Guarding while sleeping and stealing belongings.
If we were to present an image of the Islamic Republic of Iran, we cannot simply mention the three branches of government, the parliament, and the judiciary. Sovereignty here is made up of various, conflicting, and parallel aspects, each of which operates below or beyond the law. Institutions such as the Foundation of the Oppressed or the Revolutionary Guards are non-governmental organizations and “extra-legal” entities that may have more power than legal institutions like the government. The common factor among all these legal and “extra-legal” institutions is the direct supervision of the leader; meaning they all gather under the leadership (Supreme Leader) and operate within the framework of the system. The functions of the government, parliament, and judiciary are defined in the constitution and are clear. As corrupt as these institutions may be, they can ultimately be monitored in some way, but non-governmental organizations stand outside the law and are only supervised by the leader. Why did the Islamic Republic establish these institutions? What

What is the destructive coordination method?Foundation of the Oppressed (1357), Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs (1358), Imam Khomeini Relief Committee (1357), and Executive Headquarters of Imam’s Order (1368) are some of the “extra-legal” institutions of the Islamic Republic. These organizations, except for the Executive Headquarters, were formed in the early years of the revolution, when the Islamic Republic regime had not yet been established, with the order of Ayatollah Khomeini and the aim of distributing confiscated resources among the revolutionary forces. The names of the Basij Resistance Force (1357) and the Quds Force (1359) should also be added, which were established to defend and promote the revolution. The common factor among these institutions is their access to the looted economic resources that remained after the revolution. Therefore, these organizations were formed under the pretext of redistributing these resources, so we need an economic-political theory to understand their existence and mechanism.

Mehrdad V

“I determine my own fate!”In the process of revolution and war, the economic resources of the ruling powers and dominant individuals are always seized and considered as war and revolutionary spoils for victorious power. These spoils are not acquired through looting. Therefore, it can be said that looting is an inseparable part of every war and revolution. The victorious power becomes the new owner of the abandoned or seized properties of the previous powerful individuals; for example, just one month after the 1957 revolution, Ruhollah Khomeini seized the properties of 53 bankers and industrialists from the time of the second Pahlavi dynasty. These individuals were the owners of the modern market in Iran before the revolution; a newly established market that was formed around the modernization and industrialization of Iran and was different from the traditional market, which was allied with the revolutionary clergy and was somewhat their rival. After seizing these properties, Ruhollah Khomeini ordered the establishment of the Foundation of the Oppressed to redistribute them among the

Rights of looters
The looting of logic is the formation of conflicting systems and extralegal institutions. The Islamic Republic organizations have also been using this logic to this day, seizing the properties and assets of religious and ideological minorities, as well as public resources such as oil; for example, the Foundation of the Oppressed, as one of the largest holdings in the Middle East, controls a large portion of the oil industry, and the Executive Command of the Imam is still confiscating the properties of the wealthy and political-ideological prisoners. Similarly, the Sepah’s headquarters has taken over many construction projects. The first manifestation of this trend is the takeover and interference in government affairs. These institutions, which are neither public nor private, are able to play both a governmental and private role and seize economic resources for their own benefit; they also receive special privileges from the system through their definition as charities and non-profit organizations: free land, use of bank credits and preferred currency, as well as participation in large economic projects

Creating reality and reproducing ideology.
Institutions such as the Endowment Organization and the Custodianship of Astan Quds Razavi were established before the revolution; religious institutions that did not have financial independence and their affairs were managed by the government. The Pahlavi regime owned the income from holy places and monitored the financial process of endowments. This caused Shia clerics to be distrustful of the Pahlavi government. They wanted the financial resources of religious institutions to be independent from the government, arguing that otherwise, clerics could not operate independently from the active government. Wahhab explains that “from the very beginning, this distrust existed towards the bureaucratic and military remnants of the previous government by Khomeini and Shia clerics, and this was the motivation for establishing parallel institutions” (6). However, by examining the movements and totalitarian regimes of Hannah Arendt (7) and their similarities to the Islamic Republic regime, we can find other motivations for the government to establish these institutions.

Arendt says

Method of destruction
Non-governmental and extra-legal institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran have three main functions: violence, plunder, and reproduction of ideology and authority. These three characteristics are based on the inherent concept of violence and plunder that these institutions possess. All of these organizations have a similar function and operate in parallel with each other. They constantly live in a state of crisis and chaos, which is one of the internal characteristics of the system, and their power and wealth increase every day. The role of the leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, prevents their collapse despite their contradictions, parallelism, and competition (8). After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, he sat on the same throne and became the regulator of these institutions. He, who is not similar to the totalitarian leader in terms of infallibility and always being right, holds a higher position than the non-governmental organizations. He is both omnipotent and impotent, and his leadership position is just as contradictory as

Notes:

Maulana

1- Political Economy of “Iranian Disease”: An Examination of the Destructive Coordination Method, Mehrdad Vahabi, Political Economic Critique Website, 2015.

2- “The Plundering Government and Economic Development”, Mehrdad Vahabi, Webinar on Radio Zamaneh, May 2020.

3- “Critique of Violence”, Walter Benjamin, Omid Mehragan/ Morad Farhadpour, Law and Violence, Tehran: Rokhdad-e No, 2009.

4- N.K Source (1).

“Logic of Non-State Economic Institutions in Iran is Based on Plunder”, Mehrdad Vahabi, Asu, Esfand 1398.

6- Source (1).

7- Arent, Hannah, Totalitarianism, Translation: Thalath, Mohsen, Tehran: Thalath, 1395.

8- N.K Source (1).