It was July 2016 when the United Nations Human Rights Commission recognized the blocking of citizens’ access to the internet as a violation of human rights, by passing a resolution. According to this resolution, any deliberate and intentional interference with free access to the internet by governments, especially preventing the free flow of information on the internet, is condemned and considered a violation of basic human rights.

The main basis of this resolution is Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is considered one of the most important international human rights documents and was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966. Therefore, the right to freedom of expression, which includes the right to access, education, publication, search, and free expression of information and ideas, is considered a fundamental and fundamental human right. Since these rights are part of the first generation of human rights, their deprivation and denial are not permissible and legitimate under any circumstances.

Apart from the explicit statement in international human rights documents that individuals have the right to free access to the internet, modern human societies are heavily dependent on it for meeting their basic and fundamental needs. Internet connections in today’s world, in line with the promotion of human rights, especially in the recognition of rights in the second generation of human rights, such as education, health, treatment, work, and livelihood, have become increasingly intertwined with dignity and happiness every day. Especially in light of the current spread of the coronavirus, the importance of internet access for education and treatment has doubled, and any disruption in it will undoubtedly lead to disruptions in meeting basic human needs and, consequently, the violation of citizenship rights.

Based on this, it is clear that the new plan of the representatives of the parliament in Iran, titled “Protection of Users’ Rights Plan”, if it really does disrupt the free access to the internet for Iranian citizens, would undoubtedly go against human rights standards and principles, and would seriously violate the rights of citizenship in Iran. According to experts, if this plan is implemented, the access of citizens inside Iran to the global internet and its services will be greatly restricted and may even lead to a complete shutdown. On the other hand, the designers and supporters of this plan deny these claims as false and even lies, without providing any response to the arguments of critics.

However, a simple reading of the published proposal text shows that the critics’ claim is not only true but if the plan is implemented, the state of internet access in Iran will be similar to China at best and North Korea at worst.

What does the maintenance plan say?

Despite the efforts of media close to security institutions in Iran to portray the protection plan and repeated emphasis of the proponents and representatives in favor of not restricting citizens’ access to the internet and its services if the plan is approved, the actual content of the protection plan reveals another reality in which even access to Google and Yahoo email services will be severely limited.

In this regard, one of the claims that has been vehemently denied by the designers of this plan is the claim of blocking all foreign internet services and applications. This means that all services provided by companies like Google, Yahoo, as well as popular foreign applications like Instagram and WhatsApp will be blocked after the implementation of this plan, and citizens will not be able to access them without using a VPN.

This intention and plan for blocking is not a lie or falsehood, as the representatives of the parliament claim, and a clear picture of the proposed plan has been presented.

As an example, article 2 of this plan clearly states the consequences of non-compliance of these applications with Iran’s domestic laws, especially the lack of legal registration and representation in Iran, which leads to the blocking of messaging applications. According to this article, all foreign messaging applications are required to register and establish an office in Iran in order to obtain permission to operate (without being filtered) and introduce a representative in Iran to accept their obligations. Otherwise, their activities will be considered illegal and the Ministry of Communications and Technology will be obligated to block access to them.

The efforts of lawmakers in Iran to force international internet service companies to register legally in Iran is contradictory to the philosophy of these companies, which is based on freedom of information and unrestricted access to information. It is unclear why these companies should register themselves in one of the largest internet and freedom prisons. Additionally, due to international sanctions against Iran, it is not clear why companies whose existence is dependent on free trade and quick money transfers through the banking system should accept the requirement to open a legal office in Iran.

But let’s assume, for example, that WhatsApp agrees to establish an office in Iran as its legal representative. This means that, as the safeguard plan also acknowledges, WhatsApp commits to operating in Iran in accordance with the country’s domestic laws and specifically accepting the decisions of the Criminal Definitions Committee. This means that WhatsApp will be forced to easily comply with the requests of the Criminal Definitions Committee or judicial authorities to delete channels and pages or disclose the identity of the owner. This commitment has been imposed on similar domestic applications such as Soroush and Baleh, and one of the reasons for the lack of acceptance of these applications is this complete violation of user rights, especially the right to freedom of expression and privacy.

