From the earliest stages of forming human societies, two distinct classes have emerged, which in the simplest division are divided into two groups: “rulers” and “subjects”. In fact, it is the behavior, division of duties, and relationships of these two groups that introduces the concept of a political society.

If we define the political society as “the most complete society in which the relationships between the obedient and the ruler are established in an organized and structured manner through legal institutions” (2); then it can be said that the political society is a society in which the relationships between rulers and people are formed through specific and designated channels.

If the relationship between the ruler and the people in a political society is interactive and two-sided, it means that the people can convey their demands to the government through legal channels and the government reflects these demands and expectations in creating laws and its behavior, then a civil society has been formed.

What seems important at first glance is that “civil society” is a specific system of democracy; because in democratically based regimes, civil society is a tangible and real example, and in fact, by looking at the indicators of a democratic regime, it can be understood that “civil society is a special democracy and its counterpart.” These indicators include:

1. Free and fair elections.

It means that elections should be based on fair competition and the participation of all people.

2- Transparent and accountable government:

It means a government in which its officials and political institutions are obligated to be accountable to the people for their decisions and actions.

3- Respect for civil and political rights:

This means that the government is responsible for identifying and ensuring the fundamental rights and freedoms of its citizens.

4- The existence of a civil society.

The concept of civil society refers to the masses and popular assemblies that are formed continuously and spontaneously by the people, and act as intermediaries for transferring the people’s demands to the government and overseeing the actions and decisions of the rulers.

With this introduction, it seems that discussing civil society and its desires in a country like Iran, which has a political regime of religious theocracy, may be unnecessary; however, the important point is that…

Civil society is not the result of the will and desire of the government, but rather the product of the struggle and perseverance of the people who have fought and pressured the government in order to achieve their desires and aspirations, and have forced the government to submit to their demands.

Given the change in government in Iran and the emergence of a new administration under Mr. Rouhani, one of the important issues is the state of Iranian civil society and the expectations and challenges ahead. This issue has occupied the minds of many political and civil activists in Iran, as the process of the decline of Iranian civil society, which gained momentum with the emergence of the Ahmadinejad government, will be affected by the new government. What will be the state of affairs with the start of the new administration?

Is the new government a continuation of the downward trend of civil society movements in Iran, like the previous government? Or will it take steps towards improving these relationships?

If the answer to the question is that the new government’s efforts for development and giving more space to the demands of Iranian civil society, what is the framework, capacity, and resources, in short, the scope of power, activities, and areas of influence of the new government, and to what extent will this government defend its promises and slogans in power interactions with other powerful institutions within the Iranian government, which are essentially foreign and even hostile to the concept of civil society?

To understand the evolution of civil society in post-revolutionary Iran, it is necessary to remember that after the 1979 revolution, the government presented itself as the representative of all the people of Iran, aiming to fulfill all their hopes, aspirations, and desires. In such an atmosphere, everything that the government wanted was also wanted by the people, and anything that was discussed outside of the government’s sphere of influence had to be approved by the government. In the tumultuous political conditions of that time, the destruction of all the efforts of civil society, which had formed in the three decades leading up to the 1979 revolution, was inevitable and obvious.

In the political atmosphere of the early days of the revolution, any kind of demand was evaluated based on religious laws and sometimes personal interpretations, and the opinion of the leader of the revolution was the final say in cases of disagreement. However, in all of these cases, there is an important point to consider, and that is: this demand is from the government, presented as the demand of the people, and this means the destruction of the concept of “civil society” and its rejection among the thoughts of the new rulers.

The conditions that arose after the revolution were such that the civil society and its demands were not only ignored, but the outbreak of war and the mobilization of the country’s resources for the defense of the revolution dealt another devastating blow to the weak structure of Iranian civil society and its aspirations.

Because if before that, civil and legitimate demands were considered anti-revolutionary and tyrannical and were attributed to Eastern and Western workers, this time with the emergence of a war situation, supporting the enemy and arrogance, weakening the fronts and the spirit of resistance and the like, these accusations will be added and the field for any kind of civil activity will be more restricted than before.

