“متن تصویر راست چین”

“Right-aligned image text”
Shahin Ighaniyan

Naturally, what is discussed during elections in any country is the concept of choice. In Iran, however, since the emergence of political elections, the concept and impact of these choices on the lives of the people has been a topic of discussion at a deeper level. For example, Americans may consider tax promises when voting, but they are not concerned about the outcome of the presidential election affecting the quality of internet, type of clothing, or the performance of music concerts. For this reason, in countries where political leadership has the potential to change all aspects of citizens’ lives, there is usually more concern about the outcome of elections and as a result, the voter turnout is usually higher.

The life of the wealthy in Iran is not dependent on the changing presidency in this country, and the improvement of life for other citizens has not always meant improvement for the wealthy. For example, during the presidency of Mr. Rouhani, the moderate and prudent leader, the source of income for many wealthy citizens was cut off. Of course, it should be noted that the principle of separation of powers in Iran does not allow the presidency to control other branches of government; it seems that the mechanisms that were supposed to ultimately ensure the security and legal rights of citizens have been used as an excuse to avoid responsibility. The result of this avoidance of responsibility is not only evident in the situation of the wealthy, but also in the fate of many political critics, women’s rights activists, journalists, labor activists, and other protesters and religious and ideological minorities. The question here is, with all the unchecked powers of appointed institutions, who can the people turn to for the protection of their rights other than elected institutions?

A large part of what has happened to the Iranian people after the revolution, and the relative apathy of many citizens towards it, is the result of the country’s constant state of “emergency”. War, economic pressures during the reconstruction period, sanctions, and the lingering shadow of war not only leave no room for concern for destroyed graves and the right to education for Iranians, but also provide a powerful tool for the government to evade the law and pursue and suppress their imaginary “enemy”. When Iranians are labeled as spies for this bloodthirsty colonialist enemy and blamed for many of the country’s troubles and mismanagement, the destruction of cemeteries and the confiscation of their businesses does not provoke any sensitivity. This, along with years of negative propaganda, makes the cost of defending Iranians so high that even those who personally know them and are aware of their innocence prefer to leave the pursuit of their rights to themselves and international institutions.

Another joke is that public problems are the common issues of the people. When life becomes so difficult for people with the continuation of “emergency conditions” that the ceiling of human values ​​is reduced to “survival”, there is no energy or motivation left to defend the rights of other citizens. This point is true both in defending the honest and in defending the honest from the oppression of other citizens.

As long as the electoral institutions do not have the support of resistance against propaganda, manipulation, and the escape from the laws of appointed institutions, it does not seem realistic to expect a significant improvement in the overall performance of the Islamic Republic system; whether in the situation of the elite or in the living and social conditions of all Iranian citizens.