Hassan Rouhani, the seventh President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on August 4, 2013, at his inauguration ceremony, presented the names of 18 proposed ministers to Ali Larijani, the Speaker of Parliament. After the announcement of the proposed ministers, various analyses were made by political groups and the media. Some considered this cabinet to be a security-oriented one, while others saw it as composed of technocrats. All of these opinions were biased, waiting for the Rouhani cabinet to bring about change. Some saw this change as a barrier to their own interests and tried to prevent it by publishing articles in their media and revealing the past of these ministers. They attempted to influence the targeted group in Parliament, the conservatives, by using titles such as “connection of some names to sedition”, in order to prevent them from reaching the government. They were somewhat successful in this matter by promoting their own special propaganda about Najafi, Milani, and Sultanifar,

In all of these expressions, the only issue that was missing was how the introduced cabinet’s relationship with civil society is and how it can be in the future. It seems that in the past 35 years and eleven different cabinets of the Islamic Republic, civil society has been absent as a key player in fundamental equations, wars, and sometimes definitions and praises of governments.

This text aims to provide a general overview of the Rouhani cabinet and then examine its relationship with civil society. Fundamental questions arise in light of the performance of past governments and the failure of civil society to achieve its demands over the past 35 years. Can we expect an organic relationship between civil society and the government given the political structure of Iran, or should we not anticipate a bright future like recent years? In this process, have civil society and existing groups and organizations fallen behind equally over the past 35 years, or are we facing a government that is completely uncompromising with civil society as a whole? Each of these questions will be examined separately in this text.

Cabinet of the clergy

“Sorat News” website, affiliated with

The article writes to the conservatives about reviewing the track record of Rouhani’s proposed ministers: “Out of 18 people, at least 4 of them have a special background in security and intelligence. Of course, the security background of the President’s team is not limited to these 4 people and includes a much larger circle of advisors and decision-makers around him.” On the other hand, Rouhollah Hosseiniyan, in an interview with ISNA parliamentary correspondent, evaluates the proposed cabinet of Hassan Rouhani and says: “Thank God, this cabinet is very security-oriented and most of the proposed ministers are from a security background, except for the proposed Minister of Intelligence who is a religious and political figure.” Additionally, Ahmad Amirabadi, representative of the people of Qom in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, has also told the media that the flaw in Rouhani’s proposed cabinet is that the individuals are “among the major sins and somewhat security-oriented.” He also, like Rouh

If we add these analyses to the published documents about the “Start Oil” contract, which were published in Kayhan newspaper, which opposes the introduction of Zanganeh as the proposed oil minister by Rouhani, we will find that most of the speculations about this cabinet and its security have been made by fundamentalist groups. This is while reformist newspapers have a different opinion about the proposed cabinet. The reformist newspaper Bahar writes in its published article before Rouhani’s cabinet was introduced to the parliament: “Today, whether we like it or not, the reformists have an undeniable share in this success and it is their right to expect effective presence in key positions of the cabinet, commensurate with the role they played.” In all of these analyses, there are hidden political conflicts; fundamentalists, due to losing their power in the executive branch, are trying to discredit the cabinet by revealing security-related issues and linking it to a conspiracy, while reformists are counting the number of

On the other hand, foreign media consider Rouhani’s cabinet to be technocratic. According to the Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA), the Turkish newspaper Milliyet wrote in a report: “After Hassan Rouhani took office, all eyes are focused on the cabinet he has chosen. Based on the list presented by Hassan Rouhani, familiar faces from the Rafsanjani presidency era stand out, including the most prominent figure, Bijan Namdar Zanganeh, who is highly skilled in the field of oil and energy.” This is while Reuters, in an article on their website about Rouhani’s cabinet, shares the same view as Milliyet and writes: “Hassan Rouhani, the President of Iran, introduced a cabinet consisting of experienced technocrats at his inauguration ceremony and expressed hope that building trust with foreign powers will help resolve the nuclear dispute and reduce international tensions.” Additionally, the Jakarta Globe newspaper, quoting Alireza Nader, an analyst at a

