
What is social participation like in Iran?/ Mehrnoush Noydoust
“What we think, I speak on your tongue.”
Why does Iranian society have no interest in social participation? What is the current state of the quality of Iranian society? Under what conditions does this society thrive? Where do each of us stand in this human society known as the Iranian society? With which groups, classes, and social strata are we connected and in harmony with? To answer these questions, we can use the “Social Matrix” of Iran in the contemporary historical context, determine the position and value of individuals in it, and use the concept of “integration” to restate and examine the questions with a different perspective.
Given the issue of integration; who am I?
Mohammad Reza Nikfar, a philosopher and researcher, examines the social, economic, political, and cultural position of the Iranian people in a hundred-page article titled “Belonging and Non-Belonging: The Issue of Sustainable Integration in Iran” (1). He measures the quality of their interdependence in society. By borrowing the concept of “social matrix” from Pierre Bourdieu, he explains the issue of integration in Iran. This article also attempts to identify the social position of the Iranian people today, based on contemporary history, and examine their inclination towards participation and social action.
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Integration is the perspective of belonging, based on the experience of exclusion. Integration is not a concept for explaining a situation; it is used to express failure or success in a social or general aspect of life. Integration does not mean structure, pure denial of disorder, coherence, and uniformity; it is a quality of structure.
Integration is not a one-handed process, but rather a constant temptation that is destructive at its core, and has been present since the beginning of human society with the practices of consolidation. Integration is a critical, discursive, and dynamic concept. In the current stage, the indicators of integration in terms of economics, politics, law, and culture include: ownership, participation, immunity and equality, freedom of expression, and self-esteem.
Given this brief definition of integration, we begin with a more fundamental question: Who am I? The answer to this question can vary for different individuals in a society. I am a female journalist from Tehran. I am a male Turk worker. I am a smuggler. I am the director of an Islamic advertising organization. I am a sexual minority immigrant and exile. Personal and social characteristics can be extracted from the introduction of oneself, but each answer also reflects a social, economic, cultural, and even political situation. The answers to a large extent reflect the position and status of each individual in society and each one refers to a particular gender, ethnicity, religion, and culture that can be interpreted. These diverse and distinct “me”s create a heterogeneous society with similarities that may eventually lead to an “Iranian us” in a particular geographical structure. Examining the situation of these various “me”s without considering contemporary history, the state of governance, and its aftermath is not possible. This article,
Fake collective identities; nationality and Shia Islam
The Iranian nationality is a contemporary phenomenon. Reza Shah needed a nation under his government’s control in order to transform the backward countries into the nation of Iran. Therefore, he drew the Iranian nationality not from the coexistence of diverse cultures in this geography, but from the dark depths of myth and the history of the Shah’s kingdom and molded the nation into the people. He believed that the nation, like the government, could be forcibly conquered and unified. Certainly, some people were attracted to his material and spiritual promises, gathered under this word and became united with it, but others, like rural communities, could not fit into this container at the same time as urban groups; although the new political geography fence had an impact on the fate of all of them together.
The new era in Iran had begun before the establishment and formation of the country with defined borders. Naser al-Din Shah’s inclination towards foreign loans, Qajar emigrants, and later the Constitutionalists had greatly influenced the traditional social and political structure of Iran, and the issue of change and transformation had turned into a matter of cities, especially Tehran. After the seizure of the country by Reza Mirpanj, the transformation began from the top and in the structure of power. Progress was not in the desired form of universal and dynamic culture and society, but rather in the form of roads and railways. The country was the inheritance of the Shah’s father and the people were all his subjects. Anyone who did not accept servitude or wanted to share in the inheritance without the Shah’s permission was excluded from the concept of the nation. It was here that the fragmented society and tribal and ethnic groups were replaced by the concept of the “Iranian nation”. Before the invention of this concept,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, like his father, was riding on the same train of technological and equipment progress. He also wanted a modern government and facilities for a nation under his control and domination, but the human society had changed during the second Pahlavi era. The people were no longer just tribes and ethnic groups. Their ethnicity was still a defining factor, but they needed a new “self” to determine their social status. Education was now valued, cities had become attractive, and the new political-economic structure required them to have a suitable occupation. It was here that the Iranian “social status” began to take shape and evolve. Before the modern era, the concept of “social status” did not exist. The villagers were farmers and peasants, and the city dwellers were merchants, traders, and courtiers. An individual’s social status was not intertwined with their ethnicity and religion, and society had not yet evolved into a cohesive community. During this period, the various traditional and
The ruling machine, until the coup of August 1953, had one foot on the horseshoe and one on the nail. One day, the victim of the expertise and technique of a young Croatian man, he would go and the next day he would take the sermon of Hazrat Abbas and go to visit the eighth Imam. The coup of August 28 can be considered one of the turning points in contemporary Iranian history; in that the progressive forces, including the nationalists, religious groups, and leftists, rose up to change the political, social, and economic structure of Iran and brought a part of urban society with them. The traditional religious groups and many clerics were opposed to the government until then and were in agreement with the reformists, but after the coup, the Shah, out of fear of the leftists and Mossadegh supporters, allied himself with the monarchists and was able to win their support.
