was to achieve the “least possible political cost” and to convey this message with “minimal hassle” to the authorities of the Islamic Republic. In case of feeling threatened or concerned about defeat in the war, Iraq does not hesitate to bomb non-military areas of Iran with chemical weapons.

The Kurds were both a chemical weapons laboratory and a lesson that needed to be taught to Iran. Second-class citizens were supposed to serve as a lesson and instill fear in first-class citizens. The end of all political and diplomatic efforts by Iran to stop these attacks was a series of cliché letters from Iranian officials to the Secretary-General of the United Nations about them. The low cost and low hassle of killing those who were not considered familiar or important to the Islamic Republic was the narrator.

Certainly, the chemical bombardment of cities and non-Kurdish villages, where their children were involved in the front lines as Basij members, and their elders held positions in the political and military levels of the Islamic Republic at local or national levels, incurred a higher political and diplomatic cost for Iraq and did not result in anything but strengthening the sense of patriotism and enmity and attracting more forces for popular mobilization for Iraq. But here, by killing the painful “other”, a fear of enmity was created that instead of becoming a “martyr”, they were faced with the most painful deaths and inevitably became terrifying.

But after the announcement of the ceasefire, the continued chemical bombing of Kurdish areas, separate from the crooked mouth of Iranian authorities and the assurance of the low cost of killing second-class Iranian citizens, reflected the satisfaction of a nation whose resistance had been hard for Saddam Hussein for several years and the Anfal and Halabja had not stopped him. These bombings were a direct and terrifying message to the Kurds. With the end of the war with Iran, Saddam’s work with the Kurds was just beginning. Kurds of all religions and beliefs were considered a dangerous enemy by Saddam and their killing was permissible in any situation and by any means. The killing of 188,000 Kurds in the Anfal operation and 5,000 in the bombing of Halabja, along with the killing of Kurds in another country unrelated to the resistance taking place in Iraq, continued with chemical weapons.

It is not just a coincidence or a selective choice based on military and war necessities that in every 23 cases of chemical bombing in non-military areas and civilian populations in Iran, the Kurds and Kurdish areas have been targeted by Iraq’s chemical bombing. This was a long-term planning and not just a symbolic aspect, which was based on precise plans and aimed at achieving specific and different goals during the war and after the declaration of ceasefire. Regardless of the symbolic aspect, it indicated a long-term planning that Saddam’s wrong calculations and incorrect steps in relation to Kuwait and then his interaction with the United States and his downfall fortunately prevented him from carrying out.