The transition from authoritarianism to democracy is one of the most complex political processes in the contemporary world. Historical experience shows that the سقوط of authoritarian regimes does not necessarily lead to the establishment of a stable democracy. In many cases, the collapse of an authoritarian order has resulted in political instability, internal violence, or the reproduction of authoritarianism in new forms. One of the determining factors in the fate of political transitions is the presence or absence of an independent civil society. Drawing on the theoretical frameworks of Alexis de Tocqueville, Jürgen Habermas, Robert Putnam, Juan Linz, and Alfred Stepan, as well as the research of Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder on democratization and violence, this article examines the role of civil society in democratic transition under conditions of war. The article argues that war, by securitizing politics, concentrating power in military institutions, and eroding social capital, weakens the capacity of civil society and thereby increases the likelihood of a violent transition or the appropriation of the transition by military forces. At the same time, even under wartime conditions, humanitarian civic networks can serve as the initial nuclei of a future civil society. By examining comparative experiences in the Middle East and focusing especially on Iran, the article shows that the existence of an independent civil society is one of the most important preconditions for a peaceful transition and the consolidation of democracy.

Introduction

The transition from authoritarianism to democracy is one of the most important subjects in the literature of contemporary political science. In the second half of the twentieth century, waves of democratization in Latin America, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe drew scholars’ attention to the question of how authoritarian regimes collapse and what conditions lead to the establishment of a stable democracy.

Yet historical experiences have shown that the fall of authoritarian regimes does not necessarily lead to democracy. In many cases, the collapse of an authoritarian order has resulted in political instability, civil war, or the return of authoritarianism. For this reason, political scientists have distinguished between the “fall of authoritarianism” and “democratic transition.” I myself, in an article titled “The Moment of سقوط” and “The Moment of Transition,” have separated these two events from one another.

Democratic transition is a complex, multi-stage process that includes the reconstruction of political institutions, the formation of rules for political competition, and the creation of mechanisms for the accountability of power. In this process, civil society plays an essential role.

Since the classic works of Alexis de Tocqueville, civil society has been recognized as one of the main pillars of democracy. Civic associations and social networks not only strengthen the culture of political participation but also prevent excessive concentration of power in the state.

However, many theories of civil society were developed under ordinary political conditions and have paid less attention to situations in which society is entangled in war or a security crisis. War can fundamentally transform political and social structures and alter the relationship among civil society, the state, and the military.

How does the absence of an independent civil society under conditions of war affect the transition from authoritarianism to democracy?

The concept of civil society has a long history in the tradition of Western political thought, but it has acquired particular importance in contemporary political science. I have explained this history in detail in my book Civil Society: Discourses, Contexts, Experiences. Civil society refers to a set of organizations, associations, and social networks independent of the state that stand between the individual and the state.

In his famous work Democracy in America, Tocqueville argued that voluntary associations play a fundamental role in preserving freedom. He believed that associations enable citizens to learn the skills of political participation and to resist the concentration of power in the state.

In the twentieth century, this view was expanded through the theory of social capital. Robert Putnam showed that networks of social trust and civic cooperation are essential for the effective functioning of democratic institutions. In his view, social capital makes collective cooperation easier and reduces the costs of political exchange.

Jürgen Habermas also regarded civil society as part of the public sphere. Within this sphere, citizens can discuss public issues and influence political power through rational debate.

In the literature on democratic transition as well, civil society plays an important role. Linz and Stepan argue that democracy is consolidated only when several institutional arenas—including civil society—develop simultaneously.

War and the Securitization of Politics

War is one of the most important factors that can alter political and social structures. Under wartime conditions, politics often becomes securitized, and states acquire greater powers in order to confront external or internal threats.

The securitization of politics is usually accompanied by restrictions on civil liberties. The media comes under control, political activities are limited, and the public sphere for free discussion grows smaller.

On the other hand, war usually leads to the concentration of power in military and security institutions. Society’s economic and human resources are directed toward military objectives, and the role of the military in politics increases.

This process can severely weaken the capacity of an independent civil society. Many civic organizations, under wartime conditions—if they exist at all—are either shut down or brought under state control.

Democratization and Violence

One of the important debates in political science literature is the relationship between democratization and violence.

In their research, Mansfield and Snyder have shown that democratization under conditions of institutional weakness can lead to an increase in political conflict and even war.

In their view, when authoritarian regimes collapse but democratic institutions have not yet taken shape, political competition can quickly turn into violent conflict.

Under such conditions, civil society can play an important role in reducing violence. Civic networks can provide channels for the peaceful expression of social demands and prevent political conflicts from turning violent.

The Role of the Military in Political Transitions

In many countries, the military is the only coherent organization in times of crisis.

