Over the past years, at least once a day, group media have been whispering a sentence in our ears: “A kolbar was killed at the border.” The phenomenon of kolbari cannot exist without prerequisites and backgrounds such as an imbalanced economy and security approaches. The lack of investment and suitable job opportunities leaves no choice but to resort to risky options such as kolbari and smuggling through dangerous borders in order to make a living.

Although in recent years, the authorities of the Islamic Republic have tried to reduce the appeal of this dangerous profession for the people of Kurdistan by implementing economic plans and increasing border transactions. But the question is, why does this trend continue and the number of people killed during smuggling increases every day? Who benefits from the continuation of this situation?

Kulbar

“Kolbar” is a Kurdish term used to refer to individuals in Kurdistan who earn a living by carrying goods on their backs and shoulders for themselves and their families. Most of these individuals engage in this work at official and unofficial borders. The income of a kolbar, compared to the risks that threaten their lives, is considered a form of suicide.

There is no specific statistics regarding the death of Kurdish kolbars, but according to media reports and human rights organizations, it is estimated that in the past 5 years, around one thousand kolbars have lost their lives due to shootings by security forces, landmines, and hypothermia.

Ahmad Shahid, the special rapporteur of the United Nations on the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, referred to the treatment of Kurdish kolbars by security and law enforcement forces as “systematic massacre” in his report for the year 2012.

Official porter

In recent years, the Islamic Republic authorities have attempted to prevent the phenomenon of kolbari through harsh measures and elimination. They have passed resolutions and border laws to discourage people living in border areas from engaging in this profession. One of the solutions proposed has been the issuance of travel cards for citizens residing in border areas.

A smuggler who did not want his name to be revealed stated that every citizen or business owner can cross the border 6 to 10 times a year with this card and each time can buy and sell goods worth 300,000 dinars or 200 dollars. According to this smuggler, most of the smugglers, due to low income, continue to smuggle goods in unofficial borders alongside their official crossings.

This kolbar says that only in the border areas of Marivan, more than 10,000 travel cards have been issued, but due to the restrictions imposed by border authorities on the movement of these individuals, the plan has failed in practice and only a few benefit from it.

Evidence shows that despite the efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran to prevent smuggling, the only commodity that has decreased in trade volume on both sides of the border is fuel. According to this Kolbar from Marivan, due to high wages, the majority of smuggled goods consist of alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, and audio-visual equipment. These wages are 10 times higher than the monthly salary of a Kolbar who works in border markets with an active travel card.

Pilur (Pilevar)

According to Article 3 of the Border Transactions Organization Law, “Pilevar” refers to a person residing in border areas with a minimum of three years of continuous residence in the border city of their place of residence, who are engaged in border transactions in border markets.

Most of these individuals, contrary to the exhausting work of porters, are engaged in buying, selling, and clearing goods with a limit of 500 tons, considering the relationships they have with security and border authorities on both sides of the border. In such a way that these individuals play a bigger role in smuggling and are responsible for removing legal obstacles at the borders.

Hamid, who has been working as a smuggler at the borders of the city of Baneh for more than 10 years, says: “In the business of exchanging goods and trading in markets, the official and unofficial borders of Kurdistan, more than anything else, rely on relationships and having a party in security and military institutions.”

According to this citizen, “If a security institution or a person working in one of these security institutions has a problem with engaging in commercial activities, they cannot continue their economic activities. Similarly, if the relevant institutions wish, they can smuggle all kinds of goods across the border and enter the market without any obstacles.”

Security solution

As mentioned before, the approach of the Islamic Republic towards western regions of Iran has been security-oriented since the establishment of this political system. Any political, economic, and even cultural activities in the provinces of West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and Kermanshah are considered a major threat and efforts are made to solve this apparent problem through security measures.

During that time, the government resorted to military force to resolve political disputes in Kurdistan. This solution, in the absence of dynamic and collective media, was able to suppress all political groups and dissenting voices in the region in less than 15 years.

Based on past experience and the proven effectiveness of this solution in these regions, security institutions continue to strive to address the consequences of unemployment and economic and political imbalance in these areas – one of which is the issue of kolbars and smuggling goods across borders.

