In examining government actions against citizens, attention is usually focused on the final link in the chain—that is, arrest, opening a case, issuing a sentence, or shutting down a business. But part of what is happening in Iran today takes place before reaching these stages. Summonses and warnings, obtaining pledges, threats of closure, temporary blocking of pages, forced removal of content, or making the continuation of activity conditional on compliance with instructions concerning future behavior are methods whose function is not necessarily to punish a past act; sometimes the main objective is to make the individual behave differently from then on.

In recent weeks, coinciding with a renewed increase in actions against cafés, business establishments, gyms, and online activists, numerous examples of this pattern have been reported. In some cases, the continuation of activity or the lifting of restrictions has been made conditional on providing a pledge, and the scope of the measures has extended beyond hijab and clothing to include online activity, businesses, gatherings, and cultural spaces. Obtaining pledges, issuing summonses, and giving warnings have a long history in the Islamic Republic. Therefore, the issue is not the sudden emergence of an entirely new tool. The more important question is whether the scope of use and function of these old tools is changing. Are methods that were previously used in individual cases or specific areas now being used more than before to regulate citizens’ everyday behavior and prevent behaviors that have not yet occurred? If so, the issue is not merely an increase in the severity of enforcement. We are facing a change in the way power is exercised: a movement from punishment after the act toward controlling behavior before it occurs.

When Control Begins Before the Behavior Occurs

Prevention in itself is not incompatible with human rights. Under specific circumstances, states may act to prevent a real and imminent danger, and legal systems also recognize preventive and precautionary measures. The problem begins when prevention leads to restricting individuals’ freedoms without the existence of a specific danger, without a clear legal basis, and without effective oversight. The distinction between these two situations is fundamental. A responsible authority may, on the basis of specific evidence, be aware of an imminent danger, and the law may permit that authority to impose a restrictive measure for a specified period and under judicial supervision. In such a case, at least the necessity and proportionality of the decision can be reviewed and challenged.

But consider another situation: a person is summoned because of publishing a post, the type of clothing worn by customers in a café, holding an event, or behavior described as “norm-breaking,” and is asked to pledge that in the future they will observe “standards” or “proprieties.” No one may explain precisely which behaviors this pledge covers. At the same time, the individual knows that repeating what the summoning authority considers undesirable may this time result in a longer closure, the opening of a case, or another restriction. In such a situation, we are no longer dealing merely with a response to the past. Past behavior becomes a basis for controlling future behavior. The human rights significance of the issue arises precisely here, because the scope of government intervention expands from acts that have actually occurred to acts that may occur in the future.

The Boundary Between Prevention and Punishment

Preventive control can create a contradictory situation because, without any criminal judgment being issued, it may have effects similar to punishment. For a café owner, several days of closure can result in real economic loss. For an online store, blocking its main page may disrupt communication with customers. For a blogger, removing content or losing access to an account directly affects their work and income. For an event organizer, a summons or warning may be enough to ensure that the next event is never held at all. From the perspective of the person facing these restrictions, whether the measure is officially described as a “warning,” a “preventive measure,” or “law enforcement action” does not necessarily change its practical consequences.

This is where one of the fundamental issues of the rule of law arises. Can the government take an action with effectively punitive consequences without observing the safeguards established for the imposition of punishment? Iran’s Code of Criminal Procedure requires proceedings to be based on law and establishes the presumption of innocence. Article 4 of the same law makes measures restricting freedom and intrusions into privacy conditional on legal authorization, compliance with regulations, and supervision by a judicial authority, while Article 5 emphasizes the right to be informed of the subject and reasons for the accusation and to enjoy defense rights. At the international level, Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects individuals against arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy, family, home, and correspondence and requires states to provide legal protection against such interference. This standard becomes particularly important in cases where government control extends to examining mobile phones, personal accounts, online content, or other aspects of individuals’ private lives. These provisions are based on a general principle according to which government institutions cannot, merely on the assumption that a person may engage in undesirable behavior in the future, impose whatever restriction they see fit.

