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Shahed Alavi

Writing about Iranian civil society is difficult due to uncertainty about its agency, and this difficulty is intensified when discussing its relationship with the Baha’i community. The question of the effectiveness or agency of civil society in Iran is a valid question if we accept that the common definitions of civil society, or more precisely the institutions that give meaning to this concept, cannot be used without criticism and modification to refer to Iranian civil society.

In the definition of civil society, it has been said that institutions, groups, and individuals who “operate independently and separate from the government” are usually self-sufficient and self-organized, and “represent the rights and interests of citizens.” In the framework of the power-seeking political system of Iran (which cannot be called power-oriented because the resources and tools of this system are not sufficient to be considered a power-oriented system, and the rulers are not capable of exercising comprehensive power in Iranian society), the people’s groups, as institutions of Iran, cannot be considered completely independent due to the exercise of extra-legal influence or the seemingly legal but highly restrictive requirements and regulations, and their independence is not sufficient to accurately reflect and represent the “rights and interests of citizens.”

In this way, in discussing Iranian civil society, we must pay attention to the limitations of definitions. Taking into account these limitations, if we generally accept that in Iran, we have an effective civil society independent of the government, then we will evaluate its functions based on the perceived goals of civil society institutions and ask whether effective civil society institutions or individuals in Iran have been successful or at least actively involved in “promoting and expanding citizens’ political participation” or fulfilling the duty of “citizenship education for the defense of human rights at the societal level.”

In general, it can be said that civil society institutions in Iran have been actively defending the interests of various groups, such as members of professions, classes, or social interests. For example, labor unions, women’s organizations, teachers’ unions, student groups, journalists, and environmental organizations have all taken steps in this direction. However, both these institutions and well-known figures in civil society have been frighteningly silent and have not taken effective or at least visible steps to defend the legitimate interests, interests, and fundamental rights of citizens, including their own members, against the endless encroachments of the ruling authorities. This is a point that calls into question the effectiveness or agency of civil society in Iran. The result of this doubt is the claim that Iranian civil society, in general, and marginalized or denied minorities, in particular, have no successful or positive track record.

The fundamental question is to what extent have civil society institutions in Iran been sensitive to violations of the rights of religious, ethnic, and sexual minorities, and have they taken practical, albeit unsuccessful, steps to end these violations? In recent days, the atmosphere in Iran has been election-focused. In this election atmosphere, to what extent have institutions and prominent figures in civil society maneuvered around the issue of candidacy for the presidency of women and non-Shia religious minorities? How much content have they produced about it? Have they campaigned or engaged in media activities? In this same election atmosphere, to what extent has civil society focused on the issue of the exclusion of Baha’is from candidacy (individually and not as a party, as it is prohibited in the Baha’i faith and regardless of the position of the Baha’i Universal House of Justice) for any elected position and spoken or written about it?

Neglect or not seeing the oppression of “others” and violating their rights, who live somewhere far from us (mentally or physically), is not only limited to the Bahais. For example, although the Coordination Council of Iranian Teachers’ Unions has always represented the efforts to achieve the common demands of Iranian teachers, they have generally ignored the needs, limitations, and specific issues of teachers, students, and the educational environment in connection with the Kurds in Kurdistan, Balochs in Balochistan, Arabs in Khuzestan, or Turks in Azerbaijan. Or for example, women’s organizations have generally been centered and have not had a precise understanding of the specific problems of Kurdish, Baloch, Arab, and Lur women in Iran and their struggles and priorities have not paid much attention to the specific issues of these women. Ignoring or forgetting minorities in these cases, for whatever reason, will result in reducing the civil status and social base of these institutions and further seizing power in

Regarding the Baha’is, although there are limitations for institutions and figures of civil society to engage more, ultimately, these limitations do not contradict the principle of responsibility of civil society towards the Baha’is. As mentioned earlier, the function of civil society is to defend the rights of citizens against government interference. Therefore, it must be asked to what extent has Iranian civil society been active in defending the Baha’is? Have the activities of civil society been able to at least bring attention to the issue of the Baha’is, if not solve it?

