In the last three issues of the peace line, we discussed the issue of the position of human rights in the 1957 revolution in conversations with Abolhassan Banisadr, Farrokh Negahdar, and Hassan Sharifmoghaddam.

Understanding the role of human rights in the 1957 revolution without knowledge of the position of the clergy towards human rights and the overall understanding of the relationship between jurisprudence and human rights seems far-fetched. For this reason, in our conversation with Mehdi Khalaji, a religious researcher, we delve into the exploration of the relationship between clergy and human rights.

The reality is that Iranian reformists have often extended a helping hand towards the clergy in historical moments, and since the central issue for a large part of the reformists is human rights, understanding the relationship between jurisprudence and human rights can shed light on certain aspects of the quality of the relationship between reformists and clergy and clarify the need or lack thereof for continuing this constant expectation. Therefore, understanding the relationship between jurisprudence and human rights not only fulfills the demands of the 1957 revolution, but also brings us closer to the reality of the present and future of Iran.

Conditions of possibility and impossibility of human rights discourse – not as a suspicion or a subject of recognition, but as a mandatory belief component – in the mental structure of clergy and, in general, jurisprudence, what is it?

Judaism and Catholic Christianity, which have coexisted in modern Europe and have been affected by its changes, have not yet been able to accept human rights as a fundamental basis for their laws. Still, thousands of people in Africa are contracting AIDS and losing their lives due to following the Pope’s decree. Orthodox Jewish women come to public spaces wearing wigs to cover their hair. Therefore, the modernization of society does not necessarily mean that the lawmakers will automatically consider adapting their laws to human rights. Human rights are a creation of humanity, but believers do not easily accept that laws are also a human invention and can be improved and modified by reason and custom.

The compatibility of jurisprudence with human rights requires a revolution in the foundations of existing jurisprudence. The foundations of jurisprudence are mainly studied in the science of usul al-fiqh. Usul al-fiqh is “the science of rules that provide the basis for deducing religious rulings” or, as

Despite all this, the knowledge of the principles of jurisprudence is obsolete from an epistemological perspective. It is inevitable that a jurisprudence based on these principles will not have scientific credibility. Until jurists pay attention to new developments in linguistics, history, anthropology, philology or historical linguistics, hermeneutics, critical reading of texts, and literary criticism, they cannot formulate valid principles of jurisprudence. The principles must be redefined. New principles must be formulated for jurisprudence. The principles of jurisprudence taught and used as the basis for issuing fatwas belong to the Ptolemaic geocentric worldview. New principles must be incorporated into a new intellectual framework (paradigm). It is clear that formulating new principles for jurisprudence without formulating new principles for religion – that is, for a completely new theology – is not possible.

In order to reconcile jurisprudence and human rights, it is not only necessary for the understanding of jurists to be transformed regarding concepts such as “right” and “human”, but also the concept of “God”, His relationship with humans, the “text” and the horizon of expectations from it, “reason”, its credibility and effectiveness, the extent and role of “custom”, “justice” and its relationship with legislation, and ultimately the “signature” of many religious rulings and their legal consequences must be reviewed and evaluated in the light of new knowledge. For example, in jurisprudence, God is considered the “master” and “lord” while humans are considered “servants”. If someone views the relationship between God and humans as “master and servant”, they cannot formulate a jurisprudence that is compatible with human rights. Also, if it is assumed that humans are capable of fully and absolutely understanding God’s orders or words, many discriminatory rulings can be justified. Furthermore, if

Taking into consideration the different perspectives that view Islam as prone to violence, rationality, compassion, etc., and based on your statements that the revolution necessitates compatibility between human rights and jurisprudence, and that it should be divided into two parts: transformation in the principles of jurisprudence and transformation in the foundations of spiritual knowledge of clergy, can jurisprudence seek the means of this transformation, especially in the foundations of spiritual knowledge, in text and tradition? And in general, does the text allow for a non-imposed understanding to be in accordance with human rights?

I believe that the purpose of Islam’s inclination towards violence lies in the hidden potential within the foundational texts of Islam – the Quran and Hadith – for violence. Undoubtedly, these texts have been interpreted in a way that has led to the production of violence over long periods of time. The art of interpretation can remove this potential. However, interpreting Islam’s texts in a non-violent or anti-violent manner requires new foundations and fundamental changes in assumptions. To gain a fresh understanding of the text, one cannot cling to tradition. I am inspired by those who seek to do so.

