This article focuses exclusively on the arguments for abolishing the death penalty. I will show where existing arguments fall short and propose an alternative that, I argue, is more robust and logically sound.

Setting Aside Pseudo-Arguments

To begin, we must first discard a few pseudo-arguments often presented against the death penalty. A popular claim condemns capital punishment as a form of “state-sanctioned murder.” But in any serious discussion, this has little place. If we follow that line of reasoning, then imprisonment must also be condemned as state-sponsored kidnapping, and fines as state theft. If we scratch beneath the surface of this pseudo-argument, we find that it assumes the state lacks the legitimacy to punish at all—a position with no solid foundation. It’s also unclear what is being established by labeling capital punishment as “intentional.” All punishments, by definition, are intentional. Are we suggesting punishments should be accidental?

Likewise, describing the death penalty as a “state” or “legal” action is not wrong—it should be legal. This type of argument also presupposes that punishment is morally equivalent to the crime itself, suggesting that punishment is itself a form of murder.

Another pseudo-argument focuses on the uselessness or inefficacy of the death penalty. For example, Cesare Beccaria, the 18th-century Italian criminologist and legal theorist, takes this approach:

“It is evident that a score of stout robbers, condemned for life to some public work, would serve the state in their punishment, and that hanging them is a benefit to nobody but the executioner.”
— Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (1764)

This line of argument assumes that “utility” should be the guiding principle of punishment. Though this may seem to support abolition, if material utility is the main criterion, then we would also be justified in endorsing forced labor or slavery for prisoners.

Another common pseudo-argument emphasizes the irreversibility of the death penalty. If a person is found innocent after their execution, there is no remedy; whereas an imprisoned individual can be released and even compensated. While this is a reasonable point in itself, it doesn’t amount to an argument against capital punishment. Even death penalty proponents may agree that it should only be applied when there is absolute certainty of guilt. It’s also worth noting that death penalty cases often take years to carry out, providing time for review and potential correction of errors.

The Human Rights Argument

Aside from these, human rights organizations typically lean on the “fundamental rights” theory: that the death penalty violates the right to life and human dignity, and that therefore, no judicial system should grant itself the authority to take life.

For example, the European Court of Human Rights makes this claim:

“The death penalty, which involves the deliberate and premeditated destruction of a human being by the State, amounts to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, which prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
— Protocol No. 13, European Court of Human Rights

The UN Human Rights Committee also makes a similar claim:

“The death penalty is incompatible with the right to life and the inherent dignity of the human person.”
— General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 (Right to Life), 2018

However, it’s not the clarity of these declarations or the confidence of their tone that makes them convincing. While one may rightly condemn the execution of citizens by regimes like those in Iran or China—for offenses ranging from drug trafficking and manslaughter to political dissent—as brutal violations of dignity, the issue here is whether the death penalty should be abolished in all cases, including for serial killers or war criminals. For that, we need a more rigorous argument.

The problem is that most human rights organizations offer only brief assertions rather than detailed reasoning. There’s also little philosophical explanation of key terms like “dignity,” and no consensus on what the concept even means. This leaves us guessing at their assumptions and interpretations.

If, like these arguments, we isolate the act of punishment from its context—as merely an act in itself—we could say all punishments violate human rights. Imprisonment violates freedom of movement, fines violate property rights, and mandatory service is forced labor. Of course, execution violates the right to life. But following the same logic, every form of punishment violates some fundamental right—the difference is only in degree, not kind.

But we cannot ignore the defensive and responsive nature of punishment. We don’t consider killing an enemy soldier in a defensive war to be a crime—it’s an act of self-defense. Likewise, punishment is society’s defense against the offender. Imprisonment isn’t a violation of freedom—it’s the incapacitation of someone dangerous. Likewise, execution may not be a violation of life per se—it could be viewed as an act of societal protection.

So the key question becomes:

“What makes execution different from other punishments?”
Or more precisely:
“Why is execution not a legitimate form of societal self-defense?”

The Finality Argument

Some respond: “Because execution is final and irreversible.” It destroys the person permanently and eliminates any chance of reform, redemption, or reintegration into society. With imprisonment, the offender’s behavior can be observed over time and assessed for future risk. With execution, none of this is possible.

This is a stronger argument than those previously mentioned. But even this relies on a questionable assumption: that the primary goal of punishment is rehabilitation. While rehabilitation is a worthy strategy, it is not the core purpose. The main goal of punishment is to protect society by disabling the offender from repeating their crime. Reform is one way to do that, but not the only one.

And ironically, if we accept rehabilitation as the goal, we may end up with a disturbing system—one that manipulates prisoners’ minds and bodies to produce remorse or compliance.

Moreover, even proponents of the death penalty (again, excluding authoritarian or theocratic systems like Iran’s) can argue that only truly irredeemable individuals should be executed. Surely young offenders deserve second chances—but should we seriously hope for the reform of a psychopathic serial killer?

The belief underlying this argument is that human life is categorically sacred, under the label of “dignity.” In other words: we can deprive someone of liberty or property, but not of life. That position—echoing biblical commands like “Thou shalt not kill”—may be tempting to accept, but it lacks a clear, rational foundation.

A More Solid Argument: The Principle of Minimal Harm

In contrast, my argument for abolishing the death penalty is grounded in the true purpose of punishment: protecting society from the offender. While the best strategy for protection may involve rehabilitation, that is not the ultimate aim.

Punishment may also deter others from committing crimes—but again, deterrence is a side effect, not the goal. We must not confuse a method with the purpose.

So, based on this philosophy of punishment, I offer this argument:

1. The primary goal of punishment is to protect society from the offender.
   2. To achieve this goal, the state must use the least harmful means necessary (Principle of Proportionality).
   3. Since imprisonment effectively protects society by incapacitating the offender, more severe punishment like execution is unnecessary.

Therefore, because imprisonment protects the public, and because the state must do only what is minimally necessary, imprisonment is always preferable to execution.

This second point directly corresponds to the Principle of Proportionality in modern legal theory, which holds that:

State actions must be proportional to their aims, and must be necessary, minimally restrictive, and suitable.

Since life imprisonment is a less restrictive method than execution, capital punishment must be abolished wherever imprisonment is feasible.

Note that my argument is not absolute or unconditional: it allows for rare exceptions (e.g., in wartime, or when no fair judicial process exists, or imprisonment is truly impossible).

But unlike moralistic or vague appeals to “dignity,” this argument relies on a simple, logical principle:

To achieve a goal, use the least force or harm necessary.

So: to prevent crime, we must impose only the minimum restrictions necessary on the offender. And that minimum measure is imprisonment, not execution.

This argument not only justifies abolishing the death penalty, but also applies to inhumane prison conditions:
If the goal is simply to incapacitate, then extra suffering or degradation violates our second principle and becomes unjustified.