But can the cabinet of Rouhani be considered as a security cabinet or a technocratic one? With a look at the cabinet of Rouhani and the individuals introduced in it, the claims of the fundamentalists about considering the cabinet as a security one are not baseless and cannot be seen as random or far-fetched. However, it is likely that Ali Rabiei, who has been introduced as the Minister of Labor, Cooperation, and Welfare in the eleventh cabinet, is considered as the “most informed” minister in the proposed cabinet. Ali Rabiei, known as “Ebad” (his nickname in the Ministry of Intelligence), has a specific intelligence background; he also served as the deputy of this ministry in the 1970s during the tenure of Ali Fallahian. Like many other reformists, Rabiei was dismissed from the Ministry of Intelligence in the mid-1970s. However, in the early years of the reformist government, he was appointed by Khatami

In addition to “worshipers”, Hamid Chit Chian, the proposed Minister of Energy, also has a history of activity in security institutions. He was first the commander of the intelligence division of the Revolutionary Guards in Tabriz and after the formation of the Ministry of Intelligence in 1362, he held a position in this ministry. According to the website of Sorat News, he was in charge of the “Deputy of Operations in Eastern Europe” in the Ministry of Intelligence. The third proposed minister by Rouhani with a clear intelligence background is Mostafa Pourmohammadi, the proposed Minister of Justice. Pourmohammadi has also worked for years in the Ministry of Intelligence and his highest position was the Deputy of International Affairs during Ali Fallahian’s term. Of course, we must also consider the Ministry of Intelligence and the Ministry of Interior in this list, although traditionally, the Ministry of Justice has always had individuals with security and intelligence backgrounds in its ranks.

But in all of these records that are published by the fundamentalists under the pretext of security, what is omitted and not mentioned is the history of this issue in previous governments; it seems to have been forgotten that in the Ahmadinejad government, 6 members of the Revolutionary Guards, with a clear background in the Guards’ intelligence, were present and even in the Reformist government, 3 of the proposed security ministers had a background in this field. In fact, the deliberate omission by the fundamentalists is that the issue of the security of the cabinet in the Islamic Republic is not a new issue. For this reason, it must be said that the fundamentalists’ labeling of the cabinet as a security issue is not to narrow the space for civil society, but simply for a political war against the opposing faction.

But why do foreign media call the proposed cabinet technocrats, contrary to the principles of the insiders, and what hidden goal is behind this title, and why choosing this title has created hope among some international powers; it itself returns to answering this question that why do they not consider this cabinet as security, contrary to the internal currents? If we define technocrats as “masters of their craft”, does the introduced cabinet of Rouhani possess the qualities of technocrats in the position entrusted to them? In this investigation, in addition to their education, the backgrounds of these individuals in the executive positions of the assigned ministry, which is one of the fundamental variables in identifying their technocratic nature, will be examined.

For example, Ali Tayebnia has been the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, with a PhD in Economics from the University of Tehran. He has served as the Secretary of the Government’s Economic Commission in the Fifth to Eighth Governments, and as the Deputy for Planning and Evaluation at the Presidential Institution with a four-year experience. He has also served as the Deputy for Economic Affairs at the Management and Planning Organization in 2005 and 2006, and as a member of the Monetary and Credit Council from 2002 to 2009. He has also held various other positions, including the Director of Theoretical Economics Group at the Faculty of Economics at the University of Tehran, and the Director of the Social and Institutional Economics Group at the Faculty of Economics at the University of Tehran. Similarly, Javad Zarif, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, has similar qualifications. During Mohammad Khatami’s presidency, Zarif served as the Deputy for Legal and International Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In this list, we cannot include Abbas Akhoundi, the Minister of Roads and Urban Development, who possesses these same qualities, as well as Nematzadeh, the Minister of Industries, and also Bijan Namdar Zanganeh, the Minister of Oil, who has gained fame as the “Sheikh of Oil” due to his high experience in various ministries, and in addition, Hamid Chitchian, the Minister of Energy, was disregarded; although in the Ministry of Health, traditionally, individuals with excellent qualifications and long executive backgrounds have always been used.