Renewing the experience of seclusion, I find that they want to give a new rationality to the traditional and indigenous color and luster in order to reduce the alienation and hostility of the people of tradition. But in my opinion, this will neither have a convincing theoretical explanation nor will it be successful in practice. Whether we like it or not, we are no longer traditional. Our traditionalists are as modern as our traditionalists. Although both traditionalism and anti-traditionalism are dead ends, we need to be aware of our situation and constantly evaluate ourselves in relation to tradition. Therefore, we are always condemned to look at our cultural past from the historical position of today. We take our stance and perspective from today. The tools of criticism and conceptual frameworks belong to the modern world. This intellectual system of renewal allows us to revitalize and enliven tradition with fresh understandings. Let’s return to the topic of discussion…

I think it is fundamentally difficult to assume that the God of the lawgiver can legitimize texts that are not violent. In Islam, God is not only the creator of beings from nothingness, but also the sacred lawgiver. The link between God and the law is dangerous. God is the highest peak of holiness. If such a being is the lawgiver, he will establish a constant and transcendent law. The sacred law ignores the humanity, history, and transformative nature of man. The law must be able to adapt to the changes in society and the capabilities of humans.

It seems that “sacred law” makes the law holy and increases the possibility of violence. Because the law is in direct contradiction with human nature and can only be enforced through force. The most ineffective law is the one that turns a blind eye to human needs and desires, but expects obedience and compliance from them.

A critical examination of the concept of “sacred street” can open up a new interpretation of the text. In this case, the do’s and don’ts in a historical and non-sacred text will become more revealing of an ethical message rather than a legal obligation. Juridical discourse is restrictive, obligatory, and forceful, but prophetic discourse (Quran and Hadith) can be seen as an open-ended exploration of meanings and teachings. The full potential of Islamic espinosism has not yet emerged; someone who delicately carves the foundational concepts of Islamic theology under the lens of their sharp and deep faith can truly understand and measure them.

One of the main difficulties in the history of interpretation in Islam has been that the text of the Qur’an has been understood by many commentators in a literal sense. In other words, the permissible and figurative language or imaginative metaphors of the Qur’an or any other sacred text have not been the fundamental basis for understanding it. For example, those commentators who were not inclined towards analogy and had a tendency towards anthropomorphism could not understand the verse “The Most Merciful has risen over the Throne” in its apparent and literal meaning that God has physically settled on the throne like a human being. Or they could not interpret “The hand of Allah is over their hands” to mean that God literally has a physical hand and His hand is above the hands of human beings. Therefore, they have resorted to figurative interpretations for many expressions in the Qur’an that may have given the impression of anthropomorphism towards God. Why do we not expand the circle of this figurative language and include in

If God is wise and just in the sense that humans understand “reason” and “justice” today, He cannot justify the existing jurisprudence that lays the foundation for various forms of discrimination. Therefore, just as the transcendence of God requires us to remove Him from human attributes and interpret the verses accordingly, divine wisdom and justice also require us to understand the historical context of the Quranic commandments that contain elements of discrimination and discover their moral essence beyond discrimination. For example, jurists interpret a verse on retribution in the Quran as an obligatory duty. However, it can be seen as a command that the Prophet established to prevent collective revenge and tribal feuds over the killing of one person. Therefore, the purpose of this command was not necessarily for someone to be killed for a murder, but rather to prevent collective revenge for the killing of one person from other tribes. If we take the moral essence of this command as the condemnation of murder, even retribution itself becomes meaningless and we cannot

On the other hand, the fundamental issue is that the Islamic jurisprudence lacks authenticity: either they have come from the Jewish religion or they are based on the customs and traditions of the Arabian Peninsula. Islamic jurisprudence is not very “Islamic”. Unlike Christianity, Islam spread as a conquering religion and reached other lands. Despite their military and political superiority, unlike Christians, Muslims were very careful not to imitate or borrow from the legal systems of the conquered countries. Islam never felt the need to borrow laws. However, due to social necessities, they created secondary laws; meaning that under the guise of authenticity, they borrowed more from their own historical and social context. As a result, the Islamic jurisprudential system remained closed off to change. The shock of renewal was devastating for the jurisprudential system that was originally the conquerors and creators, but now had been defeated by a larger world. The foreignness of the jurists to the historical understanding of jurisprudence has

The Torah and the Gospel do not recognize and have a clear understanding of them. Essentially, the interpretation of the jurists from the past is not historical. Their understanding of Islamic history and pre-Islamic history is more fictional and mythical than historical.