It is clear that considering the importance of privacy and freedom of expression in the virtual space and the lack of these concepts in Iranian laws, if WhatsApp cooperates with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the fate of this communication application will be like other similar Iranian examples and Iranian users will abandon it. In such a case, the continuation of this application’s work in Iran will not be economically justified and this messaging app will be blocked as stated in Article 2 of the user protection plan once it is accessed from outside of Iran.

On the other hand, the self-protection plan is one of the obstacles that will cause foreign internet service companies, especially messaging apps, to refrain from registering legally in Iran. For example, Article 10 of this plan, by discriminating between domestic and foreign messaging apps, has determined that the bandwidth share of domestic messaging apps is twice that of foreign messaging apps. This means that foreign messaging apps not only have to accept all the restrictive laws and regulations and violations of privacy belonging to the Islamic Republic, but also will be deprived of free trade competition with such discrimination.

On the other hand, some of the concepts and cases considered as crimes in this plan (Article 7, Clause 10) are very broad, general, and unlimited. Messaging services are responsible for their dissemination and are obliged to remove them according to the orders of relevant authorities. Especially, the experience in Iran shows that these concepts and cases (such as insulting sacred beliefs, violating public morals, engaging in illegal activities, and containing criminal content) are merely titles for the use of force by security institutions in Iran and in practice, anything can be included.

Another problem is that the protection plan has banned providing any financial and banking services to active business owners on foreign messaging apps (those who are not willing to register legally in Iran). This means that, for example, an Iranian business owner will be forced to persuade their customers to switch to a domestic messaging app in order to benefit from banking services. The main question here is how can a foreign customer of an Iranian illustrator or painter be encouraged to use an anonymous and privacy-violating app? This issue will also be true for other internet services and apps that are blocked. For instance, how can a teacher force their foreign students to use a domestic email service after the blocking of Google and Yahoo email services?

One of the main problems with the protection plan for users’ rights is that the decision-making power regarding citizens’ access to the internet and messaging services has been entrusted to a committee that is not accountable to any elected or non-elected institution. This committee, known as the “Committee for Coordination and Supervision,” is established with the aim of “exercising the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran” in the virtual space, as stated in Article 3 of this plan. However, according to Article 4, the main responsibility of this committee is to issue licenses for messaging services. The Committee for Coordination and Supervision also has the duty to monitor messaging services and, if necessary, punish them or block them with the help of the judicial system.

The fundamental issue, however, is that the desired council is completely independent and has no supervision over its activities. This independence exists while all members of the council are legal entities affiliated with the government, unlike some countries where the supervisory body over the virtual space is truly independent (its members are not government officials and are selected from among business owners, internet service providers, and activists), the council for organization and supervision truly operates as the government’s instrument for enforcing its authority, and therefore is only accountable to the government.

Another important point is that although personal use of VPN and proxy for accessing blocked internet services is not considered a crime, according to Article 16 of the Protection Plan, any activity that involves production, reproduction, distribution, trade, publication, and making these tools available is considered a crime and is punishable. In fact, although using a proxy is not a crime, accessing it is a crime because accessing it is considered making it available by the provider to the recipient. Furthermore, contrary to the claims of the Parliament’s Research Center regarding the efforts of the plan to recognize the “principle of using a proxy” and to determine its regulations, it is a pure lie and in no article of this plan, the use of a proxy is recognized and no effort has been made to determine the method of using it.

On the other hand, apart from what is mentioned in the text of the protection of users’ rights, which clearly shows the designers’ intention to impose severe restrictions on free internet access and free access to the internet, the inclusion of Article 85 in this plan is another reason for concern for virtual rights activists and citizens. The implementation of Article 85 of the Constitution on this plan means that it does not require the majority vote of all members of parliament in the open and public session, and its approval by a few representatives in a special commission will suffice for it to be considered a law and therefore be implemented.

Therefore, what is clear until the approval of the plan for protecting the rights of internet users is that the future of this plan will not be any better than the mandatory hijab law and the ban on satellite, but with the difference that the limited current freedom in accessing the free internet will also be taken away.