If you flip through any glossary of specialized terminology, you won’t find the term “class-based internet” or a precise definition of it. However, by implementing this project over the past 20 years, the rulers of the Islamic Republic have compelled Iranian internet users to adopt a term to describe it. Class-based internet refers to the project—or rather, the series of projects—that at various times have provided special internet access to different social groups, and continue to do so. These special accesses may relate to higher bandwidth, less filtering, or even lower internet prices. However, the nature of class-based internet remains unchanged regardless of these aspects. Whenever the authorities decide that a particular group, unlike the majority of the public, can access filtered websites, or that a group needs cheap or free internet, class-based internet manifests—even if officials of the Islamic Republic refuse to shoulder the burden of this term.

The class stratification of access to free internet in Iran dates back roughly to the introduction of broadband in the country. In November 2006 (Aban 1385), the Communications Regulatory Authority instructed fixed broadband internet service providers not to offer services with speeds exceeding 128 Kbps to residential users. Initially, the organization provided no rationale for this restriction, but following media pressure, Hesamoddin Arabzadeh, then director of the organization’s public relations, cited limited internet bandwidth as the reason for the 128 Kbps cap. However, according to the then CEO of the Telecommunications Company of Iran—which at the time had not yet been “privatized”—the country’s bandwidth capacity posed no issues for offering higher-speed services. On the other hand, the Ahmadinejad-era regulatory authority stated that the restriction would remain in place until bandwidth was “organized.” Gradually, however, this limitation was lifted for students and university faculty, who could access speeds higher than 128 Kbps by presenting student IDs or faculty membership cards.

Reformists, as the most prominent critics of Ahmadinejad’s government, were understandably dissatisfied with the imposed internet restrictions. When the administration they supported took office in 2013 (1392), there were murmurs of a relatively more open political and social climate. Although enforcement of the 128 Kbps restriction had relaxed somewhat in the final years before Hassan Rouhani’s government, it was ultimately in 2015 (1394) that the restriction was officially lifted. Now, nearly 20 years after the discriminatory 128 Kbps cap was imposed, the internet in Iran has gone through many ups and downs—and has essentially returned to the same point it was in 2006. The reformists who once criticized Ahmadinejad over the 128 Kbps limit have now, after two decades and despite all their internal divisions, brought their preferred government into office—and dressed class-based internet in new clothing.

Internet restrictions in Iran have reached the point that, before the most recent presidential election, both political factions offered promises to improve the situation. Masoud Pezeshkian also made unblocking social media one of the top items in his internet-related pledges. Now, about a year and a half into his administration, only WhatsApp and the Google Play Store have been unblocked. This has had little effect on the public’s use of VPNs. According to a report published by the Tehran Electronic Commerce Association in Mordad 1403 (July–August 2024), 86 percent of internet users in Iran still use VPNs. While there is no sign of unblocking popular platforms like Telegram, Instagram, and YouTube, the Pezeshkian administration has chosen an alternative path—one that deepens inequality in access to free internet. The unblocking of YouTube at the University of Tehran is the latest stage in implementing the discriminatory project of class-based internet. If Ahmadinejad-era managers once cited insufficient bandwidth as the pretext for restrictions, now Pezeshkian government officials justify unblocking YouTube for students and faculty by citing “research and educational needs” of universities. Note the remarks of Fatemeh Mohajerani, the government spokesperson: “These access privileges [unblocking for students] were granted due to delays in the filtering review process and the unaddressed needs of universities. Otherwise, the government does not believe in class-based internet.” As mentioned, since the term “class-based internet” became widespread, neither the ministers under Ebrahim Raisi nor officials in Pezeshkian’s administration have accepted responsibility for the term, while nonetheless announcing new phases of the project to the media one after another—just like a butcher staring into the camera while slaughtering an animal, claiming he doesn’t believe in meat consumption or carnivorous diets.

The “class” in class-based internet does not precisely or directly refer to “class” as used in traditional leftist theoretical frameworks. Journalists, for example, are one group that typically has easy access to unfiltered internet, but they largely fall into lower-income brackets—so this isn’t always the case. In some instances, though, the “class” aspect of class-based internet has aligned more closely with its conventional socioeconomic meaning. For example, providing unfiltered internet to businesses active in Iran’s digital economy is one such case. In these situations, the profitability of part of the economy was directly threatened by internet restrictions, prompting the authorities to provide unfiltered internet to revive the status of this economically beneficial—and in some cases, regime-adjacent—class. The stratification of access to higher education in Iran is another manifestation of this phenomenon, in which individuals are included among those with access to free internet simply because of their wealth.

YouTube was first unblocked at the University of Tehran. Shortly afterward, Shargh newspaper reported that the same occurred at Beheshti, Amirkabir, Allameh, Isfahan, Science and Research, Shiraz, and Tabriz universities. Among these, seven are public universities and one is a unit of Islamic Azad University, whose tuition fees are generally affordable only to the wealthy. Looking at statistics, it becomes clear that access to public universities—despite being mostly tuition-free—has in recent years become increasingly exclusive to the privileged classes. Research from the Parliament Research Center shows that about 37 percent of university students come from the top two income deciles (deciles 9 and 10), while only 7 percent come from the lowest two (deciles 1 and 2). The president of the University of Tehran recently stated that over half of that university’s students are from the top three income deciles. A look at top-ranking students in recent years’ nationwide entrance exams supports this trend. According to Iranian Student Newsletter, about 85 percent of students attend public schools, while only 15 percent go to private schools. Nevertheless, public school students account for just 2.5 percent of top entrance exam rankings, while the remaining 97.5 percent belong to students from private institutions. This report also reveals the alarming extent of the commodification of education in Iran. According to available statistics, in the 2023 (1402) entrance exams, students from the bottom income decile filled only 1.3 percent of seats in medicine and dentistry programs, while 86 percent went to students from the top three deciles. In electrical engineering at Sharif University, the situation is even worse: the bottom three deciles (1, 2, and 3) had zero representation, while 60 percent of students in that program belonged to the tenth (wealthiest) income decile.

In this context, where the government has retreated from sectors like education and annually seeks to reduce its spending on them, higher education has become a commodity exclusive to the wealthy. Now, with the unblocking of YouTube for students—most of whom are affluent—free internet itself has effectively become a bonus feature bundled with the educational commodity offered to the classes who can afford it.