In this regard, by looking at the background of the proposed ministers, it can be said that the signs of the Rouhani cabinet being closer to technocrats are more than entering into a factional war and closing it with the traditional presence of military and security personnel in the governments of the Islamic Republic, calling it security. But why a more technocratic cabinet is more pleasing to the taste of Western countries is generally attributed to two factors that were discussed in the examination of the technocratic nature of the Rouhani cabinet and also to the global accumulation of capital, which with the widespread wave of privatization of the Iranian economy, which has been key since the era of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and is being pursued during the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad era, but with his adventures in foreign policy, a fundamental flaw is created in this accumulation, naturally industrial trusts and foreign companies can achieve better results with a technocratic government than with a group like the Ahmadinejad cabinet that reads his annual speeches

The state of civil society in the next four years.

But can we hope for an organic connection between civil society and the clerical cabinet? The first question that comes to mind with this title is whether this hope has been created in general or only encompasses a part of society. If we use the criterion of the percentage of the population that voted for the clerical leader, meaning slightly more than 50% of the voting population in Iran, it can be said that this hope, if it exists, belongs to the same population that voted for the clerical leader. Is this hope real or, as many analysts believe, was the people’s vote for the cleric a rejection of the Supreme Leader? We cannot rush and rely on these options without considering historical continuity, the political structure of the Islamic Republic, and the role of civil institutions in confronting the government. Because none of these options have a solid and accurate foundation, and most of them are mere speculation or are being guided by a specific ideology. If we only consider the government and executive power as the

Civil society refers to a collection of voluntary organizations and social institutions that lay the foundation for a dynamic society and, in terms of voluntarism, are in contrast to the imposed structure of government (regardless of its type) and commercial institutions and markets. If we accept this definition as the most comprehensive definition of civil society among the various definitions presented by different social theorists, it can be said that there cannot be a self-governing and voluntary institution that is in conflict with the power of the government and the market and remains safe from the suppression of previous governments of the Islamic Republic; from the suppression of June 20th, 1981 to the mass executions of September 8th, 1988, from the suppression of students on July 9th, 1999 to the massacre of workers in Khatoon Abad.

Thousands of other historical examples essentially show that, regardless of the inherent nature of institutions and self-governing organizations and their conflict with the government, no effort has been made in the past thirty-five years to reconcile and get closer to civil society by the ruling governments. If during the era of reforms, the slogan of political development is given, on the other hand, the murder of members of the Iranian Writers’ Association is put on the agenda and ruthless suppression of the 18th of Tir takes place.

But the reason why no government has been successful in establishing an organic connection with civil society is largely due to the political structure of the Islamic Republic, as outlined in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. In the second principle of the Constitution, Islam is placed as the basis, and it is elaborately described in detail: “The Islamic Republic is a system based on faith in: 1- The One God (There is no god but Allah) and the assignment of sovereignty and legislation to Him, and the necessity of submission to His command 2- Divine revelation and its fundamental role in expressing laws 3- The concept of resurrection and its constructive role in the evolutionary process of humans towards God 4- The justice of God in creation and legislation 5- Imamate and continuous leadership and its fundamental role in the continuity of the Islamic Revolution 6- The dignity and high value of humans and their freedom coupled with their responsibility towards God.” If we were to move forward according to this principle and

Of course, it must be mentioned again that civil society institutions and organizations, based on the ownership relationship they may have with the government, are not equally susceptible to government suppression and in contradiction with it. For example, as labor unions and associations do not have an ownership relationship with the government, they may be subject to attack and suppression, while trade unions and journalist associations, due to their higher level of ownership relationship with the government compared to labor organizations, are less vulnerable to overt suppression.

However, apart from being secure or technocratic, the political and economic position in this government is also of great importance; it cannot be ignored that during this period, we are faced with a huge wave of privatization and expansion of contracting companies in the employment of human resources compared to the past, which, given the technocracy of this cabinet and its experiences, the main victims of this in civil society are unions and labor syndicates. Although other members of civil society, such as the Writers’ Association and Journalists’ Associations, organizations and human rights institutions, student organizations and groups defending the rights of children and women, will be faced with the choice of compromising and coming to terms with the current situation or continuing their struggle to achieve their demands.