With the end of the war and the establishment of the Development Government, under the leadership of Hashemi Rafsanjani and the change in the country’s leadership from Mr. Khomeini to Khamenei, it was expected that significant changes would take place in addressing the demands and needs of civil society and its demands. However, this transfer of power was not easy for civil society, as the new leader lacked the charisma, ability, and influence of the previous leader. He saw strengthening his power base as a greater limitation on society and its opponents. Unfortunately, the new leader’s perspective also placed civil activists among the opposition, and the Development Government, with its war-like approach, managed the country by suppressing and not allowing civil and political activities, with most of its managers being former commanders of the eight-year war.

In the midst of all this, a third force also emerged, with the relentless efforts of Mr. Rafsanjani and the sense of need for a new leader, and stepped into the arena of Iran’s political, economic, and social power. This newcomer was none other than the Revolutionary Guards, which after the war seemed to be limited to security issues and guarding the revolution and its leaders. However, since the revolution and its leaders did not have much appeal without the presence of boots and financial power, this dangerous player, who had both military and security power and abundant resources, entered the political and ruling arena of Iran. From the very beginning, in order to prevent any opposition to its presence in the new position, it acted with great intensity, trying to ignore and suppress any civil action in Iranian society.

Since civil society and the desires of the people are not something that can be managed, set boundaries for it, or managed in a governmental manner; during the end of the era of state-building, the activities of civil society took on a political color and the whispers of conflict between civil desires and governance became strongly evident, and the work progressed to the point where within the government itself, some groups took control and began to make reforms.

This.

The sudden demand for reform by some individuals within the government was not due to thinking and analyzing the current situation, but rather under immense pressure from the Iranian civil society and the growth and strengthening of civic beliefs, especially among intellectuals and educated individuals. They gradually reached a point where they believed that achieving the minimum demands of civil society would require the removal of the ruling system.

The situation was not similar to the 1957 revolution; with the difference that at that time, the people wanted an Islamic government, but now the people want to reclaim their civil and personal rights that have been lost.

Under the influence of these pressures, the government was forced to give in to a group of its own members under the name of reformists, whose main slogan was to prioritize civil and social demands.

The government’s policy of reforms towards civil society was a policy of carrot and stick, in a way that in the early days of its rule, it tried to appease the demands of civil society and cooperate with them to a certain extent, so as not to create problems for its authority.

With the slight easing of the relentless pressures from various ruling factions, suddenly the flood of demands from Iranian civil society poured in and ultimately led to the events of the Kooye Daneshgah and similar incidents. On the other hand, the government attempted to stop the growing demands of civil society at any cost, even if it meant killing leaders and activists of political and social movements, in the form of chain murders at a high cost, including sacrificing the reputation of security agencies and some lower-ranking officials.

With the end of the reformist government and the coming of the new government under the leadership of Mr. Ahmadinejad, a group took control that was not bound by any religious or political rules and was willing to do anything to stay in power and maintain their political position. The first threat that caught their attention was the demands of civil society, mainly from educated and middle-class groups.

Based on this, a more targeted policy was pursued with greater determination and, in parallel, a completely new policy was implemented with seriousness; this time the goal was not the destruction of the leaders, nor the chain killings, nor the student movement, but rather in a completely intelligent and cunning manner, the integrity of Iranian civil society, which consisted mostly of the middle class, was attacked; in such a way that…

The government’s economic policy has become such that it reduces the middle class as much as possible and places them either among the affluent or among the poor and deprived at any cost.

This policy, which aimed to impoverish the people and increase the number of those living below the poverty line in Iran, was very successful.

The cunning point of this policy was to confront the West and strengthen enmity through domestic and foreign policies, so that with the increase of sanctions, the responsibility of this dangerous and diabolical policy would fall on foreign actors and global arrogance, and the global community, in disbelief, would also be involved in this predetermined game and play its role in the best way possible. Unprecedented sanctions were imposed on the Iranian nation, which resulted in the relative destruction of the middle class in Iran. In this regard, the Ahmadinejad government acted remarkably and almost achieved all of its predetermined goals, and the burden of responsibility for this issue fell on the shoulders of global arrogance.

But the topic of our day is civil society and its ups and downs in the new government, under the leadership of Mr. Rouhani.

In my opinion, the changes in Iranian civil society will not be significant after the start of the purple government of Mr. Rouhani, and it cannot be hoped that the civil society and its demands and aspirations will receive much attention from the authorities.