The same logic can also be found in human rights standards. Restrictions on rights, including freedom of expression, must have a clear legal basis, pursue a specific legitimate aim, and be necessary and proportionate. General references to concepts such as “order,” “security,” or “morality” are not in themselves sufficient to justify every form of intervention. Several simple questions can be asked when assessing a preventive measure. What exactly is the behavior in question? Which law prohibits it or authorizes intervention? What specific danger is supposed to be prevented? Why is this restriction necessary? Is there no less restrictive alternative? How long does the decision remain valid? Which authority can review it, and how can the individual challenge it? The more ambiguous the answers to these questions are, the greater the likelihood that lawful prevention has given way to arbitrary control.

Pledges, Consent, and the Limits of Government Authority

A pledge is one of the clearest examples of moving from a reaction to the past toward control of the future. On the surface, a pledge relates to an act that has already occurred and for which the person has been summoned. But its provisions usually look toward the future. The individual promises not to “repeat” a behavior, to observe certain regulations “from now on,” or to change the manner of their activity. For this reason, the most important question concerning such documents is not whether the person’s signature appears on them. The main question is on what legal basis and within the scope of which authority such a pledge has been demanded.

The Code of Criminal Procedure defines judicial officers as officials who, under the supervision and instructions of the prosecutor and “by virtue of law,” act in the detection of crime, collection of evidence, preliminary investigations, and implementation of judicial decisions. Their duties have specific limits under the law, and these provisions cannot be interpreted as granting them a general and unlimited authority to determine citizens’ future behavior. The Law on Respect for Legitimate Freedoms and Protection of Citizens’ Rights also requires judicial officers to base their actions on the law and on specific and clear judicial orders and to refrain from exercising personal discretion and abusing their power. This law also emphasizes respect for the right of defense and the avoidance of unnecessary and unlawful measures. If a pledge merely repeats an obligation that already exists in law, it creates no new legal obligation. Whether or not the individual signs it, the legal duty remains in place. But if the content of the pledge goes beyond the law, the matter takes on a different form. A citizen’s signature cannot create authority for an officer or executive body that the law has not granted. Put simply, a pledge cannot fill a gap in the law.

This issue becomes more sensitive when the pledge does not concern entirely specific behavior, but rather concepts such as “norms,” “proprieties,” “values,” or “standards.” In such circumstances, the individual does not know exactly what act might be considered a violation of the pledge, and a significant part of defining the boundaries is left to the interpretation of the enforcing authority. The presence of the individual’s signature alone does not establish that they accepted the pledge freely and without pressure. Suppose a business owner is forced to choose between signing a pledge and resuming activity, or refusing to sign and facing continued closure or restriction. On the surface, they have a choice, but this situation cannot be compared with an agreement between two equal parties.

The main question is what cost refusing to sign carries for the individual. If a citizen must sign in order to regain access to a page, reopen a place of business, prevent a case from being opened, or bring a restrictive situation to an end, serious doubt arises as to whether their consent was freely given. The issue is not merely the legal validity of the pledge. The more important problem is that a government institution can turn a restriction it has itself created into leverage for obtaining a pledge. First, the individual is placed in a vulnerable position, and then ending that situation is made conditional on accepting a demand concerning future behavior. Under such circumstances, a signature does not necessarily indicate that the individual freely agreed to the terms of the pledge. It may simply indicate that, among the available options, they chose the less costly one.

The issue is not limited to criminal procedure. The Constitution also protects the rights, dignity, property, and occupation of individuals from interference except where the law permits it, and Article 36 stipulates that a sentence and its execution must be imposed through a competent court and pursuant to law. Therefore, even within domestic law, the question remains as to how far an executive body or judicial officer can, outside a clear and appealable ruling, set conditions for individuals’ future behavior.

