The end of the twelve-day war between Iran and Israel, contrary to public expectations, did not result in a fragile peace but rather ushered in a disturbing and unstable state within the country. During the war and immediately following the announcement of the ceasefire, security and military forces of the Islamic Republic established hundreds of checkpoints across cities, highways, border areas, and sensitive urban locations. Official authorities claimed these measures aimed to “prevent infiltration by Mossad agents” and “combat espionage,” but in practice, these checkpoints became a blatant manifestation of internal repression, gross human rights violations, and senseless killings. The so-called “security-building” project in post-war Iran, by distorting the true meaning of security, has effectively become a tool for suppressing society, silencing dissent, and reinforcing an atmosphere of fear. This is despite the fact that the real issue of “infiltration” originates not from the borders and roads of Hamedan, Zahedan, and Kurdistan, but from within the power structures and at the highest decision-making levels.

The fact is that infiltration into the upper echelons of the Islamic Republic has been repeatedly and seriously raised over the years. Seyed Mahmoud Alavi, former Minister of Intelligence of the Islamic Republic, repeatedly warned about this issue. In 2016 (1395), at a conference of public and military prosecutors and judicial authorities in Mashhad, he stated: “The issue of infiltration is more serious and fundamental today than in the past.”¹ In 2019 (1398), during a television program, Alavi noted that “projects of infiltration by foreign intelligence services” were ongoing, stating: “Those who infiltrate usually chant the most fervent government slogans, swiftly accuse others, and hide behind a veil of sanctity to avoid suspicion and criticism.” He added, “Never before has the enemy been as close to internal elements as in recent years. We discovered spies whose identification shocked and astonished senior officials.”² In a video released about a year ago, this official warned: “Mossad’s infiltration into various parts of the country is so serious and deep that all Islamic Republic officials should fear for their own lives.”³

Thus, if the goal were truly to combat infiltration, checkpoints should have been erected years ago within the heart of power and at the highest levels of government—where the main infiltrators operated calmly, shaping policy and setting direction. Nevertheless, in the days following the end of the Iran-Israel war, checkpoints expanded in Tehran, Kermanshah, Sanandaj, Zahedan, Ilam, and other border regions. IRGC, Basij, and police forces—donning military uniforms and using armored vehicles—were deployed in the streets of most cities. Ordinary citizens, particularly at night, were frequently subjected to body searches, phone inspections, and vehicle checks. Simultaneously, arbitrary arrests intensified. Many detainees were imprisoned merely for having a “suspicious appearance” or for “failing to stop” at checkpoints. It appears the regime sought to “prevent a post-war protest wave” rather than counter espionage, as the security apparatus targeted powerless and marginalized individuals instead of strategic institutions.

Killed in Darkness: The Hamedan Incident

One of the most tragic outcomes of the post-war security clampdown was the “Tarik-Darreh of Hamedan” incident. In July 2025 (Tir 1404), IRGC patrol units, operating a checkpoint on a secondary road in the Ganjnameh area of Hamedan, opened fire on a vehicle. As a result of this shooting, two young Hamedani men—Mehdi Abaei and Alireza Karbasi—were killed on the spot, and a third, Mohammadreza Saberi, was severely injured. Security institutions and affiliated media outlets, such as Fars News Agency, quickly released an official narrative—without providing any credible evidence or witnesses—implicitly labeling the victims as “Mossad operatives” and “drone controllers.”⁴ However, widespread public skepticism, the outrage of public opinion, and the large turnout at the funeral of the two young men at Behesht Zahra Cemetery in Hamedan swiftly challenged the official account. Testimonies from the victims’ families, shared on the Instagram account of Mehrdad Maher (mehrdadmaher4), unequivocally refuted the espionage allegations with detailed accounts.⁵ Under the pressure of this social movement, security institutions were forced to backtrack. On July 1, 2025 (11 Tir 1404), the head of the Armed Forces Judicial Organization in Hamedan Province announced that the shooters had been arrested and placed under judicial supervision.⁶ However, this retreat was not driven by accountability but by public pressure. Had the families remained silent, had social media not questioned the official story, the truth would have never surfaced. Now that the real story is known and it is clear that two unarmed citizens were shot without warning, a more bitter question arises: Will the shooters or those responsible for the attack be legally prosecuted and punished? Or, as in dozens of similar cases, will the matter be quietly shelved with vague promises of “investigation”?

