In recent years, the issue of dowry-related imprisonment has become one of the significant challenges facing Iran’s legal and judicial system. On one hand, it concerns the rights and human dignity of men indebted for dowries; on the other hand, within the framework of Iran’s family law, dowry has become the only effective tool for many women to claim their rights or to facilitate divorce. This is despite the fact that the current structure of family laws—especially concerning custody, guardianship, obedience, inheritance, and divorce—is largely designed in favor of men, thereby limiting the realization of gender justice. Under such circumstances, any measure aimed at capping dowries—including the so-called “Fourteen Coin” bill—can, in the absence of fundamental reforms in other aspects of family law, further weaken the legal standing of women. Therefore, a legal analysis of this bill and a review of its challenges during the approval process, particularly regarding its compatibility with the Constitution and Islamic law as assessed by the Guardian Council, is of heightened importance.

The proposal now informally referred to as the “Fourteen Coin Bill” is in fact part of the “Bill to Amend Certain Articles of the Law on Enforcement of Financial Convictions and Some Provisions Related to Dowry.” It has been drafted by the Judicial and Legal Commission of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and is pending review in the parliamentary plenary session. According to the provisions of this bill, if a dowry is set at up to fourteen full Bahar Azadi gold coins, it will still be subject to Article 3 of the Law on Enforcement of Financial Convictions. However, for any amount exceeding this threshold, collection will only be possible if the husband’s financial capability (solvency) is proven. A noteworthy point in this bill is the removal of the prison sentence as an enforcement mechanism for men who refuse to pay the portion of the dowry exceeding fourteen coins. On the other hand, with the stated aim of “protecting women,” Article 7 of the bill stipulates that a woman may obtain a divorce through the court, and ultimately with the permission of a religious authority, if she waives all her financial rights and meets certain conditions, including two years of physical separation or proving extreme aversion. The lack of appropriate and robust alternative protections for women in this bill may lead to a weakening of their financial rights and thus necessitates a more thorough review within legal frameworks.

Given the contents of this bill, it is essential to examine it in light of the principles of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Article 20 of the Constitution explicitly states: “All citizens of the country, both men and women, equally enjoy the protection of the law and all human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights in accordance with Islamic criteria.” Additionally, Article 21 obliges the state to guarantee the rights of women in all respects and to provide favorable conditions for the development of women’s personalities and the restoration of their material and spiritual rights. However, the current proposal, by eliminating the prison sentence as a means of enforcing dowry payments above fourteen coins and by conditioning a woman’s right to divorce on a complete waiver of her financial rights, may in practice further exacerbate the existing imbalance in the family law system to the detriment of women. From a constitutional perspective, any legislation must aim to promote equality and eliminate discrimination, not to restrict women’s legal tools, thereby limiting their position in the process of divorce and claiming their rights. Furthermore, Article 4 of the Constitution stipulates that all laws and regulations must be based on Islamic principles, and the Guardian Council’s clerics are responsible for determining this compatibility. Given that under Islamic jurisprudence, the payment of dowry is obligatory and a woman may be entitled to request divorce in cases of hardship, the severe restriction on dowry enforcement and conditional divorce procedures may also be subject to dispute from a jurisprudential standpoint. Therefore, the proposal in question appears to require a more precise articulation of its Islamic and constitutional foundations, as well as the inclusion of more effective protective mechanisms to guarantee women’s rights, in order to pass the scrutiny of the Guardian Council.

One of the major obstacles in the path of passing and implementing reforms in family law—especially regarding dowry and divorce—is the stance of the Guardian Council, which serves as the body overseeing the conformity of laws with Islamic law and the Constitution. According to Articles 91 to 99 of the Constitution, the Guardian Council has exclusive authority to evaluate the legality and religious conformity of parliamentary legislation, and its historical record indicates a highly conservative approach to structural changes in the family law system. This Council, when faced with bills that could potentially limit the traditional legal role of men in the family or grant women greater authority in matters of divorce and finances, has often rejected such proposals by citing traditional jurisprudential principles. Examples such as the rejection of the “conditional dowry payment” bill or the amendments to the Family Protection Law regarding custody and guardianship demonstrate the Council’s resistance to reforms that may alter the traditional Islamic family structure.

In the case of the current bill, on one hand, the removal of imprisonment as an enforcement mechanism for dowry payments may not necessarily be seen by the Council as contrary to public interest; however, on the other hand, provisions that grant women the right to divorce through the court without the husband’s consent—even if they waive all financial rights—may be interpreted by the Council as interfering with religious rulings on divorce and could face serious opposition. Especially since, based on certain interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence, divorce without the husband’s initiation is only permissible in proven cases of hardship, not merely based on aversion or prolonged physical separation. As such, the fate of this bill depends heavily on the Guardian Council’s flexibility in interpreting religious principles in light of social developments, which—given the Council’s historical conservatism and its members’ adherence to traditional jurisprudence—seems unlikely.

Beyond the theoretical and jurisprudential challenges, the practical implementation of such a bill could have significant implications for the structure of family litigation and the legal security of women. Firstly, conditioning a woman’s right to divorce on the complete forfeiture of all financial rights—regardless of whether hardship is proven—effectively places additional pressure on women to relinquish all entitlements, including dowry, alimony, compensation for household labor, and even their dowry trousseau, in order to escape harmful or undesirable marital situations. This could turn family court proceedings into arenas of unequal bargaining, where women—due to economic dependence or weaker social standing—are compelled to accept unjust agreements. Additionally, proving conditions such as “extreme aversion” or “continuous physical separation” in court requires a complex evidentiary process involving witness testimony or collection of proof, which not only places a heavy burden of proof on the woman but also opens the door to broad judicial interpretation. In the absence of clear guidelines, this could lead to inconsistent rulings in family courts, where similar cases yield dissimilar verdicts. Furthermore, the elimination of imprisonment for dowry debts above fourteen coins may lead to an increase in informal and unwritten agreements between parties outside the official legal system, which not only complicates judicial oversight but also increases the likelihood of women being subjected to further injustice. Overall, implementing such regulations without adequate support mechanisms and standardized judicial procedures may institutionalize new forms of inequality in the divorce process.

Given all that has been discussed, it appears that any reform in the area of dowry, divorce, or other aspects of family law must be undertaken with a comprehensive and gender-just approach. Gradual erosion of women’s legal protections, without a fundamental review of other discriminatory structures in family law, will not only fail to improve the current situation but may in fact further weaken the legal and social position of women. If lawmakers genuinely aim to reduce the number of dowry-related prisoners or to ease divorce procedures for women, they must simultaneously revise laws such as the absolute guardianship of fathers, the principle of obedience, the imbalance in inheritance, and the difficulty of proving hardship. Legislation in this field cannot be effective through temporary measures aimed at resolving specific crises but requires a systematic perspective aligned with social developments and dynamic jurisprudence. Otherwise, any limited reform—no matter how well-intentioned—may simply reproduce inequality in a new form and conflict with the foundational principles of the Constitution, including the obligation to eliminate discrimination and uphold human dignity. Therefore, without fundamental reforms in other parts of family law and without enforceable guarantees to protect women’s financial and human rights, the current bill cannot meet the needs of society and may, in the future, face a wave of dissatisfaction and legal complications.