In early May, the government of Congo signed a contract worth 5.6 million dollars with the group “Mer”. Mer is an Israeli security consulting company with deep ties to Israeli intelligence services. Mer sells monitoring tools to foreign security forces and the result of its products is a large data analysis system called the Strategic Actionable Intelligence Platform. This platform allows users to monitor and conduct covert investigations into the activities of communities and groups in order to infiltrate them.

The Congolese government has not given an explanation as to why they have signed such a contract. However, it is not a coincidence that the president, Joseph Kabila – who is facing a political crisis at home – has suddenly become interested in technology that can easily be used against his opponents. After Kabila stayed in power beyond his legal term as president – which expired last December – protests erupted in the country. Only after continuous demonstrations and heavy international pressure, did he agree to hold national elections by the end of the year. However, there is much doubt about whether Kabila will give up power without a fight.

If this is true, this fight will involve dividing and harassing opponents and most likely silencing them. The MIR collection in the field of surveillance tools will definitely help.

By organizing the increasing presence of political and human rights activists online, an authoritarian leader gains a significant advantage when able to spy on the activities of their opponents. If security forces in Congo are able to identify and disrupt gatherings of opposition leaders and civil society groups who are organizing protests in Kinshasa, they will strengthen Kabila’s chances of winning.

It is very unpleasant that Mir is not a unique company. The International Privacy Watchdog Group has observed in its recent report that 27 Israeli companies and 122 US-affiliated companies offer surveillance and infiltration technology to their customers. Although this sale is not entirely legal, as it crosses ethical boundaries. As a result, governments have begun to crack down on such transactions with higher levels of surveillance. For example, the European Commission has proposed controlling the export of surveillance technology in the field of human rights. In addition, the Freedom House report on internet freedom in 2016 noted that two-thirds of all internet users live in countries where criticism of the government, military, or family laws is subject to censorship, and that in the past year, authorities in 38 countries have made arrests solely based on the content of social media posts. It is difficult to say how many of these arrests are a result of Mir’s sold technologies, but some groups estimate that 25 countries have carried out technical attacks against government

However, digital surveillance is only one of the tools available to the government for suppressing opponents. One of the popular and more effective strategies is to create a targeted system for cutting off networks. If dissatisfaction and protests have disrupted a particular province, the response is to cut off access to local internet and create a complete information blackout. In Cameroon, President Paul Biya, who has ruled alone and ruthlessly for the past 35 years, used this technique last year to suppress protests in English-speaking regions of the country over economic discrimination and lack of political representation by the French-speaking majority. Biya’s response was swift and brutal. He pressured mobile phone operators to cut off communication and internet services to the troubled areas. As a result, for 93 days, citizens in those areas were unable to connect with the outside world. When the government restored internet access, there was significant economic damage estimated at over $3 million.

Internet shutdowns are used to suppress dissenters around the world. Currently, the advocacy organization Access Now has reported fifteen documented sudden shutdowns in 2015, including in Brazil, India, and Turkey. By 2016, a list of sudden shutdowns in relation to 65 countries such as Algeria, Ethiopia, and Pakistan was documented, showing the spread of this statistic. In addition, repressive governments are also using tactics such as false advertising, restricting access to the internet by making it inaccessible, and physically harassing, pressuring, or arresting online activists. Such regimes also launch cyber attacks against civil society organizations, political opponents, and journalists, censoring information through IP blocking (preventing connections from specific IP addresses) and DNS filtering (manipulating the exchange of information necessary for internet connection).

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How should supporters be responsive?

Although the United Nations Human Rights Council has increasingly recognized online rights such as freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, the laws of human rights do not explicitly and clearly protect freedom of expression on the internet and activities within it. As David Kaye, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, points out, the closest protective laws are hidden in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 19 states that “everyone has the right to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” However, the issue is that there is no specific internationally recognized right for the internet. These two articles are the closest to recognizing such a right in international law, but norms and principles are competing with technological advancements, and

Therefore, part of the responsibility falls on the supporters of this mindset to create a public discourse for the independent right to expression and communication online, or to elevate Article 19 as a real legal position. This requires more awareness, electoral struggles, and public outrage whenever a government commits a heinous act that restricts the online rights of its citizens, such as the ban on social media networks and mobile internet services in Kashmir by the Indian government. Groups like Access Now have taken important steps to raise awareness about internet shutdowns through campaigns like #keepiton, but such efforts must be complemented by other creative actions. One proposal in Africa that has gained attention is the establishment of the African Network Information Center (AFRINIC), an agency responsible for managing and allocating IP addresses, which has been limited for government entities in countries where sudden shutdowns occur. This idea could impose direct costs on governments that restrict internet access. However, this proposal has moved beyond the stage of formulating the problem, and

As activists have condemned and condemned the actions of companies like “Nike” and “Gap” in using child labor in their Vietnamese workshops, they should behave similarly towards countries that restrict or spy on their citizens’ access to the internet. For example, Ethiopia has quickly imposed severe restrictions on the internet and mobile communications, including strict and widespread online surveillance, following months of anti-government protests across the country and the blocking of internet access for all mobile phones in Addis Ababa, resulting in the arrest of thousands of civilians. Advocacy groups should pressure companies to reconsider their investments in Ethiopia. Ethiopia is a country in East Africa where companies from Asia have relocated in search of cheap labor for textile and clothing production. Activists need to bring in credible elements to the game; to make people ask whether it is morally acceptable for a company like “H&M” to produce its clothes in a country where systematic surveillance and harassment exist and people are denied access to the internet.

In order for these strategies to be effective, human rights communities require legal tools, resources, and capabilities. Increasing alert systems for when network disruptions occur and improving monitoring capabilities when governments interfere with online activities will enable activists to report danger and mobilize the international community to condemn this behavior. Opponents in repressive countries must make great efforts and choose the right foundations and techniques to overcome government restrictions and achieve greater digital security.

Planners must raise their voices and engage with key stakeholders such as embassies, telecommunications companies, internet service providers, and other relevant decision-makers when faced with restrictions on internet access, online surveillance, and such harassment. This will enable them to effectively curb oppressive governments through their collective influence.

In this way, companies like Mir, which sell complex surveillance and infiltration technologies to oppressive governments, must be pressured. Activists must push for decision-makers to explicitly consider human rights issues alongside their import and export policies.

In other words, when the United States or the European Union are deciding whether to allow the sale of technology to a specific country, lawmakers must consider potential human rights risks in addition to their own concerns about national security and economic interests.

In fact, just as these countries have limited the sale of weapons based on decision-making hierarchies and considerations such as the possibility of misuse, they should also review and restrict the sale of sensitive technologies.

So far, the human rights community has not been able to launch a unified and successful campaign against oppressive governments that restrict internet access, or international standards that violate access to the internet. This is partly because the issue is still new and has not been able to garner public attention to its sensitivity. However, it can also be requested that human rights groups consider access to the internet as a priority and achievable goal: for many groups, this issue has not been prioritized as the first or even second priority. As long as the international community continues to grant licenses to companies like Mir, they will continue to sell products to authoritarian governments that allow them to spy on citizens, harass and oppress opponents, and deny people access to the internet.

Explanation:

This article is a translation of a Persian article titled “Why Internet Access Is a Human Right” written by Stephen Feldstein and published in English on June 1, 2017 on the website of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.