In the absence of strong civic institutions, the armed forces may play a decisive role in the transition process.

The military can play three different roles: 1. supporting the transition, 2. managing the transition, 3. appropriating the transition.

The case of Egypt after 2011 shows how the military can appropriate the transition. The experiences of Tunisia and Egypt provide an important example of the impact of civil society on political transitions. In Tunisia, civil society was stronger and the military less interventionist. Labor unions and professional associations were able to play a mediating role. In Egypt, the military was the principal actor of the state and civil society was weaker. As a result, the military was able to halt the transition.

Iran and the Challenges of Democratic Transition Under Conditions of Crisis and War

Compared with many authoritarian regimes, the political structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran has a particular complexity. This system cannot be regarded simply as a military dictatorship or a classic form of party authoritarianism. The Islamic Republic is a combination of limited and controlled electoral institutions, religious ideological structures, and security and military networks organized around the axis of Velayat-e Faqih. This multilayered combination has made the question of political transition in Iran not merely a matter of replacing one government, but of reconfiguring the entire relationship among religion, the state, law, and coercive forces.

In political science literature, such structures are often analyzed within the framework of “hybrid authoritarianism” or “electoral authoritarianism”; systems in which electoral institutions exist, but real power is concentrated in unelected institutions. In Iran, this concentration of power lies in an institution that possesses both ideological legitimacy and the support of an extensive network of security and military forces. These characteristics make transition from such a system institutionally far more complex than transition from many military or personal dictatorships.

One of the most important of these challenges is the role of military and security forces in the structure of power. In many countries, the military is a professional institution whose principal duty is the defense of national borders. But in Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, in addition to its military role, has an extensive presence in security, economic, and even cultural spheres. Over the past four decades, this institution has become one of the most important actors in the country’s political economy and controls a network of companies, foundations, and economic institutions.

This situation has made the IRGC not only a military institution but also part of the structure of political and economic power. Under such conditions, the issue of democratic transition is not simply a matter of limiting the role of the military in politics; it also involves containing an extensive network of military, security, and economic power integrated into the structure of the state and the economy.

From the perspective of democratic transition theory, this situation doubles the importance of civil society. Linz and Stepan emphasize that democracy is consolidated when five institutional arenas—civil society, political society, rule of law, an effective bureaucracy, and an institutionalized economy—develop simultaneously. In Iran, many of these arenas have, over the past decades, come under pressure from the concentration of ideological and security power. As a result, independent civil society is one of the few arenas that can reconstruct the link between society and politics.

At the same time, civil society in Iran has also faced serious limitations. Many civic associations, non-governmental organizations, independent unions, and free media outlets have, over the years, been confronted with legal and security restrictions. These limitations have prevented Iranian civil society from playing the kind of institutional role seen in some successful transitions.

At the same time, Iranian society has undergone profound social and cultural transformations. The growth of urbanization, the expansion of higher education, increased global connections, and changes in cultural values have all led to rising social demands for political participation and civil liberties. These transformations show that the gap between society and the structure of power in Iran has widened over recent decades.

This gap between society and the state is one of the most important factors of instability in authoritarian regimes. When institutional channels for expressing social demands do not exist, social protests may emerge in non-institutional and at times violent forms. Under such conditions, the absence of an organized civil society can increase the risk of political instability.

This issue can also be understood within the framework of Mansfield and Snyder’s theories. They show that political transitions under conditions of institutional weakness can lead to increased internal conflict. When an authoritarian regime weakens but democratic institutions have not yet taken shape, political competition may quickly turn into violent conflict.

In Iran, this danger becomes even more significant in scenarios where transition occurs under conditions of severe crisis or even war. War usually leads to the securitization of politics and an expanded role for military forces in government. Under such conditions, if civil society is weak, military or security forces may play a decisive role in shaping the new political order.

As I wrote above, comparative experiences in the Middle East also show that this danger is real. In Egypt after the 2011 revolution, the military, which had already been one of the central pillars of the state, was able to seize power again under conditions of political instability. By contrast, in Tunisia, civil society was able to play, to some extent, a mediating role among political forces and prevent the complete collapse of the transition.

In some respects, Iran is closer to Egypt than to Tunisia. In both countries, military forces play an important role in the structure of the state. But the power structure in Iran is even more complex than in Egypt, because it includes a network of military, security, and paramilitary forces, some of which are directly linked to the ideological structure of the government.

Under such conditions, if political transition occurs in Iran, one of the most important questions will be whether the military and security forces will be willing to withdraw from politics. The answer to this question depends to a large extent on the strength of civil society and its ability to create broad social coalitions.

Civil society can play several important roles under such conditions. First, it can help create peaceful channels for the expression of social demands and prevent political conflicts from turning violent. Second, it can contribute to the formation of a democratic political culture. Third, it can rebuild social trust through social and institutional networks.