Some of the main reasons that prevent the Iranian civil society from being able to draw a bright future for itself and its demands and aspirations during President Rouhani’s term are as follows:

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The destructive effects of the previous government’s economy have completely shattered the power and resilience of the middle class in current Iranian society, to the point where it cannot be expected that the engine of this class, which has been the main source of all civil movements throughout history and in all countries, will be illuminated anytime soon.

2- According to the principles of the multiple constitutional laws, the scope of authority of the President in Iran is much more limited than what the majority of people expect from a President, and all major centers of power, as well as the appointment and dismissal of key government officials, are directly or indirectly under the control of the Supreme Leader. With a general look at some of the constitutional principles, it is easy to see the minimal impact, and in some cases, the lack of impact of the President on the structure of government and the Islamic Republic system in Iran, including:

The phrase “absolute guardianship of the jurist” in Article 57 of the Constitution, titled “The Governing Powers in the Islamic Republic of Iran are: the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers, which are under the absolute guardianship of the jurist and the leadership of the nation, according to the principles of this law. These powers are independent of each other.” It can easily be concluded that the President, under the absolute command and supervision of the Supreme Leader, has a heavily determined and controlled sphere of responsibility.

According to the fourth principle of the Constitution, all civil, criminal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies to all fundamental principles of the Constitution and other laws and regulations, and the determination of this matter is the responsibility of the jurisprudents of the Guardian Council.

Therefore, the demands of civil society within the framework of Islamic law are open to discussion and debate, and essentially, a non-Islamic civil demand is not admissible.

According to Article 60 of the Constitution, “The exercise of executive power, except in matters directly entrusted to the Leader, is carried out through the President and the Ministers.”

According to Article 89 of the Constitution, “If the President commits an offense or takes actions outside of their authority, they will be subject to impeachment and can be removed from office.”

According to Article 110 of the Constitution, “The most important powers and authorities of the government are in the hands of the Leader.”

Monitoring the proper implementation of overall policies of the system.

Command of Consensus

Command of all armed forces.

Announcing war and peace and mobilizing forces.

Installation, insulation, and acceptance of resignation.

The jurists of the Guardian Council…

The highest position of the judiciary power.

The head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting organization.

Chief of Joint Staff

Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

High commanders of military and law enforcement forces…

Resolution of differences and regulation of trilateral relations.

Solving system problems that cannot be solved through normal means, through the Assembly of Determining the Expediency of the System.

Signing the decree of the presidency after the people’s election.

The eligibility of presidential candidates, in terms of meeting the conditions outlined in this law, must be approved by the Guardian Council before the elections and by the leadership in the first term.

The impeachment of the president, taking into account the country’s interests, after the ruling of the Supreme Court of the country on his violation of legal duties, or the vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly on his incompetence based on Article 89…

Pardon or reduction of punishment within the limits of Islamic criteria after the proposal of the head of the judiciary.

3- The main actors on the stage of Iran’s domestic and foreign politics are numerous and far beyond imagination. In promoting the main policies of the system, actors and factors such as the Revolutionary Guards, the Supreme Leader, and behind-the-scenes economic and political groups play the most significant role. In this regard, the President does not have much power, and unfortunately, all these factions and power groups prioritize their own interests in maintaining the current situation.

4- Security, economic, and international issues, as well as competition among factions within the government, are at a level where under no circumstances will a new problem, especially in the realm of civil and social issues, be allowed to arise.

But as we mentioned before, civil society and its desires are not formed by the will of governments nor are they engineered according to their wishes; therefore, Iranian civil society and its desires and demands will continue on its challenging path and ultimately achieve the results it desires, despite all difficult circumstances.

In the past three decades, Iranian civil society has been under the weight of the toughest attacks and restrictions and has endured the hardest blows, but despite this, it has become stronger and more resilient.

Sources:

1- Fundamental Rights – Abolfazl Qazi Shariatpanahi – Mizan Publication – Eighth Edition – 1374 (1995) p. 3.

2 – Fundamental Rights – Meysam Asadi – Rah Publications – Second Edition – 1388.

3 – Fundamental Rights – Meysam Asadi – Qaed Publications – First Edition – 1390 – p. 135.