According to the latest statistics published by the Statistical Center of Iran, three provinces are at the top of the list of provinces struggling with the issue of unemployment. Any investment in these areas has also been overshadowed by the government’s security approach and lost its appeal.

This solution has faced challenges from media and human rights organizations in Yemen, as well as global pressures (although minimal). If it had been seen as a successful solution in the political realm before, it cannot be applied in other areas now.

Economy

As previously mentioned, according to reports from human rights organizations and the UN Special Rapporteur on the “systematic massacre” of kolbars, the authorities of the Islamic Republic have attempted to reduce the attractiveness of kolbari and smuggling at the western borders of Iran by passing laws and implementing economic approaches.

In 1384, the Islamic Consultative Assembly passed a law titled “Border Transactions Organization Law” in order to facilitate border transactions in underdeveloped areas and create economic opportunities for sustainable employment for the people living in these regions. In line with this, in clause 2 of article 7 of this law, it is explicitly stated that any transfer of active cooperatives in border markets to non-native individuals is prohibited; a provision to protect the residents of these areas.

In addition, the legislator has exempted imported goods from 30 to 100 percent of the import duty (tax on imported goods) in order to increase income levels and promote trade in these regions.

However, the question remains, why despite 10 years passing since the approval of this law, kolbari and smuggling are still prevalent in western Iran and border areas?

The answer to this question must be sought in the mafia of power and rent among the forces and security agencies. In recent years, no type of construction and economic activity has been carried out in the western borders without the approval of security agencies, especially the Revolutionary Guards. For example, all reconstruction projects in villages and border areas have been assigned to companies affiliated with the Khatam al-Anbiya Garrison. Economic projects with quick returns have been assigned to individuals close to the power circle in security institutions; for example, in the 2015 budget, 500 billion rials have been allocated for the reconstruction of western border villages in Iran, of which 90% of the projects are assigned to the Basij Construction Organization and the Khatam al-Anbiya Garrison.

As an example, the Ching family in Marivan, from the mid-1970s, took advantage of government grants and relationships with senior officials of security and political institutions in Kurdistan province, to benefit from many advantages of border trade, including exports and imports of industrial and agricultural machinery, alcoholic beverages, fabrics, and in recent years, currency exchanges. The Heiva gang, using the operational and informational power of the Revolutionary Guards in Kurdistan province, in addition to kidnapping and killing non-military citizens under the name of anti-revolutionary groups, was one of the main players in the trade of drugs to the Kurdistan region, as well as the import of industrial drugs to Kurdistan and Iran. These were individuals who were easily cast aside due to their disagreements with powerful institutions.

Hamid says that no merchant or trader is able to operate in Marivan without the approval of the Revolutionary Guards. He says, “Every trader, aside from paying taxes, is obligated to pay a fee to the Revolutionary Guards. In some cases, every trader and merchant must import or export goods ordered by this security institution.”

According to one of the border workers employed in Marivan, security forces benefit from both sides. “In addition to controlling all currency, commercial, export and import transactions, the Sepah also kills and eliminates the assets of Kurdish workers and merchants, and fines them, which is another way of making money.”

The Revolutionary Guards, with control over the markets of Kurdistan, not only gain income and expand their power, but also create opportunities and conditions for cooperation with economic activists. One of the merchants of Nadri Baneh says, “The Revolutionary Guards, in exchange for cooperation with economic arms, provide the possibility of importing and conducting trade without any trouble for merchants. Most wholesalers, with the cooperation of institutions affiliated with security forces, especially the Revolutionary Guards, bring their goods, which mostly include audiovisual equipment, clothing, fabric, medicine, and alcoholic beverages, into the market.”

What is evident is that the continuity of underdevelopment and unequal distribution of power and wealth in Iran only benefits certain security and military institutions such as the Revolutionary Guard. In such a way that these institutions benefit from this trend in five ways:

Utilizing security and military budgets to establish security.

“Expansion of power and influence, especially beyond the borders of Iran.”

“Benefiting from major and minor fines for smuggling goods, as well as confiscated goods themselves.”

The possibility of smuggling profitable goods and controlling the luxury and profitable goods market.

Increase in financial and human costs for joining the semi-official system.