Social trust is one of the most important sources of political stability. In conditions where society has become severely polarized, trust among different social groups declines and the likelihood of conflict increases. Civil society can help rebuild this trust by creating networks of cooperation and dialogue.

Another important point is that civil society can continue to exist in various forms even under conditions of repression. Many social networks, cultural groups, charitable associations, and local initiatives may appear non-political on the surface, but in the long run they can provide important foundations for the formation of a future civil society.

In fact, in many political transitions, the initial nuclei of civil society have taken shape in the form of informal and social networks. In times of crisis, these networks can quickly transform into civic and political organizations.

Ultimately, historical experience shows that the fate of political transitions depends to a large extent on the relationship between civil society and coercive institutions. Wherever civil society has managed to survive as an independent actor, transition—even if fragile—has had a greater chance of being peaceful. Conversely, wherever the securitization of politics has engulfed all public space, the result has often been the reproduction of authoritarianism or a descent into violence.

For Iran, this issue is doubly important. If political transition occurs under conditions of crisis or war, the existence of an independent civil society can make the difference between a peaceful transition and a violent collapse. For this reason, strengthening civic institutions, even under conditions of political restriction, is one of the most important preconditions for a stable transition to democracy in Iran.

Iran has a complex power structure. The Islamic Republic is a combination of electoral institutions, ideological structures, and security networks. Within this structure, the IRGC is not only a military institution but also an economic and political actor. As a result, if political transition occurs under conditions of crisis or war, there is a danger that military forces will determine the rules of the political game.

Conclusion

Historical experience shows that the fall of an authoritarian regime alone is not sufficient for the establishment of democracy. Democratic transition requires active civic institutions and social capital. Under wartime conditions, these elements are often weakened.

Yet even under such conditions, civic networks can still serve as the initial nuclei of a future civil society. Civil society, therefore, must be understood not merely as a complementary element, but as the very condition of possibility for a peaceful transition to democracy.

Footnotes:

• Arendt, H. (1970). On violence. Harcourt, Brace & World.

• Bellin, E. (2012). Reconsidering the robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East. Comparative Politics, 44(2), 127–149.

• Brownlee, J. (2012). Democracy prevention: The politics of the U.S.–Egyptian alliance. Cambridge University Press.

• Brownlee, J., Masoud, T., & Reynolds, A. (2015). The Arab Spring: Pathways of repression and reform. Oxford University Press.

• Chehabi, H. E. (1990). Iranian politics and religious modernism: The liberation movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini. Cornell University Press.

• Dahl, R. A. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. Yale University Press.

• Diamond, L. (1999). Developing democracy: Toward consolidation. Johns Hopkins University Press.

• Diamond, L. (2015). Facing up to the democratic recession. Journal of Democracy, 26(1), 141–155.

• Fukuyama, F. (2011). The origins of political order. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

• Habermas, J. (1989). The structural transformation of the public sphere. MIT Press.

• Huntington, S. P. (1991). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. University of Oklahoma Press.

• Kaldor, M. (2003). Global civil society: An answer to war. Polity Press.

• Kamrava, M. (2010). Iran’s intellectual revolution. Cambridge University Press.

• Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of democratic transition and consolidation. Johns Hopkins University Press.

• Mansfield, E. D., & Snyder, J. (2005). Electing to fight: Why emerging democracies go to war. MIT Press.

• Migdal, J. S. (2001). State in society: Studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another. Cambridge University Press.

• North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., & Weingast, B. R. (2009). Violence and social orders. Cambridge University Press.

• O’Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. C., & Whitehead, L. (1986). Transitions from authoritarian rule. Johns Hopkins University Press.

• Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton University Press.

• Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. Simon & Schuster.

• Rustow, D. A. (1970). Transitions to democracy. Comparative Politics, 2(3), 337–363.

• Schmitter, P. C., & Karl, T. L. (1991). What democracy is… and is not. Journal of Democracy, 2(3), 75–88.

• Skocpol, T. (1979). States and social revolutions. Cambridge University Press.

• Stepan, A. (2012). Tunisia’s transition and the twin tolerations. Journal of Democracy, 23(2), 89–103.

• Tilly, C. (2007). Democracy. Cambridge University Press.

• Tocqueville, A. de. (2000). Democracy in America. University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1835)

• Varshney, A. (2002). Ethnic conflict and civic life: Hindus and Muslims in India. Yale University Press.

• Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society. University of California Press.

• Whitehead, L. (2002). Democratization: Theory and experience. Oxford University Press.

• Yom, S. L. (2015). Civil society and democratization in the Arab world. Middle East Law and Governance, 7(2–3), 157–184.