From a Specific Offense to an Ambiguous Risk

Criminal law usually begins with the question of whether a person has committed a prohibited act. But under the logic of preventive control, the question is whether the person might in the future engage in behavior that the government considers undesirable. The distinction between these two questions is important. A “crime” must at least be defined in law, but the concept of “risk” can be far more fluid. A person may, because of their behavioral history, the nature of their activities, their audience, or simply the assessment of a supervisory institution, be identified as someone likely to cross the designated lines again. In such a situation, the government does not wait for the next act and instead seeks to reduce the likelihood of its occurrence. A pledge can play such a role. A summons may acquire the same function. A temporary closure can also make clear to the individual that continuation of activity depends on changing the way they operate.

The problem becomes more serious when the red lines themselves are unclear. If citizens know precisely what is prohibited and what is permitted, they can continue their behavior up to the limits of the law. But if they do not know how terms such as “norm-breaking,” “unconventional behavior,” or “failure to observe proprieties” will be interpreted in the next encounter, they may, in order to avoid possible consequences, restrict their behavior more than the law expressly requires. This is where the principle of foreseeability of the law becomes important. The United Nations Human Rights Committee, in General Comment No. 34 concerning Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has emphasized that restrictions on freedom of expression must be provided by law, pursue a specific legitimate aim, and be necessary and proportionate. A law restricting freedom of expression must also be sufficiently precise to enable an individual to regulate their conduct accordingly and must not confer unfettered discretion on those charged with its execution.

This is not merely a technical discussion about the quality of law. If the boundary of a restriction is not foreseeable, citizens are forced to make decisions based not on the law but on their own perception of the sensitivities of government institutions. In a system based on law, a person asks: “Is this prohibited?” In a system based on ambiguity, the question changes to: “Will doing this get me into trouble?” This change in the question itself is one of the most important consequences of controlling future behavior.

The Chilling Effect and the Expansion of Self-Censorship

To understand how this pattern functions, we must look beyond the individual who has been directly summoned or restricted. Suppose a café owner gives a pledge after a brief closure. Owners of other cafés hear about what happened and, without having themselves been summoned, begin calculating the risk. The owner of a page may change their content after a colleague’s page is blocked. A tour organizer may cancel a program. The manager of a cultural center may reconsider inviting a particular person, or an athlete may decide not to publish an image. None of them has yet been directly targeted, yet their behavior has changed. It is at this stage that preventive control reaches its greatest effect. The exercise of power no longer depends only on direct intervention by an officer, and part of the process of surveillance is transferred to individuals themselves. Before making a decision, each person tries to anticipate the likely reaction of the supervisory institution.

In human rights literature, the concept of the “chilling effect” is used for part of this phenomenon: a situation in which fear of punishment or restriction causes people to refrain even from some of their lawful and legitimate behavior. Producing such an effect does not necessarily require issuing a prohibition order against every individual. The existence of an ambiguous but serious risk can itself limit the extent to which people actually exercise their freedoms.

This self-censorship is not limited to speaking or publishing content. A business owner may monitor the behavior of customers or employees. A café manager may change the way an outdoor space is used. A cultural organization may refrain from holding an event, or a tour organizer may warn participants about their clothing or behavior. In this situation, the government institution transfers part of the enforcement of restrictions to others. The business owner becomes the monitor of customers, the manager becomes the monitor of employees, and the event organizer becomes the monitor of participants. The human rights significance of this process lies in the fact that it expands control over individuals’ behavior without requiring the direct and constant intervention of government officers.

The compulsory publication of a pledge can reinforce the same effect. When an individual is forced to publish the text of a pledge or similar content on their page, the issue is no longer merely a restriction on expression, and the question of “compelled speech” also arises. Publishing the pledge extends its effect beyond the individual. Others who see it not only become aware of the restriction imposed on that person, but also receive the message that similar behavior may have consequences for them as well.

