In recent years, experts in various fields have spoken of deeply rooted crises in Iran. Among these are crises stemming from conflict with nature, such as the drying of lakes and rivers and, as a result, land subsidence in various regions to the extent that the habitability of this land is seriously endangered. On one side, there are crises stemming from damage to the economy, such as the bankruptcy of banks and social security funds and economic collapse, and on the other, there are crises with social foundations, such as generational divides, widespread migration, societal polarization, numerous socio-cultural fissures, and many more. The existence of this level of crises—produced by one and a half centuries of non-democratic governance following the Constitutional Revolution—raises concern that if Iranian civil society manages to attain democracy, what effect this grim legacy will have on the fledgling democracy.

Most political researchers consider the final stage in the sequence of democratization to be the consolidation of democracy, and unless this step is fully completed, the democratization process remains unfinished. As commonly cited, democratic consolidation can be measured by several indicators. First, none of the main players in the democratic space should entertain thoughts of returning to a non-democratic system, nor should such a return seem possible or desirable. Second, the democratic system should be regarded by actors as having no recognized alternative. Third, the majority of society should consider democratic mechanisms the most desirable methods for making political decisions.

Passing through the consolidation stage in democratization does not mean permanent stability of democracy in a country. Over the past two decades, many scholarly articles in the field of democracy have addressed the wave of democratic backsliding or retreat around the world; and international reports from institutes such as V-Dem Institute and Freedom House have warned of declining levels of democracy and freedom globally. Although this decline is not a point of consensus among all thinkers in the field, it has become widespread, and the repetition of these warnings indicates that even the oldest democracies, such as Britain and the United States, and the most democratic systems with the highest scores in this area, are not immune from decreasing levels of freedom and democracy, or even the fall of democracy into authoritarianism.

The explanation of the consolidation stage itself implies that in many cases, societies after experiencing a democratic election have quickly regressed into a new form of authoritarianism, and such elections are not repeated; and it is common not to refer to such cases as transitions to democracy and declines from it, but rather to call them democratic moments. For instance, the years 1979 to 1981 can be referred to as the democratic moment following the 1979 Revolution. Also, it is possible that a newly democratic condition might endure more than one election but ultimately fail to entrench democratic mechanisms. This has led democracy advocates and theorists to the relative conclusion that consolidating democracy is neither easier nor less important than achieving it initially. In this regard, democratization theorists have from the beginning addressed how to consolidate democracy.

The first prominent theorist to address the causes of democratization in the twentieth century was Martin Lipset, who in his famous 1959 article also addressed the question of democratic consolidation. He discusses numerous factors that can stabilize democracy in societies. Although several decades have passed since his study, the ideas presented in his article, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” remain relevant to thinkers in this field.

In his view, the main factor in stabilizing democracy in a society is the level of industrialization of that society. Because industrialization brings about several major changes. First, increased welfare reduces the likelihood that, as Ayatollah Taleghani put it, a populist figure might deceive the people with promises of bread and water and take away their freedom. Second, rising levels of urbanization, education, and industry help spread democratic values and foster democratic culture, and the more educated segments—residents of large cities and employees of major industrial centers—see the world as more complex than their counterparts do, and a complex understanding of politics is a prerequisite for democracy. Because authoritarians generally rely on the spread of simple and incorrect ideas in politics to gain public support, and the more society embraces these simplistic answers, the greater the chances of authoritarian rule. Third, the expansion of the new middle class helps prevent social conflict and acts as a buffer, assisting in resolving crises through democratic mechanisms. Fourth, since education level correlates with a tendency for civic engagement, more developed societies with higher education levels show more interest in civic activities and therefore are expected to build stronger civil societies which, on one hand, can help the government resolve crises, and on the other, can prevent the expansion of state power and its transformation into an authoritarian regime.