It is important to consider that a new interpretation requires a foundation in modern philosophical and theological principles, and presuppositions that are based on concepts such as freedom, human rights, and equality among human beings. How can modern legal philosophy, which has its place, ignore Kant, Hegel, Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Marx and speak of rational principles for jurisprudence or religion?

Of course, the issue of interpretation is not purely arbitrary and cannot be transformed with a mere change in knowledge. As long as the jurists are dependent on the ruling system of the Islamic Republic, interpreting discriminatory institutional forms will be difficult. In order for new interpretations and principles of jurisprudence to emerge, we need jurists who do not share interests with the religious ruling system and are able to create an independent institution separate from the religious government.

“You stated that God is also present in the holy street of Islam and it seems that the holy street sanctifies the law. Allow me to raise two questions based on this statement. Firstly, why has the rule of law never been established in Iran and “holy law” not been the basis for its formation? And secondly, why specifically after the revolution, when power was in the hands of the clergy, did this holy law not take control and instead, a jurist gained absolute power instead of jurisprudence?”

The question of why the rule of law did not take shape in Iran is another inquiry that requires a broader scope. However, one can ask why the concept of the rule of law is not present in jurisprudence. In other words, the idea of the rule of law, as we see it even in medieval Europe, did not emerge in jurisprudence. This question is closely related to your second question of why the clergy were unable to establish the holy law as the basis of government, and is continuously intertwined.

The divine law differs fundamentally from the customary law in that it is not self-made. Its legitimacy is transcendental. As a result, the interpreter of divine law also has a different nature than the interpreter of customary law. The jurist is not only a lawmaker, but also holds a divine position and stands above the law. With the claim of lawmaking, he creates laws. The human nature of the law is covered by a veil. It considers what is entirely historical and human as non-historical and superhuman.

The jurists are the continuation of the chain of narrators. At the time of the emergence of the sacred texts (Quran and Hadith), the first narrators were oral narrators who were considered the authorities in understanding the divine law; that is, the reciters and scholars. Gradually, as we move away from the early days of Islam, narration alone is not sufficient. Schools of theology and jurisprudence emerged. The narrators became jurists. In the transition from narration to interpretation, the divine authority of the narrator was also transferred to the jurist or interpreter.

In order for others to accept the narration of the Prophet, the narrator relied on their own faith, sincerity, and piety, and their closeness to the Prophet served as a testimony to their truthfulness and trustworthiness in conveying his words. Therefore, the narrator was not just a storyteller, but a part of the narration, giving it a holy credibility. They were either from the “companions” or from the “followers”; those who had not seen the Prophet but had seen his companions. They were either a just and trustworthy person, or a scholar of the science of narrators who would investigate and verify their identity. The character, history, and lineage of the narrator play a determining role in the meaning and credibility of the narration. This is why the narrator becomes a holy authority. They are sanctified. The spiritual and religious ties of the narrator are connected to their narration. The words of the narrator must be convincing and believable. They must be in line with the words

When we reach the jurist, we see that the holy authority is bestowed upon him. Not everyone can imitate him. The source of emulation must be a Twelver Shia and “Adil”. This means that expertise in jurisprudence and knowledge of its principles is not enough. Beyond the knowledge of the jurist, he must possess divine character. The reason why jurists are now called “Ayatollah” or in the past “Hujjat al-Islam” is because of this. They also attribute miracles to the esteemed sources of emulation in order to lower their rank below that of the Prophet or Imam who performs miracles. An “Adil” jurist is someone who has the power to control existence, as he possesses a supernatural force. Since the Safavid era, the theory of general representation of the jurist from the Imam has solidified the divine status of the jurist. Therefore, jurisprudence is not as important as the jurist, just as

