The death of Mahsa Amini, an Iranian Kurdish girl, after being detained by the “Feraja Guidance Patrol,” has once again stirred public emotions. Many are asking why violence has become so rampant among the police force and why the dignity and honor of citizens have been taken lightly by this security organization. Why has the force that is supposed to protect the lives and property of the people become a threat to their lives?

The answer to these three questions can be summed up in one word: corruption. Corruption is a common practice among military institutions in developing and non-democratic countries. Armed forces are often used as a support for non-democratic regimes and have access to exclusive privileges. Coups and sudden political changes in these countries are evidence of the existence of economic and political mafia competitions within military institutions.

Iran, of course, has not been exempt from this rule. The issue of corruption among military institutions, especially since the establishment of the army and police during the reign of Reza Shah, has always been observed in various periods, but is now beyond our discussion. What is within the framework of this discussion is finding an answer to the question of how the police force in a religious-military government has become a single economic cartel and has brought out various economic corruptions from within it.

In general, the root of economic corruption among military institutions is the lack of public oversight over their activities. In military institutions, all documents and records are “top secret”. As a result, only a few individuals have access to them and there is no possibility for public supervision. Therefore, these institutions always become a secluded courtyard for profit-seekers who are able to pocket mythical benefits in the economic arena by using security cover and eliminating competitors.

Another issue that can lead to corruption among military institutions is legal and structural problems. Lawmakers either unknowingly or intentionally grant powers to military and law enforcement institutions that can be corruptive, while there is no oversight even from the same legislative institution. This is evident in the case of the Iranian police, which has changed its name several times since its establishment, and remains true to this day.

The first name that was initially given to the Iranian police force was “Nazmiyeh”. The name was later changed to “Shahrbani” and “Gendarmerie”. Shahrbani was responsible for maintaining order in the cities, while Gendarmerie was responsible for maintaining order in villages and border areas. After the revolution, the “Islamic Revolution Committee” was also added to this organization. The duty of these committees was initially to identify and arrest government officials and establish order in all revolutionary cities. The revolution had essentially dissolved all security and law enforcement institutions, and the committees had a strong hand in maintaining order in the cities. Gradually, these committees became a tool for enforcing Islamic slogans. From dealing with unveiled women to arresting boys and girls, crashing mixed-gender parties, and confiscating videos, alcohol, and drugs; these are the tasks that are now entrusted to the Guidance Patrol and Moral Security Police.

During the 1970s, when Abdullah Noori, the representative of Ayatollah Khomeini in the Revolutionary Guards, became the Minister of Interior, the police, gendarmerie, and committees were merged and the law enforcement forces were formed under the command of the leader of the Islamic Republic. Although it was customary for the leader to delegate his powers to the Minister of Interior to handle affairs as before, the placement of the law enforcement forces under the leadership was the starting point for the formation of an economic cartel under the cover of the law enforcement forces.

During the time of Abdollah Noori’s ministry, Reza Saifollahi was appointed as the commander of the law enforcement forces from the ranks of the Sepah commanders. This appointment was the beginning of opening the doors for Sepah commanders to join the law enforcement forces. The first step in the economic aspect was also taken during this period with the establishment of the “Naja Cooperative Foundation” in 1993; a foundation that initially focused on providing housing for Naja forces through the support of Naja housing cooperatives by acquiring land and changing its use, as well as providing legal and financial support and producing and supplying building materials and products. However, with the addition of a clause to the law, this armed force was also given permission to engage in commercial and trade activities and establish production and construction units. According to Haji Ali Bigi, a former member of the Naja Cooperative Foundation, the value of this foundation’s capital is over six trillion tomans.

This trend intensified

During Ahmadinejad’s command, the Naja cartel entered a new phase. The issue of bribery by drug traffickers and commission on zero-kilometer police cars was no longer a problem. With the start of international sanctions against the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, the law enforcement forces entered into oil transactions.

In announcing the names of major debtors in the financial report, the Rouhani government also mentioned one of the subsidiaries of Naja and reported the debt to the Ministry of Oil. According to these reports, oil shipments worth 180 million dollars and 60 million dollars were sold in late 91 and early 92 by order of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad by the police force, but the amount was not deposited into the government treasury; an amount that, based on the price of 4,000 tomans per dollar in early 92, was more than 900 billion tomans. The police spokesperson only accepted 400 billion tomans of this amount.

The Naja Cooperative Foundation is known as one of the five main holdings in the country; a holding that has a presence in everything from beverage companies to large construction and oil companies. For example, in 1388 (2009-2010), this company purchased over eighty percent of the shares of the Marine Installations Company, which is one of the three main companies involved in the construction of oil platforms and port facilities.

The Naja Cooperative Foundation is the sole owner of Megamall, Yas, Hyperme, and other stores in Tehran, as well as the Samen Al-Hojaj, Sadra, Zomorod, Negin, and Bakhtar hotels in Mashhad. It also owns several hotels and commercial and recreational complexes in Tehran, Mashhad, Shiraz, Abadan, and northern provinces of the country. It is also a major shareholder of the Mehragan Investment Company. In addition, the Century Sustainable Structures Company, which has nearly one hundred companies under its umbrella (sixty in Tehran and over thirty in other cities), is another subsidiary of the Naja Cooperative Foundation, which carried out a significant portion of the Mehr housing projects during the Ahmadinejad government.

The Civil Engineering and Power Generation Company, with over 250 dam construction projects, the Car Import Company which has imported more than 10,000 Delica vans into the country in a single transaction, the Laleh Computer Company which produces smart cards for ten banks, the Naji Research and Development Company which provides exclusive IT services to +10 police offices, the Naji Art Institute, Naji Amin Supervision Company, the Persian Gulf Development Horizon Company which undertakes power plant projects, Foolad and Sim Takistan, Arsh Natanaz Cement, Zagrosnoush Mehragan, Tehran Gostar Wire Industries, Naji Publishing, Omid Insurance Institute, Naji Coverage, Naji Stores, and Rahgosh (Traffic Police Contractor) are among the other subsidiaries of the Naja Cooperative Foundation.

On the other hand, the Qavamin Good Loan Institution, which was established with the capital of police forces and under the pretext of providing services to them as a subsidiary of the Naja Cooperative Foundation, was granted permission by the Ahmadinejad government to become a bank. Part of the corruption of the Naja Cooperative Foundation was carried out through this bank; a bank that opened eight hundred branches across the country, but eventually went bankrupt and merged with Sepah Bank.

The corruption case in the NAJA Cooperative Foundation is still ongoing, but has not resulted in any consequences. In early 2019, the military prosecutor announced that the case of the NAJA Cooperative Foundation is an important one and some individuals have received judicial sentences, but no mention was made of their names. Ahmadinejad, the dismissed commander of the law enforcement forces, is the main suspect in this case; although no sentence has been issued or publicly announced for him yet.

But why has the once peaceful Naja turned into a secluded courtyard for corruption after changing its name to Faraja today? After the events of 88 and the public and trade union protests, the demands of women and girls for freedom of dress and the expansion of virtual space have become three sensitive and serious points for the Islamic Republic. The Islamic government has been forced to invest heavily in the police force to protect itself against these three phenomena. Equipping the special anti-insurgency unit, launching the Guidance Patrol and Cyber Police, along with other daily police duties, incurs huge costs that burden the treasury. Therefore, since the Ahmadinejad era, it has gradually been decided to make the police force self-sufficient so that, in addition to the budget it receives from the treasury for public expenses, it is also allowed to engage in economic and commercial activities to ensure that its assigned missions are not dry and empty, but rather attractive for commanders and officers to suppress and control.