The Iranian Parliament Research Center recently published a study indicating that nearly 55% of students ranked in the top 3,000 in the national university entrance exam come from the top two economic deciles. The study warns that access to higher education in Iran, both in terms of quantity and quality, is significantly unequal. One major reason for this glaring gap is the difference in annual educational expenditures for students, with the average educational cost for high school students in the top two deciles being more than three times that of students from the seventh and eighth economic deciles.

As Iran, like other Eastern countries (whether developing or developed like India, China, South Korea, etc.), is known for its highly competitive educational environment, this level of inequality reflects many of the social and economic problems the country faces. Despite the fact that Iran’s Gini coefficient—a measure of income inequality—has generally decreased over the past four decades, and Iran ranks lower in inequality compared to other oil-rentier states, educational inequality shows that greater attention needs to be paid to the public’s sense of inequality.

In recent years, especially after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and the onset of a new wave of sanctions, major changes have occurred. On one hand, the Gini coefficient has increased, indicating greater inequality, and on the other hand, persistent stagflation has placed additional pressure on lower economic deciles, forcing them to forgo many goods and services, exacerbating their sense of inequality.

One of the major issues in addressing the current crises is democratization. However, this is not a one-sided relationship; democratization impacts the economy, but the economy also affects democratization. According to many scholars, inequality and economic conditions in general—including economic development, economic crises, and the level of inequality—play a significant role in providing the groundwork for democratization. To explore this issue, we will separately examine the impact of each of these three factors from the perspective of researchers.

1. Economic Stagnation
   

Seymour Martin Lipset, an American sociologist, argued in a 1961 paper that there is a relationship between a country’s level of development and its democratic status. Although his criteria for development (such as education, urbanization, wealth, employment in industry, etc.) were less emphasized, and his definition of democracy was eventually set aside, the overall connection was acknowledged. Subsequently, democracy theorists confirmed that societies with better economic conditions have a higher chance of democratizing and maintaining democracy.

This theory, known as “modernization,” has also faced critics. Some theories that give more credit to the actions of agents argue that even without considering oil-rich countries, we find democracies among very poor societies like India and Mongolia, and authoritarian regimes in more affluent ones like Singapore and China. Therefore, it is better to attribute more importance to the behavior of actors. Other scholars, such as Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, have questioned the causal direction of this relationship, arguing that democratic institutions themselves are the drivers of economic development.

However, both camps of critics do not seriously dispute the idea that better economic conditions increase the likelihood of democratization and the stability of democracy. For example, although Acemoglu and Robinson sharply critique the modernization theory in Why Nations Fail, they confirm in another book, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, that higher GDP per capita contributes to the likelihood of democratization and its consolidation.

While there is no consensus among modernization theorists on which index should be used to measure a country’s level of development, they point to indicators such as GDP per capita/national income, the Human Development Index, industrial employment, or the expansion of the middle class and even cultural effects like the spread of self-expression values.

Despite the probable decline of all these indicators since the sanctions began in 2012 (1391), Iran—both today and during the reforms and the 1979 revolution—has been at a sufficient level of development for a democratic transition. For example, theorists like Samuel Huntington, Ronald Inglehart, and Fareed Zakaria have noted that Iran was at an appropriate level for democratization in the 1970s or 1990s, or in both periods.

Even so, it can be understood that economic growth further increases the chances of democratization, and the economic sanctions in recent years, which have led to over a decade of continuous stagnation, have dealt a serious blow to this potential. For example, Iran’s GDP per capita has declined since 2012, reaching levels similar to two decades ago. This negative impact has not gone unnoticed by scholars, many of whom describe U.S. sanctions against Iran and Cuba, as opposed to increased trade with China and Vietnam, as a clear failure both theoretically and practically.

2. Experience of Economic Crisis

Although economic growth is defined as supportive of democratization, social, cultural, and economic crises have often destabilized regimes and created the conditions for democratization in non-democratic states. In his famous book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Samuel Huntington references both factors. He analyzes the multiple transitions that occurred between 1974 and 1991.