We said that after the beginning of the new era in Iran and during the first and second Pahlavi periods, the social identity of the Iranian people also changed with the new political and economic structure, and the issue of values and status emerged; although this expression of existence was always accompanied by suppression and domination, it still advanced in the depths of society. After the coup, the playing field that had been created in society was closed. The aristocrats, although they had taken the side of the Shah and had benefited to some extent from this support, still did not have access to the main structure of power and did not have control over many economic and political resources. As a result, the two main poles of society, the modernists and the traditionalists, went from the surface to the depths, and it was here that the traditional-religious groups infiltrated into the lower and marginalized layers and expanded their social base.
Nation instead of people.
As we saw, the meaning of “nation” was imposed on the people of this geography by the force of the Pahlavi’s mace and boots. The issue of social status and position emerged, and each layer of society questioned their own social identity. The reformists advocated for political participation, while the aristocrats sought power and wealth, and the common people wanted a better life. The progressives and traditionalists were in opposition to each other, with the marginalized people caught in between. Immigrant villages, poor city dwellers, and working classes were in contrast with the new and old middle class, all against the absolute rule of the monarchy. With the beginning of the 1950s and the change in development plans and the influx of cash into the country, the class divide became even greater and social rifts were revealed. However, issues such as religion and the patriarchal culture bound many of these classes together in a place other than their social position.
“Islam and the Shia religion were among the factors that led to unification, even bringing along a portion of the progressive and leftist forces. The majority of social classes were in agreement on cultural issues such as the subjugation of women. The main conflicts arose over economic and political matters, which manifested in tensions and class divisions. The slogans of freedom and equality existed, but only for men who sought a new status and position within the ruling system. The topic of women was only discussed in certain leftist groups or women’s associations, and was not considered a primary demand. Revolutionary groups, heavily influenced by conservative figures like Khomeini, interpreted discrimination through their own perspective. They wanted freedom, but only for themselves, not to eradicate discrimination for all members of society. The issue was not to solve the problem of minorities; it was to make the Shia religious majority the ruling power and once again take control of everyone’s destiny, just as a father would. We must accept this statement about the
Religion and worship were so deeply rooted in the collective identity that they even transformed left and progressive forces into agents of ideological production. The majority of men and women were under the influence of religious forces. Women were more active in radical left parties and less concerned about issues such as their own subjugation. Only a small group of independent, progressive, and freedom-seeking women existed, whose voices were not heard by anyone. An example of this can be seen in the February 1979 protest against compulsory hijab, where only a small group of university women participated. No left or right group supported this small student movement; unveiled women had no place in any institution after the revolution and were not allowed to take public transportation. Society had a tendency to push back half of its population, women, and after the revolution, it took steps in the same direction and aligned with the Islamic government.
Interdependence in worshiping God and religion and class separation gave hand in hand, opposing and similar social groups were linked together and the 1957 revolution happened. The Shah left, Khomeini came, at the same time, the throne of the Shah and the position of the Imam of the Shiites were taken over with the support of the people, he became the representative of God on earth and ultimately changed the name of “nation” from Reza Khan to “Islamic Ummah”. “We” were no longer “the nation of Iran”; we were “the Iranian Muslim Ummah”; more confused and disoriented than before in determining our social, political and economic position.
Where is “I” located?
So far, we have seen how the two concepts of “nation” and “ummah” were constructed and imposed on people. We have come to understand that many social groups and individuals did not fit into these concepts; for example, women were excluded from the beginning. “Nation” was defined based on loyalty and relationship with the monarchy, and did not include many members of society, including peasants and workers. “Islamic ummah” was also determined in the same way, in relation to the religious and clerical ruling system; but the delineation of the “Islamic ummah” in terms of religion and its radical and extremist treatment of society led to further exclusion, separation, and division under the strict religious rule. This further intensified the crisis of determining and establishing individuals’ positions in Iranian society.
