Many political researchers who study political transformations, comparative political systems, and topics such as revolutions, democratization, and similar subjects tend to have a relative theoretical consensus regarding the types of revolutions that can lead to democracy. They consider elements such as global political developments in different periods, the level of industrialization and development in society, the behavior of actors—including non-violence and the dominance of moderates—and many other factors as influential in democratization. Based on this, if we ask most of these researchers to analyze the outcome of an imaginary revolution characterized by these traits, we would likely receive similar answers from them.

Let us first assume the revolution takes place during the golden period between 1974 and 2006, known as the third wave of democracy. It is important to note that during this period, global conditions were so favorable to democratization that, for the first time in human history, the majority of the world’s population lived under democracy, and most countries were governed democratically. Second, the per capita GDP at the time of revolution in the 1970s was above $2,000, while the range of $1,000 to $3,000 per capita GDP was considered the window for democratization during that era. Third, this revolution was predominantly non-violent in most of its campaigns, and its success was achieved through mass strikes, massive demonstrations, and similar actions. Its charismatic leader repeatedly emphasized the unity between the army and the people—a critical factor in revolutions that successfully produce democracy. Fourth, the revolution was led by a leadership council that had excluded all radical Marxist revolutionaries and consisted solely of nationalist liberal and religious figures, most of whom a few years earlier did not even support the idea of revolutionary change. Instead, the performance of the authoritarian regime pushed events to this point. Again, the dominance of moderate opposition forces over radicals is among the essential factors for successful democratization.

Therefore, we can predict that all the researchers we present this hypothetical scenario to would respond that this revolution had a high chance of producing democracy. Yet the experience of the 1979 Revolution (1357) produced completely different results despite these promising preconditions. The course of the 1979 Revolution up until victory resembled other non-violent urban political revolutions that successfully established democracy. But from the very first nights—starting with executions on the rooftop of Refah School—the trajectory began to shift. Through the elimination of internal opponents, including members of the original Revolutionary Council and moderate factions, and through experiences of internal and external war and mass executions, the revolution ultimately resembled violent Marxist revolutions instead. What explains such a deep transformation in outcome?

The more common explanation emphasizes the traditionalist role of the clergy in the revolution. However, such an explanation likely overlooks other global experiences. The Catholic Church, arguably the most organized, widespread, and wealthy religious institution in the world, with a long history of repression, played a very positive role in the third wave of democracy across regions including Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia. Many regional leaders of revolutions that led to democracy in these countries were religious figures. In fact, the leader of the 1979 Revolution was, before the revolution, repeatedly compared to Gandhi, yet after the revolution he chose models such as Mao and Castro—leaders who rejected religion.

Another common explanation, perhaps more deserving of attention, is the dominance of Marxist perspectives not only among leftist groups but also among religious forces rooted in traditional social bases, which shaped the post-revolution transformation. For example, religious revolutionary leaders such as Taleghani, Beheshti, and Motahari emphasized economic equality and changes in the mode of production more strongly than political freedom before the revolution. This raises the next question: what caused such a transformation?

Common explanations again overlook global developments. It is often argued that during the 1960s and 1970s Marxist ideas dominated global discourse, or at least that opposition movements in Western-backed countries were influenced by such views. If we accept this, we should expect that other political transformations during the third wave in Western-aligned countries such as the Philippines, Chile, Spain, and Portugal would have failed to democratize and instead experienced authoritarian outcomes similar to Cuba or China. But they did not. So what made Iran’s experience different?

Perhaps the answer lies in the economic conditions of late Pahlavi Iran.
The economic conditions during the late Pahlavi era are shaped more by global trends and external pressures than by domestic policies alone. Mohammad Reza Shah’s rule began with the Allied occupation of Iran and the resulting famine. Early development programs struggled due to budget shortages, and soon debates over underdevelopment shifted toward oil and confrontation with Britain. Over time, after the end of the oil nationalization crisis and the signing of the Consortium Agreement in the 1950s, Iran’s oil revenues increased dramatically, and for the first time in its history, the central government acquired extraordinary power. It now had enough resources to massively expand the military budget, establish an extensive security apparatus such as SAVAK, deepen the state bureaucracy, and distribute rents. Yet the Iranian economy during this period remained plagued by crises. For instance, in May 1961 (Ordibehesht 1340), despite the atmosphere of repression after the oil nationalization period, teachers protested in front of the parliament due to unbearable economic conditions, and one of them was shot dead by armed forces.