From an Individual Measure to a Method of Governance

Direct control of society is costly. If an officer is required to intervene in every “undesirable” behavior, a case must be opened and formal proceedings carried out, substantial resources and costs are required. Controlling future behavior reduces some of these costs. A single summons may change an individual’s behavior for a long period. One closure can make dozens of similar businesses more cautious, and publication of a pledge may cause many other users to review their own content. Under such a method, success is not necessarily measured by the number of convictions. Even a decrease or a limited number of cases may be regarded as a sign of success if individuals change their behavior before reaching the stage of formal enforcement.

Pledges, summonses, warnings, and temporary closures are not legally or operationally identical, but they can converge at one point. All of them can convey to the individual the message that continuing their activity requires changing their future behavior. Another effect of this method is the creation of a record. A person with no conviction may, after being summoned and required to provide a pledge, be recorded in an administrative or security file as someone who has previously “received a warning” or “pledged not to repeat” the behavior. The phrase “non-repetition” is significant in this respect. Repetition usually has meaning when the initial violation has been validly established. But a pledge can create the appearance of a “first offense” without any conviction. In a subsequent encounter, the individual may be reminded that they were previously warned and had also made a pledge. The circumstances under which the original pledge was obtained may gradually disappear from the narrative, but the document itself remains. In this way, an administrative or security record can come to play a role similar to a judicial record, without necessarily being subject to the same procedural safeguards.

Obtaining pledges, issuing warnings and summonses, and threatening harsher measures in the event of repeated behavior have a history in the Islamic Republic. What matters today is not the novelty of these tools, but the expansion of their use and the role they are acquiring in regulating citizens’ future behavior. Recent reports indicate that such methods are being applied in a more diverse range of areas, from commercial and cultural activities to sports and the online sphere. (1) More information about directives, chains of decision-making, and the continuity of this trend would be needed to establish the existence of a single nationwide policy, and the existence of a centralized order cannot be concluded from publicly known cases alone. Nevertheless, if pledges, warnings, and temporary restrictions are repeatedly used to compel individuals to change their future behavior, if the lifting of restrictions depends on accepting specific conditions, if those conditions go beyond clear legal obligations, and if action against a few individuals leads to self-censorship among a much wider group, then a pledge can no longer be viewed merely as an administrative form. Under such circumstances, we are facing a form of preventive control whose objective is not only to respond to behavior that has already occurred, but also to restrict possible future behavior.

From Fear of Punishment to Self-Regulation of Behavior

Perhaps the most important effect of this method is seen not in the cases of those who have been summoned, but in the behavior of those who are never summoned. The most successful system of control is not necessarily one that directly intervenes in every “undesirable” behavior, but one that compels individuals to regulate the boundaries of their own behavior, even when those boundaries are not precisely clear. Under such circumstances, the citizen does not merely obey the law. They manage risk. This is an important distinction. When the law is clear, an individual can know how far their freedom extends. But when the standard is the anticipated reaction of the government apparatus, the boundary of freedom constantly shifts. Few people are willing to test an undefined red line and bear the cost of discovering where its boundaries lie. From this perspective, the central issue with compulsory pledges is not merely the legal validity of a document. A pledge is one of the tools that can be situated within a broader structure—a structure moving from punishing past behavior toward regulating and restraining future behavior.

The human rights standard for assessing such interventions is clear. Every restriction must have a clear, accessible, and foreseeable legal basis, pursue a specific legitimate aim, be necessary and proportionate, and be subject to effective oversight and appeal. When these conditions give way to opaque summonses, ambiguous pledges, and fear of later consequences, the citizen’s relationship with the law also changes. The individual no longer asks only what the law prohibits; they try to guess what the government will tolerate. It is precisely at this point that control of future behavior moves beyond an isolated measure and becomes a method of governance.

Footnote:

1- From Blocking Pages to Sealing Cafés: A New Wave of Pressure on Cyberspace and the Public Sphere, HRANA News Agency, August 1, 2026 (10 Mordad 1405).