Nowadays, most people in Iran are familiar with the term “hard core of the system”. This core, according to the laws of the Islamic Republic, refers to the leader and his inner circle. According to this definition, the inner circle of the system must be made up of high-ranking military commanders appointed by the leader of Iran (including army, IRGC, Quds Force, and security commanders). In this circle, the head of the judiciary is also present, who is also appointed by the leader. The head of parliament and even the president are also included in this circle through the supervision of the Guardian Council. In addition, some members of the Expediency Discernment Council, Basij, and other organizations known as the “social-security base of the system” are traditionally part of this inner circle. This core sees itself as the center of the system and also has the power to issue orders. They believe that they are the center of existence of the Islamic Republic and its structure

But today, exactly this core has turned into a problem for the system. It is not clear what process has led to this group not following the changing policies of the government and reaching an open conflict. Part of this group, with the planning of their leaders, have become fortified against the parliament in order to force the government and parliament to implement a law that was the previous government’s main dish, with the leadership of the Stability Front. Those who until a few days ago were willing to join them and encouraged them…

To further understand the root of this trend and the downward separation from its main core, we need to go back a little. Where the system, in its true meaning, made the decision to move in a new direction and change its course. Although before April 2003, the decision to make fundamental changes in the ruling process had been made; the same day that the 13th President’s helicopter crashed in an air accident. From that day on, a part of Ibrahim Raisi’s supporters (who are now seen as opposition and becoming critics of the government) prepared themselves for gaining control over the executive power and continuing their presence in power, with hopes of the Guardian Council, to compete within their own group without any significant opponent. However, with the confirmation of the qualifications of the physicians and the determination of the composition of other competitors, the story entered a new phase. A series of events that occurred during the intense election competitions and the gap that was created among this group (for choosing

The selection of doctors and chain of events such as the assassination of Ismail Hanieh in Tehran, Israeli military operations, the true promise 2 and the killing of high-ranking commanders of the Revolutionary Guards in Syria and Lebanon, and the bullet that entered the body of Hassan Nasrallah, conveyed to Tehran the belief that this time the story is truly different. Although the decision had been made beforehand, the subsequent events accelerated its implementation. It seems that the main core had predicted all the events and had a specific plan for each one. One of them was coordinating and aligning all the hardline elements, bringing together the reformists, fundamentalists, and the people tired of sanctions and pressure. The military commanders, according to the military hierarchy, whether satisfied or dissatisfied, were forced to obey. As a result, the slogan of national unity between doctors and the new government was designed and received support from the leadership of the system; a slogan that was exactly the point of separation between radicals

However, the section was still at risk of being removed from the hard core, and did not want to easily leave the field. On the other hand, their leaders were also concerned about falling or, to put it more appropriately, falling from the train of the system. Therefore, with their most radical elements mobilized, they tried to put the new wheel in motion and let the hard and firm sticks break, so that if they failed, they would make a loud noise and cause damage. They tried their best with the belief that no matter what, the ruling power would not throw away their flesh and bones, and made maximum efforts to make their voices louder and their damage greater. The protesters against the parliament and their own leaders in the parliament, put pressure to dismiss the strategic deputy and one of the most important elements of the victory of the physicians, as well as the impeachment of the Minister of Economy and his dismissal on the pretext of increasing the price of the dollar, were among these efforts.

The escalation of tensions and confrontation with enforcers of the hijab law in front of the parliament and sending threatening text messages in cities like Isfahan and Shiraz, showed an effort to exert pressure for stricter enforcement of laws. However, its continuation could have led to an increase in public dissatisfaction; protests like the one that took place after the death of Mahsa Amini in 1401, or earlier in 96 and 98, could have been the spark for a larger fire. With the start of a new round of negotiations with America, it became clear that the government did not want to give the opportunity to its limited and coordinating members to turn it into a suitable place for the gathering of “opponents of negotiations”. This possibility, given the events and reactions seen from the opponents, before and after the negotiations, was very high.

Although the scattered remnants of this broken core are still present in various parts and even in sensitive sectors of the system, their influence has weakened more than ever. It seems that the system has achieved its desire (to minimize the cost of silencing this group), but despite the numerous tribunes and the loud voices at their disposal, there is still a possibility that they can turn a spark into a raging fire and pose a threat and cost to the entire government and even its existence in the continuation of the negotiation process. It is said that the recent meeting of the Minister of Intelligence with the officials of the judicial power and the important judges of this power was also for better coordination in dealing with this group. On the other hand, it seems that the prolonged and strange silence of Saeed Jalili, as the main leader of this core and a staunch opponent of any negotiations, is also in line with this. We must wait and see the next move of this group for a definite stone-throwing

Given what has been said, it seems that this event is a small reflection of a larger challenge that the government will not easily escape from. Neither will this small, noisy group easily be able to pull from the structure of the government and its resources, nor will the system risk losing their support. However, the time for decision-making is near, and it is possible that this malignant tumor will be accompanied by bleeding and crisis, and even the risk of the patient’s death. The mandatory hijab law is still supported by a section of the government, or the hard core, and dealing with its defenders in this way may be a sign of efforts to mitigate social pressures and avoid further polarization, not denying the essence of the matter. Although this aggressive approach may lead to the collapse of an important part of the traditional base of the system, it has once again been proven that the issue of hijab in Iran goes far beyond a religious matter, and is a political and social field where every move has