However, the economic memory most influential in shaping the 1979 Revolution relates to conditions in the 1960s and 1970s, rooted in three major developments:

1. The industrial boom of the 1960s:
Technological progress, increased trade, and global peace created opportunities for developing countries to achieve economic growth. Many regions, including Southeast Asia and Latin America, used this moment to redefine their place in the global economy, earning the 1960s the title “the decade of development.” This had two key effects on Iran: first, the rise of young technocrats in the Mansour and later Hoveyda administrations allowed Iran to align with global development; second, industrialization increased global energy demand, boosting oil revenues. However, due to the political economy of the era, the benefits flowed primarily to rent-seeking networks connected to the monarchy, widening the economic divide.

2. Land reform:
Modernization worldwide has typically dismantled traditional feudal systems. In 15th-century England, the enclosure movement initiated this shift; in post-1789 France, the collapse of feudalism began through revolution. In countries where such change did not emerge organically, state-led land reform became a cornerstone of modernization. Iran’s transformation happened in stages: Reza Shah weakened local feudal lords, Mohammad Reza Shah advanced land reform significantly, and the Islamic Republic completed it in the 1980s.

Land reform under Mohammad Reza Shah was driven by both internal necessity and external pressure. Domestically, governments since the 1940s attempted to address the issue, with Ali Amini being the last pre-revolution figure who attempted reform but failed. Externally, the United States, as Iran’s global patron, advocated sweeping reforms to prevent Iran from drifting toward the Soviet bloc.

As with global precedents, land reform in Iran brought significant disruption and urban migration, leading to the rise of shantytowns and widening class inequality. England’s Elizabeth I had attempted to mitigate such problems centuries earlier through poverty relief measures, but the Pahlavi regime failed to respond effectively.

3. Oil price fluctuations in the 1970s:
The empowerment of OPEC, the Arab-Israeli War, and the oil embargo contributed to soaring oil prices and higher Iranian revenues. Although this initially caused stagflation in non-oil economies, the crisis soon boomeranged back on oil producers. This is the well-known Dutch disease: the negative economic effects of volatile natural resource revenues. Economic experts recommend saving oil windfalls rather than injecting them into the economy. But Mohammad Reza Shah, convinced that rising oil prices were an opportunity to reach his vision of a “Great Civilization,” ignored such advice. Injecting oil profits into the economy triggered Iran’s most severe economic crisis since World War II. The speed of decline in per capita GDP at that time was unprecedented—and has not been matched even by the economic crises of the 2010s and 2020s. This sudden contraction hit lower-income households especially hard.

Although impartial institutions like the World Bank do not provide Gini coefficients for pre-revolution Iran, combining these trends suggests that economic inequality grew rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s. Independent estimates support this. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the rise of Marxist ideas among Iran’s political opposition was an outcome of the monarchy’s rentier economic mismanagement.

If we accept the premise that the presence of severe class inequality and a high Gini coefficient—resulting from global trends and Pahlavi-era political decisions—diverted the expected outcome of the revolution from democracy to authoritarianism, then we must also examine the resulting consequences. The post-1979 regime, motivated by egalitarian ideals and the desire to build a support base among lower-income groups, implemented policies that reduced economic inequality by more than ten points between the 1980s and late 2000s.

This modest improvement, achieved despite a rentier economy, ongoing crises, and chronic inflation, came at the heavy cost of losing a major opportunity for democratization and development. Yet since 2012 (1391), under sanctions and economic turmoil, even this limited achievement is now at risk. If these crises persist, existing inequality may worsen further—and at an accelerated pace.