On the other hand, in jurisprudence, especially in Shia jurisprudence, the concept of the absent government exists. The rule of law is based on ideas that require recognition and acceptance of the concept of government. A government that relies on dictatorship and operates independently of any particular individual. In our jurisprudence, we have the concept of the ruler and the ruler of the law. The ruler of the law and the judge must be a mujtahid and a jurist. This means that the idea of a judicial system where individuals, based on their various expertise in legal matters, manage the affairs of a country is impossible in jurisprudence. The legitimacy of judicial rulings lies with the jurist. There are many judicial matters that depend solely on the opinion of the judge, not the law; such as punishment or the issue of the judge’s knowledge. It is not a system that operates automatically based on laws and rules. When an Islamic government is formed, instead of jurispr

You have often said that the clergy is dependent on the government due to the economic benefits derived from the rule of the Islamic Republic, and if any criticism is made by the clergy, it is in the direction of making them more Islamic and expanding their power and influence in order to promote the idea of human rights and democracy. At the same time, you have stated that the clergy is primarily concerned with its own survival. Some theorists believe that in transitioning to democracy, the military only withdraws its support for the regime when it feels that the continuation of the status quo as “the military in power” rather than “the military as an institution” would seriously harm its position. Can this discussion not be extended to the current situation in Iran, where the clergy, in order to protect its own interests in power, turns a blind eye to the harm caused by the continuation of the status quo as “the clergy in power” rather than “the clergy as an institution” and withdraws its support for the

The difference between the military and the clergy is that the military is usually flexible in terms of ideology and is known for its pragmatism. Therefore, with the change of the political system, it can adapt to new conditions and secure its own interests. However, historically, the clergy is conservative and is resistant to intellectual change.

The ideology of spirituality is based on discrimination and differentiation between clergy and non-clergy. The future political transformation in Iran will shift from a religious government to a secular one (whether militaristic or democratic). The secular government will gradually eliminate positive discrimination in favor of the clergy. Even religious capital will lose its symbolic value. Being religious, leading group prayers, and growing a long beard to climb the ranks of administration will no longer be necessary. The currency of religion will gain value in the market of social capital. Therefore, the clergy is concerned about the decline of the Islamic Republic, as it will be replaced by a secular government. If the clergy can envision an alternative to the Islamic Republic that not only preserves their current interests but also increases the satisfaction of the people, they will strive to achieve that alternative. The clergy is concerned that the collapse of the Islamic Republic will have the same fate as the fall of communism for communist parties in Eastern Europe.

“Religion lacks a horizon for a future without the Islamic Republic. Not only does it tremble at the decline of the current government, but also at the widespread tendency of society towards individualism, liberalism, and increasing awareness of women’s human rights. After one hundred years since the Constitutional Revolution, the clergy have still not been able to redefine their position in the new world. If religion had not been in a state of intellectual crisis and had not fallen into stagnation and decline from within, it might have been able to break its ties with the Islamic Republic in a softer manner. The pouring of billions of tomans into the hands of the seminaries and the easy and free access of the clergy to political power has trapped them in intellectual stagnation and decline, instead of opening their eyes to the realities of the new world and the rapid changes in Iranian society. The external power and privilege have covered the hundred flaws of the clergy. The situation of the clergy in Iran is not unlike that

Let us return once again to the revolution in principles for the harmonization of jurisprudence and human rights. What needs to happen inside and outside the field for it to move towards this discursive transformation or be pulled towards it?

The tragedy of the twentieth century is that anyone who thought differently was officially or practically expelled from the realm. The realm has no strong digesters to guard fresh thoughts. Its direction has constantly been imposed from outside on the clergy in the past two hundred years. We do not remember the clergy voluntarily moving towards self-improvement.

Shiite spirituality has been heavily politicized; even those who are known as traditional scholars or non-believers in the concept of guardianship of the jurist are deeply involved in politics and do not take political steps without considering the consequences. We need scholars who will take a lean approach to politics, practice self-restraint and moderation, step away from political power, and return to the spiritual knowledge of our religion. In order for the seminaries to focus on religious knowledge, freedom of thought and expression is necessary. Based on the experience of the past thirty years, freedom of thought for seminarians under a religious government is not possible. Therefore, without a democratic system where the law and its enforcers protect freedom of expression for all citizens equally, seminarians cannot freely pursue their religion. Currently, the knowledge they “produce” is completely in service of the ruling religious regime. Without this freedom, the clergy will face many difficulties in reconstructing their intellectual and institutional foundations.