One of the issues that the modern era brought with itself was the topic of “social status” and the value and worth of the modern human. This issue remained unresolved as a phenomenon even after the revolution and caused individuals in society to experience a crisis of social identity; however, with the help of the “social matrix”, one can somewhat understand the position of individuals in society. “Bourdieu defines the vertical axis of the matrix with the volume of possession (material, cultural, and symbolic assets): the richer sit higher and the poorer sit lower. This part of the work is the same as the traditional class classification model. He also considers a ruling class that sits at the highest level and a lower class consisting of the masses: workers and the destitute. In between these two positions is the middle class. The distinction of houses in the horizontal columns is based on the type of capital accumulated in each; for example, in the row of the ruling class, one may have a factory,
By imagining the “social matrix”, we can somewhat replace individuals in the “social space” and measure their relationship with the ruling class. Economic and cultural assets are important in placement. These assets are constantly changing and also change the position of individuals accordingly. Considering the social status and value of each household, one can imagine a social status; for example, someone who is in the category of artists, based on their distance or proximity to the ruling class and their economic assets, enjoys a special status.
This example can be extended to the current society of Iran, when we separate government artists from independent individuals in this field. These individuals have a status with the government, but not with certain groups of people. This example can be applied to any group, class, or individual. In this way, every Iranian is faced with a contradiction and instability in determining their place in society and measuring their worth and value with the government or the people. This results in a constant cost for maintaining or obtaining other cultural and economic possessions, along with social status and value.
Some individuals sacrifice their values and cultural position in order to maintain or gain economic advantage, while others lose their economic prosperity due to their cultural foundation.
Possessions are constantly transforming and disappearing. The Iranian human cannot find a steady position in society even for a short period of time and is therefore in crisis. This crisis combines with other crises, increases pressure, and deepens the gaps between individuals and groups in unstable situations. The population density in the lower part of the graph has increased and every day, the number of those who are close to poverty is decreasing. People are constantly struggling not to fall further, but the pressure from above is too great and they do not have the ability to confront it. Today, the issue of discrimination and segregation is much larger than in the years leading up to the revolution. Women and other minority groups based on religion, gender, and culture are more aware and demanding, although the pressure from the patriarchal ruling system still exists.
Return to the first question and the issue of integration.
“Integration policy, as mentioned, is from the perspective of combating discrimination against the fusion of religion and state. This opposition is not a conflict with the freedom of citizens in matters of religious inclination. If a democracy is established that oppresses believers, that system will fail. Integration policy is a policy of differentiation, yet it is also a policy of reconciliation. Integration is not possible without compassion and peace.”
Let’s put this definition of integration and what came in the first part of the text on hold and repeat the first questions with some minor changes: What is the quality of social cohesion in Iran (5)? Why is social participation low in Iran? To reach more accurate answers, we must first change the components of collective identity. What characteristics are associated with a society that has not been able to establish the concepts of “nation” and “community” and has not identified its identity due to the rule of the dominant powers? All members of present-day Iranian society, except for the ruling class and groups close to it, are grappling with the issue of discrimination. Freedom and equality, not in the abstract sense, but in relation to the reality of society, can be the answer to the issue of discrimination. If society can open the way to freedom in the face of discrimination, it will regain its ability to be cohesive. Cohesion, along with freedom and justice, is the main pillar of social participation
Social participation takes place in a society where the quality of community is high; meaning that to a large extent, the rights of all individuals are respected, there is no discrimination, and social identity is defined not based on narrow concepts such as nationality or religion, but rather on the principles of freedom and justice. When individuals in a society are in tension and conflict with each other and with the ruling system in determining their position and worth, the gaps prevent cohesion. Tension reduces social power and ultimately there is no capacity for cohesion. Current social participation is aimed at cohesion and social responsibility. Members of society need to recognize and determine their social identity in order to participate in social affairs. This social identity must be respected and valued in society so that individuals can use their power for it.
Notes:
1- Nikfar, Mohammad Reza, belonging, not belonging. Part two: The issue of sustainable integration in Iran, critique of political economy, 2021.
2- Same.
3- Same.
4- Same.
5- Nikfar, Mohammad Reza, belonging, not belonging- A general review of the issue of integration, Part 1, Radio Zamaneh, 27 Dey 1399.
Inspired by a line from the poem “Hand Cannot Reach Hand” by Ahmad Shamlou.
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