Freedom of speech, in the sense of recognizing the right of individuals to express their opinions, beliefs, and promote them through language or any kind of symbols (such as a sign or symbol), is essential. Governments like the Islamic Republic in Iran, which do not tolerate even the slightest dissenting speech or beliefs contrary to the official religion, have a noticeable difference from democratic societies. We can easily identify which countries have freedom of speech and which do not. Without trying to obscure this stark difference, however, even in countries that respect freedom of speech, the scope of this freedom is ambiguous and there is no law that does not limit freedom of speech in some way. The question is, in what cases and where is freedom of speech limited, and if it is to be limited, what is the rational justification for it? This article discusses several arguments about limiting freedom of speech.

First of all, why do humans need to have freedom of speech at all? We may be tempted to accept the utilitarian approach in justifying freedom of speech and say that freedom of speech is a necessary condition or promoter of democracy, diversity of opinions, and political freedom. Or that, for example, freedom of speech helps people have more access to accurate information. Or that freedom of speech strengthens individual independence and autonomy. However, all of these reasons – although valid – paradoxically provide reasons for rejecting freedom of speech as well. For example, if the justification for freedom of speech is democracy, then non-democratic and pro-dictatorship speech should be prohibited. Or if freedom of speech is necessary for access to accurate information, then the freedom of those who provide false information to the people should be restricted. Therefore, every reason for the necessity of freedom of speech is also used to limit and violate freedom of speech itself.

This contradiction arises because freedom of speech does not require justification. On the contrary, restrictions that may be imposed on individuals’ freedom of speech require rational justification and reasoning. Therefore, the burden of proof falls on those who want to impose restrictions on certain statements or expressions. In other words, restrictions require justification, not freedom of speech itself. This is why we say that freedom of speech is a fundamental and natural right.

One of the justifications that authoritarian governments use to deprive citizens of freedom of speech is the accusation of “spreading lies.” According to them, “false” statements and information must be prevented. But who determines what is a “lie” and what is the truth? In almost no case is the truth and all aspects of reality clear to everyone, and the whole truth is not in the pocket of one person. Therefore, in practice, some people must have the privilege of determining what is reality and truth. This principle governs the law enforcers and ideologues of authoritarian governments, like the all-knowing gods or the “Ministry of Truth” in the novel 1984 (by George Orwell). Therefore, the spread of lies is also included in freedom of speech, and without it, there is no such thing as freedom of speech. In other words, we also have the freedom to speak lies, otherwise we do not have freedom of speech at all.

Even when there is a consensus among the majority of people on a reality, the freedom of expression of the opposing individual must be preserved in order to express their dissent. As Stuart Mill said, “If all of humanity except one person were of one opinion, and only that one person held the opposing view, humanity as a whole would have no right to silence that person; just as that one person, if they had the power, would have no right to silence the entire population.” (1).

It is better to continue the discussion of freedom of speech within a liberal discourse that accepts the basis of freedom of expression. In this framework, the disagreement and ambiguity are about the boundaries of freedom of speech, not the existence of freedom of expression as a whole.

The first principle proposed for determining the boundaries of freedom is the “Harm Principle”. According to Stuart Mill, it is the principle of harm.

The sole purpose of exerting power over one of the members of a civilized society, against their will, is to prevent them from causing harm to others.

According to this principle, freedom of speech becomes very broad, as it is rare to imagine words that directly harm others or violate their rights; indeed, speech can cause annoyance and distress to others, or be insulting, unethical and undesirable, but it rarely causes “harm and damage”.

However, the words “harm and damage” are ambiguous. Some claim that insults can cause “harm and damage” to an individual, or that another principle called the Offense Principle should be applied to restrict freedom of speech. According to this principle, not only speech that harms others, but also speech that is considered insulting can be limited.

One argument against the principle of insult and the claim of psychological and mental harm caused by hearing others’ words can be presented as follows:

Let’s assume that person “A” (for example, the descriptions of a book’s sensuality, erotic images of a movie, and blatant lies of a speaker at a seminar) causes distress and psychological harm to person “B” for certain reasons. We assume that this claim of distress and harm is real.

But person “B” can refrain from hearing or reading the seemingly harmful words of person “A”. For example, they can close the book, not watch the movie, or leave the seminar room. So if person “B” continues to read the book or watch the movie, or stay in the seminar room, then it is their own action that harms them, because they could have always prevented harm to themselves by not hearing or reading.

Therefore, due to the possibility of permanent avoidance and the argument that anyone can defend against the alleged harm, insulting words cannot truly harm anyone; unless someone claims that being aware of the existence of these insulting words is distressing for them, which is of course a baseless claim.

When we overlook the main instances of insult, we realize that most of them are avoidable or can be prevented by creating regulations (rather than pursuing legal action against the individual for their words). As a comparison, in public spaces, everyone is free to smoke, but if someone claims that the smoke is causing them harm, they can distance themselves, and if they don’t, then it is their own fault. In enclosed spaces and places where distancing is not possible, smoking should be prohibited by regulations, but this does not mean criminalizing the use of tobacco. Similarly, in most cases, an individual is able to avoid hearing insulting or offensive words, or regulations can be put in place to make this avoidance possible.

Therefore, we can only rely on the principle of “harm” to determine the limitations of freedom of expression. The freedom of expression of an individual is only restricted when it harms others and violates their rights.

If we reflect a little, we will realize that all cases in which someone’s words may cause harm to others are actually cases in which “speech” is used as an “action,” or in other words, what philosophers and linguists call “speech acts.” When a commander orders his subordinate to shoot an innocent person, his command is considered a “speech act” because it is part of an act of murder. In this case, his trial is not a violation of his freedom of speech, but rather for his participation in a crime; even though his role was essentially just uttering a few words. In this matter, we all agree that his “speech” is an “action.”

In this way, in cases such as inciting others to violence against someone, destroying the reputation of a specific person in a way that leads to their financial harm, and similar cases, freedom of speech is not limited, but the individual is punished for their “speech action”. In these cases, “speech” is part of a plan or conspiracy against a specific person or people. If we take the example of ordering the murder of a commander as an example, we can understand the difference between freedom of speech and seditious “speech action”.

Therefore, if we think positively, the principle of “harm” is not really the main principle that limits freedom of speech, because no speech can cause harm to others unless it deviates from the nature of “speech” and turns into an “action”. By distinguishing between “speech” and “speech acts”, many ambiguous boundaries of freedom of speech can be clarified and made transparent. In this way, freedom of speech can be redefined as an inviolable and unconditional principle, without exceptions or conditions being considered as “harmful speech acts”.

This proposal of mine can also be interesting for many linguists, as one of their topics, “speech act”, has a practical and important application. They can help legal philosophers and criminologists understand when a speech can be considered a “speech act”. For example, when can a threat made online be considered a “speech act” because this threat can be in the form of an angry comment or a serious threatening letter for extortion.

As a summary, the boundaries of freedom of speech should be determined not by the principle of “insult” but by the principle of “harm”. However, if we think positively, the boundaries of freedom of speech are also the boundaries of our own expression, meaning that an individual’s speech is limited to a place where it is no longer just “speech” but considered part of a “communicative action”. This “action” can include acts such as ordering murder, threatening murder, plotting to defame someone, etc. and these actions should not be considered as “speech” but rather as “verbal actions”.

Footnotes:

1. Mill, J.S., 1978.

   Azadi

   Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. Page 16.

2. Mill, J.S., 1978.

   Azadi

   Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. Page 9.