The causes put forward by Martin Lipset have been revised or expanded by other theorists in the field, such as Larry Diamond, Inglehart, Tarrow, Huntington, and others, and have sometimes even been quantified. Many studies have shown that if a society has a lower level of GDP and attains democracy, it has less chance of consolidating it. Although theorists who have quantified the ideal level for democratic consolidation have proposed indicators that suggest Iran, during the 1979 Revolution, the reform era, and even now, meets the minimum criteria for democratic consolidation, it can be concluded that better economic conditions aid democratic consolidation; and on the other hand, as Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue, while short-term economic crisis might be associated with democratization in an authoritarian regime, it constitutes a threat to democratic consolidation. Therefore, one might surmise that enduring an economic crisis and bequeathing it to a potential future fledgling democracy presents a serious threat to its viability and survival. In this sense, the additional burden of social security funds in the coming years, along with other economic crises and the cost of implementing economic reforms, could portray this system to the public as ineffective and offer an opportunity for democracy’s enemies to orchestrate its fall into authoritarianism. As seen in the post-Soviet Russian experience, economic crisis and the inefficacy of the fledgling 1990s democracy not only prevented democracy from taking root and led to a fall into electoral authoritarianism, but, according to various polls, turned Stalin into a highly popular figure in Soviet society.

This is not the only factor that Martin Lipset points to. As indicated by the title of his article, maintaining and strengthening the legitimacy of a nascent democracy is essential for its consolidation. Legitimacy here means that a significant portion of society believes the existing political mechanisms are the best available. Although effectiveness—particularly economic—strongly impacts legitimacy, Lipset, in order to assess other legitimacy factors, considers effectiveness separately.

He identifies two main axes as influential in democratic legitimacy. First, democratic legitimacy requires the support and approval of both ends of the social spectrum. On one end are the beneficiaries of authoritarian systems—often traditional classes connected to institutions like the church or monarchy. On the other are social groups that were previously denied equal citizenship rights and were not recognized as full citizens by the former regime and are angered by those circumstances. If the newly democratic government can appeal to both sides, it gains significant legitimacy for consolidation. This is why Lipset suggests that if democratization occurs while preserving some institutions from the authoritarian system that have major constituencies, the chances of survival are higher.

In recent years, the ruling system has seen its survival in pitting segments of society against each other. This strategy is clearly visible in the regime’s actions: whenever a segment of society protests for its demands, not only is it suppressed, but the regime also mobilizes its loyal base in response. As a result of such efforts, society has become so polarized that not only does the prospect of building a political future with the support of both sides seem far-fetched, but moderation in the rhetoric of either side is even denounced as undesirable behavior.

Another axis for gaining legitimacy is resolving major crises. Lipset points to three major crises that every modern society faces: redefining the role of religion in governance and society, securing equal citizenship rights for all, and the struggle over how different classes share the national income. If a society proceeds step by step in resolving these crises, the fledgling democracy stands a better chance of resolving the next crisis and gaining legitimacy in the process. But if these crises accumulate and reinforce one another, democratic consolidation becomes even more challenging.

From before the Constitutional Revolution until today, many Iranian intellectuals and political and civil activists have taken significant steps toward resolving these major crises, yet at least two out of these three crises still plague society and cloud the path forward. If we add to these the environmental crises and other new disasters, the situation becomes even more complex, and a potential future democracy will face serious challenges on this front.

Despite all this, the political trajectories of societies are shaped more by the actions of communities and actors than by existing conditions. Meaning that a skilled player can win with the worst hand, and a poor player can lose with the best. Let us consider two examples. Democratization in Chile followed Lipset’s ideas relatively well. Pinochet, the dictator of Chile, and his supporters retained some share of power in the subsequent democratic regime and were not completely removed. Chile experienced solid economic growth before its transition and, according to a 2007 evaluation, had the highest economic growth rate in Latin America and reduced poverty faster than any other country in the region. Yet during this same period, Latinobarómetro public opinion polls showed that only 46% of Chileans believed democracy was always preferable to other forms of governance. By contrast, over 70% of citizens in countries like Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Argentina agreed with that statement.

On the other hand, India, one of the world’s poorest countries, grappling with major religious and ethnic divides, and still struggling with traditional crises, had severed ties with previous political institutions—whether from the colonial period or before. Based on Lipset’s view, democracy should not have consolidated there. Yet India has experienced decades of democratic endurance and is known as the world’s largest democracy. Hence, despite all the crises, there remains hope that Iranian civil society, notwithstanding the burdens of authoritarian legacy, can navigate the path of democratic consolidation and achieve a stable democracy.