Based on the recent report by Amnesty International (published on April 8, 2025), (1) the Islamic Republic, with a minimum of 972 executions, accounts for more than 64% of all recorded executions in the world. This figure puts the regime ruling over Iran in the first place among the countries carrying out executions in the world. In this report, the total number of recorded executions in the world in 2024 was approximately 1518, indicating that the Islamic Republic alone accounts for more than half of this number. After the regime ruling over Iran, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with 345 executions and Iraq with 63 executions are in the next ranks.

To calculate the execution rate relative to the population, the population of Iran must be taken into account. Based on some estimates from 2024, the population of Iran is approximately 89 million people. By dividing the minimum estimate of executions (972) by the population (89,000,000) and multiplying it by 100,000, the execution rate per 100,000 people is calculated. This means that in 2024, the execution rate in Iran was approximately 1.09 per 100,000 people. In comparison, if we look at global statistics, assuming 1518 executions and a global population of approximately 8 billion people, the estimated global execution rate is 0.019 (0.019 per 100,000 people with a population of 8 billion people), indicating a significant gap between Iran’s statistics and the global average. However, this number does not include the statistics from China, North Korea, and Vietnam, as their data is confidential.

Theories of political economy.

Execution.

The concept of “political economy of capital punishment” according to the writings of Brightwhite (2) in the book “Political Economy of Australian Capitalism” is essentially an examination of the relationship between economic conditions, social structures, and methods of punishment in different societies. The author demonstrates that throughout history, punishment has not only been used as a tool for justice or deterrence, but also as a response to the economic and social needs of dominant classes and their desire for maintaining power. In this regard, in order to analyze the complexities surrounding executions in Iran, various critical theories from political economy and criminology can be utilized. The Foucauldian approach in Discipline and Punish (3) and the theories of Rusca and Kirkhamer in Political Economy of Punishment (4) provide a suitable foundation. Additionally, theoretical frameworks related to authoritarian regimes (5) and the political economy of repression (6) can also aid in understanding the function of executions in Iran.

1- Execution as a tool for biopolitics and social oppression (Foucault).

Foucault sees execution as part of the transition from “power technology” and in line with the power of “biopolitics” (management of collective life). (3) In Iran, execution has a dual function: both as a display of traditional system power (such as public executions) and as the management of “surplus” or “threatening” populations (such as ethnic minorities and drug convicts). More than 51% of executions in 2024 were related to drug offenses, which mostly occur in deprived and border areas, such as Sistan and Baluchestan. This policy, instead of investing in development or poverty reduction, uses punishment for physical elimination and is indicative of a biopolitical approach to “purifying” society.

2- Political Economy of Punishment (Ruska and Karkhaeimer).

Roska and Karkhehaimar (4) argue that punishments in capitalist or authoritarian systems are linked to economic and political conditions. In Iran, the economy is under pressure from sanctions, inflation of over 40% (according to the World Bank), and a decrease in resources, which has pushed the ruling regime towards low-cost solutions for managing the crisis. Execution, compared to long-term imprisonment, reduces direct financial costs, as some government officials have also admitted. For example, the cost of keeping a prisoner in Iran (including food, security, and infrastructure) can amount to millions of tomans annually, while execution eliminates this cost. This economic reason, especially for drug offenders who are mostly from lower classes, is true and demonstrates the link between punishment and structural inequality in Iranian society.

3- Survival of the regime and ruling class.

Lens (5) emphasizes that in authoritarian systems, suppression is used instead of social reconstruction to maintain the current situation. In Iran, executions serve specific purposes, some of the most significant of which are:

Preserving the power of the dominant class: Executing political activists and minorities (such as the Balochis, who according to Amnesty International account for 19% of executions despite only making up 2-3% of the population) prevents challenges to the monopolistic institutions of the ruling government (extractive).

Limited control: Unlike mass mobilization, executions are targeted and aim to target specific groups (upper classes, minorities, opponents, those who convert their religion) in order to maintain the dominance of the regime.

4- Suppression in authoritarian systems.

Ajam Oghlu and Robinson (6) argue in their book “Why Nations Fail” that authoritarian regimes use repressive tools to maintain their “extractive” or monopolistic institutions for the benefit of the ruling elite and dominant class. In Iran, execution serves as a tool to increase the “cost of opposition”. Executing political activists (such as after the nationwide protests in 1401) or ethnic groups is a strategy to solidify power against internal challenges. This approach strengthens the legitimacy of the regime among its social base, but at the cost of deepening social divides.

Target groups of executions in Iran.

1- Social classes, poor and economically marginalized.

This group consists of poor, unemployed individuals and residents of deprived areas who are often involved in drug-related crimes and other related offenses due to economic pressures. In 2024, 51.6% of the 972 executions were related to drug offenses. (1) These crimes disproportionately occur among lower classes, especially in border areas such as Sistan and Baluchestan (with a poverty rate of 60%, according to the Iranian Statistical Center in 1402). From the perspective of Rostow and Khrushchev (4), this group is targeted as “surplus labor” or “non-productive.” Their execution reduces social costs (such as prison or welfare) and replaces physical elimination instead of economic development. For example, widespread executions of drug traffickers in deprived areas, who are often breadwinners of poor families…

2. Two.

Ethnic groups and geographical minorities.

This category includes ethnic groups such as the Balochis, Kurds, and Arab Khuzestanis who live in border areas and underdeveloped regions and often face structural discrimination. Despite making up only 2-3% of the population, Balochis accounted for 19% of executions in 2024. (1) Executions in this group are often carried out on security charges (such as “waging war” or membership in opposing groups). (7) According to Ajamu Oluwole and Robinson (6), executions of these groups serve the interests of extractive institutions, or the ruling elite, as ethnic resistance poses a threat to their power and resources. Additionally, this policy avoids the cost of developing underprivileged regions. These groups, due to lack of economic opportunities, engage in illegal activities and the regime, instead of addressing the root causes (poverty and unemployment), eliminates them. This aligns with the theory of Rusk and Krugman (

3- Political opponents and civil activists.