The Islamic Republic has repeatedly resorted to security narratives to justify structural violence and blame the victims. But this scenario is nothing new. For decades, the official narrative has been used not to illuminate but to justify repression. Wasn’t the same pattern repeated in the Mahsa (Jina) movement? Didn’t the regime, instead of answering for its actions, accuse Mahsa Amini and her family? Wasn’t the same flawed model applied in the deaths of Sarina Esmailzadeh, Nika Shakarami, and dozens of other young Iranians? The killings of Mahsa, Sarina, and Nika are only the tip of this repressive iceberg. Names like Milad Zare, Mohsen Gheysari, Hannaneh Kia, Erfan Rezaei, Mohammadhossein Morvati, and others paint a clearer picture of the scope of the tragedy: young people full of hope, answered with bullets, simply for shouting, “No to violence, no to lies.” In the face of this cycle of bloodshed and denial, the fundamental question remains unanswered: If security is achieved only through elimination and death, is that truly security—or merely the shadow of death cast over society? If the Islamic Republic seeks to suppress protest rather than address root causes, can one still speak of the legitimacy of its security claims? In a country where citizens’ lives are left defenseless and vulnerable to fabricated narratives, security ceases to be a public right and becomes an extension of state repression.

Checkpoint or Repression Post?

The real function of these checkpoints must be understood through citizens’ daily lived experiences. Eyewitness reports clearly show that during these inspections, citizens’ mobile phones are searched without any judicial warrant. In border regions, people often face verbal abuse, ethnic slurs, and repeated threats. Officers—many of whom are inadequately trained and unaccountable—respond to the slightest protest by threatening arrest or vehicle confiscation. This situation has effectively institutionalized lawlessness, where an armed officer, without oversight, can decide who is “suspicious” and who must be punished. In reality, the widespread and increasing presence of armed forces in cities and on roads not only fails to create psychological security but directly generates anxiety, distrust, and fear among the public. For many citizens, passing through a checkpoint is not a safe experience but one fraught with stress and humiliation—especially for ethnic and religious minorities and for young people who are labeled “security threats” solely based on their appearance or clothing style.

What we witness today on Iran’s streets and highways is the product of an inverted logic of governance: the regime, after its intelligence failures during the twelve-day war, has chosen not to reform its intelligence apparatus or answer public concerns, but to convert checkpoints into tools of fear, control, and domestic repression. These checkpoints, rather than signs of order, are symbols of a regime that destroys trust at its roots through armed violence, instead of rebuilding it. The key question under these circumstances is: Does security justify injustice? The prevailing assumption within the Islamic Republic’s mindset is that in times of crisis, it is acceptable to suspend citizens’ fundamental rights. Yet, contemporary Iranian history—and that of many other societies—has shown that whenever security replaces justice, neither that security endures nor does the government retain its legitimacy. If the regime sincerely fears infiltration and security threats, it must first purge its own corrupt institutions and inefficient networks within the security apparatus, not target nature-loving youths or ordinary travelers on the roads of Kurdistan, Hamedan, and Sistan. A country where a security officer, instead of protecting lives, casually fires upon citizens, is undoubtedly rotting from within. The post-war checkpoints, rather than responses to real threats, reflect a legitimacy crisis and a political deadlock. What happened in “Tarik-Darreh of Hamedan” is a serious warning about a dangerous trend that normalizes violence in the name of “security”—a trend that, instead of ensuring peace and rule of law, puts the lives of defenseless citizens at risk. Continuing on this path will not only further erode public trust but may spark a new wave of protests, deepen national distrust, and escalate social fragmentation. In these conditions, rebuilding public trust is not a suggestion—it is a vital necessity for survival. A clear response to victims’ families, transparency regarding responsible officers, an end to unlawful searches, and the immediate prohibition of arbitrary firearm use at checkpoints are the bare minimum steps the government must take to restore its legitimacy. Otherwise, these checkpoints will mark the beginning of the end.

References

1. Alavi: The issue of “infiltration” has become more serious than before, Tabnak, September 29, 2016 (8 Mehr 1395).

2. Infiltrators according to the Intelligence Minister, Donya-e-Eqtesad, August 26, 2019 (4 Shahrivar 1398).

3. Former Intelligence Minister: Mossad has infiltrated Iran, video from a year ago of Ali Younesi, former Minister of Intelligence, on Mossad’s presence in the country. Fildo.

4. What happened in the Hamedan security patrol shooting? From Fars News Agency Telegram Channel.

5. From Mehrdad Maher’s Telegram Channel.

6. Head of the Armed Forces Judicial Organization of Hamedan: Suspects in the Tarik-Darreh shooting incident have been arrested. IRNA, July 1, 2025 (11 Tir 1404).