The situation of Baha’is in Iran, the experience of being a Baha’i and living as a Baha’i in present-day Iran, is a difficult and unique experience that, although it has historical parallels, is not easily understood by non-Baha’i Iranian citizens. The current situation of Baha’is in Iran is reminiscent of the situation of Jews in Germany during the Nazi regime and the situation of African Americans living in the southern states of America in the first half of the twentieth century.

Bahais in Iran refrain from political activities, but politics in Iran is intertwined with their lives and existence without their consent. They may avoid politics, but politics does not leave them alone. In fact, in the past thirty-five years, civil society has brought the political aspect of the Bahai situation to light in the most obvious way by remaining silent about the Bahais.

Ahmad Jannati, the secretary of Iran’s Guardian Council, had recently written a letter to election officials of city and village councils, demanding a ban on the candidacy of official religious minorities (Zoroastrians, Christians, Jews) in the elections of city and village councils in areas where “the majority of people are Muslim and follow the official religion of the country.” This means that in a city or village where the majority of its residents are Shia Muslims, Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians cannot run for these elections. Not mentioning religious minorities such as Bahais, Yarsans, and Mandaeans in this letter, which should be seen as their absolute right in this area, does it have any meaning other than the failure or inefficiency of civil society in addressing the issue of these minorities as a societal issue?

In 1359, 9 members of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Iran were abducted by the Revolutionary Guards and have been missing since then. An unknown number of other Baha’is have also been abducted in Iran since 1979 and their fate remains unknown. Despite this dark history, how much does Iranian civil society know about the disappeared Baha’is during the 39 years of the Islamic Republic’s rule and how much sensitivity has been shown towards them?

Bahais, affected by the bloody oppression of the past 39 years and following the orders of their religious center (the Universal House of Justice), have removed themselves from political and party activities. During these years, they have not had the joy of participating in elections or the power to do so, nor have they been able to freely express their beliefs or share their thoughts with others. They only want to be free from any pressure to change their religion or be deprived of education because of their religious beliefs. To what extent have student unions, women’s organizations, teachers’ unions, journalists, and other civil society institutions spoken and written about the rights of deprived students, women, students, and Bahai citizens to pursue higher education?

After the dark period of mass executions in the early days of the revolution, which included the execution of all Baha’i leaders and some of their religious activists, and even a 17-year-old Baha’i girl in Shiraz, Baha’is still struggle to bury their dead in special cemeteries. Their leaders are still imprisoned and expelled from government jobs.

In recent decades, the situation has significantly improved! Now, in addition to being deprived of the right to education, they are gradually and continuously being deprived of the right to work and employment. Dealing with Bahais who have their own specific jobs and businesses has intensified in recent years and months, especially during the moderate and hopeful government, and their places of work and life are constantly being inspected, destroyed, and confiscated. In Semnan, for example, almost all business licenses of Bahais have been invalidated, their workshops have been closed, and their shops have been shut down.

Bahai’s are sometimes completely ignored even in discussions that take place in the public sphere and in the civil society. In a statement released by Abdullah Nouri and Mohammad Khatami on the occasion of Rouhani’s victory in the 2013 election, the swift release of the leaders of the Green Movement, Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi, as well as Zahra Rahnavard and other imprisoned reformists and Green Movement activists, was described as “the beginning of a path towards unity and harmony with critics, and the return of the country’s management to the path of rationality and marginalization of authoritarian and other extremist movements.” How has civil society dealt with the issue of Bahai’s, that two well-known reformist figures, by simply mentioning the Bahai prisoners who have been detained solely because of their religious beliefs, dismiss their right to live as a matter related to rationality and national unity?

Now, although it is very late, it is necessary to remember that reformist politics or any political action aimed at democratic changes in Iran, without explicit, clear and obvious reference to the fundamental change in the legal and real situation of Baha’is in Iran, is doomed to failure; because by ignoring the Baha’is, it has already shown their infertility and incompetence. However, reformist politics will only pay attention to the issue of being a Baha’i and living as a Baha’i in Iran and will inevitably have to face it without any cover, when civil society comes to the belief that without focusing on the issue of minorities in Iran, including the Baha’is and representing their demands, the immature Iranian civil society will not reach the maturity and independence it should.