In the legal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, qisas (retaliatory justice) is not only prominently featured in Book Three of the Islamic Penal Code (2013), but its procedural structure and associated privileges are also legally codified. These include defining the scope of cases eligible for qisas, conditions for the equivalence of the weapon used, and the principle of “proportionality” between the harm inflicted and the punishment. They also cover the critical role of the wali-ye-dam (guardian of the victim’s blood) in initiating or waiving the qisas claim, and the potential for commutation or substitution of qisas with diyya (blood money) or pardon under specific conditions. These provisions aim to integrate religious jurisprudence with judicial practice and illustrate that qisas in Iran functions both as a judicial mechanism and as a cultural and symbolic institution.

From a comparative perspective, legal models of qisas differ significantly across various Islamic countries in terms of scope, enforceability, and legal standards. Some have codified qisas and diyya laws in detail; others rely primarily on judicial precedent; and there are those that have gradually distanced themselves from retaliatory punishment in favor of alternative or restorative systems. Thus, the position of qisas in Iran must be understood both within the framework of domestic law and in the context of international and comparative legal developments. In practice, Iran’s national regulations are shaped not only by internal religious-legal traditions but also by external human rights pressures and comparative legal discourse. Any reform of qisas, therefore, requires simultaneous attention to explicit legal codes, judicial practices, and cultural-social sensitivities.

The traditional philosophy of qisas rests on three core claims:

1. Retributive justice and the principle of “an eye for an eye” as a means of achieving proportional punishment;

2. Psychological and legal satisfaction for the victim’s family;

3. The deterrent effect of severe punishment.

However, when these claims are examined through the lens of contemporary legal philosophy, major discrepancies emerge.

First, the concept of proportionality is only meaningful when justice is based on a full understanding of the circumstances and root causes of the crime. If structural factors—such as poverty, deprivation, unequal access to education, or psychological trauma—are excluded from analysis, proportionality becomes merely symbolic and masks deeper systemic injustices.

Second, the assumption that qisas brings true and lasting relief to survivors is not fully supported by psychological evidence. Numerous studies show that both the implementation and non-implementation of qisas can create complex processes of grief and identity reconstruction for the victim’s family. In some cases, the insistence on retaliatory punishment prolongs psychological suffering.

Third, from a legal and ethical standpoint, the risk of judicial error (e.g., flawed evidence, coerced confessions) and the idea of using inflicted pain as a legal tool are in conflict with principles of human dignity and the prohibition of cruel and inhumane punishment. Thus, if qisas is applied in a purely retributive way, it raises significant ethical and legal questions and proves ineffective in terms of restoring social harmony or preventing the cycle of violence.

Modern criminology warns us that the formalization of revenge—even in sophisticated legal frameworks—can normalize violent behavior. Social learning theories demonstrate that societal norms and behaviors are reinforced through symbolic approval and observation. When the state itself becomes a legitimate actor of violence, the social message is clear: “Violence is permitted”—the only difference is that it is now institutionalized.

Moreover, strengthening the logic of state retribution can weaken processes of local reconciliation and undermine the capacity of civil society to rebuild relationships among victims, offenders, and the broader community. From a justice distribution perspective, qisas is often implemented disproportionately in unequal societies, with marginalized groups and minorities being more vulnerable to errors or malfunctions in the criminal justice system. As a result, qisas may not only satisfy demands for official revenge but also reproduce structural inequalities.

The proposed solutions in this field emphasize:

• Restorative justice, which focuses on repairing relationships, compensating for harm, and restoring dignity;

• Strengthening victim support institutions;

• Adopting preventive social strategies that shift from reactive violence to reducing risk factors and empowering communities.

The central claim of qisas proponents is that harsh punishment significantly deters murder. However, a fair analysis of the empirical literature, conducted with scientific caution, reveals that this claim is not easily verifiable.

First, many studies that report a link between harsh punishment and crime reduction are methodologically flawed—often suffering from biases such as poorly selected control variables, overgeneralization from limited samples, or failure to account for structural factors. Therefore, their findings are not stable or generalizable.

Second, cross-national comparisons—some of which show that abolishing the death penalty does not lead to increased murder rates—suggest that homicide rates depend on a complex set of variables: the efficiency of the judicial system, social policy, economic inequality, police quality, and preventive programs.

Third, various national experiences show that focusing solely on punitive alternatives—without integrating comprehensive social policies—has limited potential to reduce violent crime. Given the weak deterrent evidence and the multifactorial reality of homicide, wiser policymaking would redirect resources toward structural prevention programs, judicial reforms, and victim/community support services, rather than relying exclusively on retaliatory punishment.

Given the current flawed legal framework, maintaining qisas as the primary response to murder is riddled with legal, ethical, and practical contradictions:

• A contradiction between the promise of justice and the actual function of revenge;

• A contradiction between the claim of deterrence and the lack of empirical support;

• A contradiction between the state’s legitimacy in inflicting suffering and the standards of human dignity.

From a policy standpoint, the transition toward abolishing qisas must be gradual and multifaceted:

(a) Announce a moratorium or initiate a legal reform process to foster public and expert dialogue;
(b) Develop alternatives, including restorative justice programs, compensation funds, psychological support for survivors, and judicial mechanisms that facilitate reconciliation and redress;
(c) Invest in structural preventive measures such as poverty reduction, educational development, and access to mental health services to address the underlying risk factors of violence;
(d) Implement strict safeguards against judicial errors and ensure fair trial procedures.

Such a discourse and policy approach aligns with international human rights obligations and offers a more promising path—both criminologically and socially—toward reducing violence and fostering societal repair.

Ultimately, a rational and humane move toward abolishing the death penalty—especially qisas—does not deny the need to respond to serious crimes. Rather, it shifts the response from official revenge to constructive and preventive mechanisms that promote justice, dignity, and long-term peace.