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Reza Alijani

The dominant power in Iran, especially at the top of the political pyramid, is seeking to solve economic problems by engaging in more nuclear negotiations and lifting sanctions. Although these negotiations have been seen as a test for negotiations with the Americans on other issues, the combination of elements and factors shows that they need to maintain a mild conflict with America in the discourse of legitimizing the power established in Iran.

The stable power can no longer rely on its religious nature and its role in enforcing the law in the country to legitimize itself among various social classes. Therefore, it has been forced to make enmity and preservation of the resistance axis as its main source of legitimacy in the region.

On the other hand, in the depths of power in Iran, there are established points that if we come up short and weaken, both in foreign and domestic arenas, we will lose the rhyme. Previously, Hashemi Rafsanjani had said in the 1990s that we will not make the mistake of the Shah and open up the space to be overthrown ourselves. This idea still exists in the unconscious and conscious depths of power in Iran.

Based on this, the power stationed in Iran does not want to address the issue of nuclear and relative tension resolution in this regard, but rather focus on internal tension resolution. The lack of cooperation with the Khatami government in the past, and the lack of support for the more moderate slogans of Hassan Rouhani in domestic policies, as well as the insistence on increasing executions, arrests, summons, and suppression, all indicate the strict domestic policies in parallel with the heroic softness of the targeted champions abroad.

Therefore, the power stationed in Iran does not want negotiations to have any impact on human rights inside the country, neither intentionally nor directly. It has been previously said that the enemy is not seeking a solution and will not back down even if this issue is resolved, and will instead focus on human rights. This, of course, is a valid issue! However, not all of this reality can be attributed to the enemy’s conspiracy. The main issue is something else. Self-destruction is the result of breaking the mirror. The main problem lies in the behavior of the ruling authority, and as long as there is a political blockade and violation of human rights in Iran, political and civil activists will continue to strive for change from within, and of course, the global public opinion and independent human rights organizations, especially after the end of the Cold War, have become more sensitive to human rights ideology and will react to this issue. And of course, global powers will also try to exploit this issue for their

In this way, solving the issue of nuclear power in Iran directly and voluntarily will not have any impact on respecting human rights.

However, indirectly and unintentionally, solving human rights issues in Iran will be effective through various paths on the problem.

Firstly, the dissidents in Iran, a significant portion of whom voted for Rouhani in the recent elections or at least supported his coming into power in a demand-oriented manner, will have higher expectations for the government to focus on domestic issues, especially those related to freedoms, after resolving the nuclear issue. This pressure will inevitably force the government to be more active and sensitive in this regard. This pressure will also affect the entire established power. Power in Iran must be more accountable in this matter at least.

Second- Economic dissidents will also gradually demand more rights by creating relative openness in the economic situation and improving their living conditions (according to Abraham Maslow’s theory). The closest path to democracy in Iran is the welfare of the people, not their poverty. A wider range of the middle class, with a certain level of welfare and relief from economic problems, will have more leisure time to pursue higher demands. The slightly more affluent middle class will demand political participation and a share in governing the society, which will also increase pressure for human rights demands and have an impact on related issues and matters.

Third- In the international arena, global public opinion, which is accustomed to Iran being the headline of nuclear issues, will gradually distance itself from this headline and the next major headline will likely be the issue of human rights in Iran (although regional issues will also be other contenders for this headline). Similarly, in addition to global public opinion, human rights forces and independent institutions will also have the same situation and will show more interest in the issue of human rights in Iran. The world’s major powers will also be involved in this challenge in the continuation of their sometimes mild and sometimes severe conflict with the Iranian government (alongside other potential regional challenges).

In this way, these factors will work hand in hand to challenge the established power in Iran, which does not see any connection between nuclear negotiations and human rights issues and does not want it to be so in the future; it will be forced to pay more attention to human rights issues.

But the best and most ideal situation is for the power to be consolidated instead of internal or external pressures, so that external stress relief will not be successful without internal stress relief. Statesmen must understand that economic development in an oil-rich country with high income and abundant potential for economic corruption is not possible without freedom of expression and media, and without an independent judiciary. In general, the best and closest way for sustainability is not through nuclear capabilities and military interventions, but through internal democracy and national solidarity and internal stability; especially in a land where a significant portion of its population is young and not willing to submit to tolerable forms of governance.

There are no clear indications for these lessons at the moment. However, the political climate in Iran is like its diverse and unpredictable weather. Anything is possible and nothing is impossible. Even the gradual and difficult acceptance of democracy by the rulers. The rulers and those in power must either be flexible and comply with the demands of their people, or if they show stubbornness and rigidity, they will be defeated. This choice, more than being related to the people, is related to the rulers and their learning and experience from the events of the time.