One of the factors Huntington cites is the economic growth of the 1960s in many countries and the economic crisis caused by the rise in oil prices, which impacted numerous nations. Iran, too, was affected by these global economic waves during the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1960s, which researchers call the “decade of economic development” in world history, Iran experienced significant economic growth, but as seen in the graph above, the oil price crisis, which was one of its causes, led to a recession that pushed Iran’s GDP per capita back to pre-1960 levels.

From this perspective, the economic growth of the 1960s exposed Iranian society to the potential for democratization, while the 1970s recession created a crisis that destabilized the regime. However, due to the actions of political actors, neither of these conditions led to democratization in Iran. In contrast, the recent economic crisis seems to have gone beyond being merely an economic shock and has weakened society more than the authoritarian regime, hindering both economic growth and democratization.

3. Changes in the Level of Economic Inequality

Among democratization theorists, Acemoglu and Robinson focus much of their analysis of democratization on inequality, although they include not only economic inequality but also racial, ethnic, religious, and social inequalities. They describe the political arena as a battleground between the elites and the lower classes, with one side seeking to secure the interests of all and the other protecting the interests of the dominant group. Democratization, they argue, is the result of institutional changes achieved through continuous pressure and negotiation between these groups.

They conclude that low levels of inequality reduce the motivation for change. For example, a society like Singapore, which has experienced high economic growth and low levels of inequality for several decades, has little incentive for democratization. Thus, societies with low inequality are not poised for democratic transitions.

On the other hand, extreme inequality also does not promise democratization, as high inequality leads the dominant group to perceive the cost of democratization as very high, prompting them to resist it at all costs. Simultaneously, the lower classes have fewer resources to resist. In such conditions, even though authoritarianism may seem illegitimate to much of society, the regime can survive through repression, much like the apartheid regime in South Africa, which persisted for decades despite widespread discrimination until gradual changes in equality eventually led to its collapse.

In their broader analysis, Acemoglu and Robinson also consider the cost of repression as a key factor in democratization, framing the situation as a cost-benefit calculation. Therefore, in cases where the cost of repression outweighs the benefits of maintaining authoritarianism, the elites insist on preserving the status quo. Based on this model, although the current level of inequality in Iran may seem conducive to democratization, increasing inequality, particularly economic inequality, likely pushes society further away from democratization.

After 2006, as the wave of color revolutions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia subsided, and with the failure of the Arab Spring to achieve democratization, many democracy scholars concluded that we are experiencing an era of democratic decline. The emergence of Donald Trump in the United States and the rise of the far-right in many democratic countries further highlighted the issue of democratic backsliding. It seems that countries on the verge of democratic transitions have stalled, fragile democracies have sometimes regressed into authoritarianism, and the level of freedom in stable democracies has also diminished.

Scholars have offered various explanations for this new phenomenon. Some, like Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, strongly oppose the notion of democratic decline, calling such claims exaggerated, though they do acknowledge that the wave of democratic transitions has subsided. Many other scholars, however, recognize it as a global phenomenon that warrants analysis. Their explanations include factors such as the rise of the internet and social media, the weakening of political parties and civil society, globalization, changes in the balance of power at the international level, and more.

What concerns us here is Ronald Inglehart’s perspective. Inglehart argues that improved living conditions in the post-World War II era helped generations raised in times of abundance develop different values, growing into a generation that advocates for democratization, the recognition of sexual minorities, different religious perspectives, and more. However, in recent decades, the gradual increase in inequality and the decline in real income have reversed these value changes, with values emerging that do not support democracy or democratization.

If we accept Inglehart’s theory and apply it to the current situation in Iran, the ongoing economic crisis has impacted the values of Iranians, making the conditions for democratization less favorable than before. As he notes in his book Cultural Evolution (published in 2018), although the younger generation in Islamic countries has experienced significant value shifts compared to previous generations, Iran falls into a group of countries where value changes between generations have not significantly advanced democracy.

In conclusion, based on the existing research, it appears that sanctions, resulting economic stagnation, inequality, the creation of various economic and social crises, and their numerous consequences have pushed Iranian society further away from democratization. Although the cultural, economic, and social foundations for democratization still exist, the fear is that, if the current situation continues, we may gradually move further away from these minimum requirements.