This group consists of political activists, protesters, and individuals who directly or indirectly challenge the government, especially after the nationwide protests. Since the movement of “Women, Life, Freedom” in 1401, at least 10 people, including Mohsen Sharari, Majid Reza Rahnavard, Mohammad Mehdi Karami, Mohammad Hosseini, Saleh Mirhashemi, Majid Kazemi, Saeed Ya’qoubi, Milad Zahrehvand, Reza Rasaei, and Mohammad Ghabadloo, have been executed on charges such as “corruption on earth” and “waging war against God.” According to the theory of Agamben and Robinson (6), the execution of this group raises the cost of opposition and prevents organization against the regime. From the perspective of Lens (5), this action displays ideological power and intimidates civil movements. For example, the execution of young protesters in major cities sends a clear message of

4- Young people and lower age groups.

This group mainly consists of individuals between the ages of 20 and 35 who are at risk of execution due to unemployment, lack of economic opportunities, or participation in protests. Reports show that the average age of those executed for drug and security crimes is often within this age range. (8) The youth unemployment rate is around 25%. (9) This group is perceived as a potential threat by Rosca and Krukheimer (4) because their dissatisfaction can lead to unrest. Their execution, especially in the context of protests, serves as a deterrent and, according to Agam Oglu and Robinson (6), eliminates the future generation of resistance. In this regard, the execution of young protesters like “Majid Reza Rahnavard” in 1401 (2022) can be seen as a symbol of suppressing the younger generation.

5- Individuals accused of security or religious crimes.

This group consists of individuals who are convicted of vague charges such as “corruption on earth”, “waging war”, or unauthorized religious activities (such as Baha’is or Christian converts). In this regard, executions with these charges are common among ethnic and religious groups and political activists. For example, executions of Baha’is have been reported on charges of “acting against national security”. From a Lens perspective, these executions reinforce the religious legitimacy of the regime and suppress deviation from the official ideology. Political economy also plays a role here, as these groups are eliminated as “ideological threats” to reduce the costs of controlling discourse.

Integrated analysis.

Targeted execution groups in Iran are strategically chosen to fulfill multiple economic and political functions.

• Layers of descent: Reduction of economic costs and elimination of “surplus” (4).

• Ethnic Minorities: Establishment of Extractive Institutions and Control of Deprived Areas (6).

• Political dissidents and youth: Intimidation of civil movements and preservation of authority (5)-(6).

• Religious Accused: Strengthening Ideological Hegemony (5).

The consequences of execution for these groups.

1- Expansion and deepening of inequality and poverty.

The execution of individuals from poor and minority classes makes their families even more destitute or impoverished. For example, in Sistan and Baluchestan, the execution of a breadwinner can push the entire family below the poverty line, exacerbating the cycle of poverty and crime. This consequence challenges the logic of economic governance, as it may reduce short-term costs but increases long-term social costs.

2- Increase in anger and extremism in ethnic groups.

The widespread execution of Baloch and Kurdish people has strengthened the feeling of discrimination and injustice and has given rise to opposing groups (such as Jaish al-Adl). This goes against the regime’s goal of suppressing threats and shows that punishment can have the opposite effect. As a result, the security of the regions has been compromised and, consequently, human and financial resources have migrated from the region to other areas.

3- Deprivation of social trust capital and increase in political isolation.

The execution of political activists and youth has deepened the gap between the regime and society (especially the younger generation). Some unofficial polls show a significant decrease in trust in judicial institutions, which has undermined the legitimacy of the regime.

4- Migration and Escape of Minds.

Fear of execution and suppression, especially among educated youth and activists, has led to an increase in migration. This consequence takes away human capital from the country and in the long run, reduces economic growth and slows down the process of sustainable development, which in turn, according to Rosca and Krukheimer (4), incurs hidden but significant costs.

Aspects and functions of the solution of execution for governance.

1- The function of the discourse of the ideology of guardianship: legitimizing the religious-political authority.

The Iranian system justifies execution through Shia jurisprudence (concepts such as retribution and punishment), which gives it a “guardianship discourse”. This function not only maintains social order in religious systems, but also promotes a narrative of “divine justice” that helps legitimize the power structure.

2- Hidden Costs: Crisis of Legitimacy and Global Isolation.

The widespread use of execution has indirect costs that are significant from an economic and political perspective. According to Wallerstein’s theory of the world system (10), the isolation of the Islamic Republic in the international system due to human rights violations restricts access to foreign investment and global markets. These costs can weaken the economic and political stability of the system in the long term, especially in situations where public dissatisfaction has increased due to economic crises.

Buttocks.

The implementation of the death penalty in the Islamic Republic is an example of the political economy of execution in the world, where the concealment of crises, civil intimidation, and suppression of protests are intertwined. According to Foucault’s theory, execution is a biopolitical approach for the “purification” of society by the ruling classes, instead of reconstruction and development of society. In this regard, Lens emphasizes that in power-oriented systems, execution is a strategy that replaces the reconstruction of society. From the perspective of researchers such as Ruska and Karkhaimer, the punishment of execution suppresses the upper classes, minorities, and opponents, and hides the failures of corrupt and political systems. From the perspective of Ajam Oghlu and Robinson, execution is a strategy for the continuation of the exploitation of monopolistic institutions (extractive institutions).

Notes:

1. Amnesty International. (2025).

   The report on the death penalty in 2024: Global.

   London.

2. Braithwaite, J. (1980). “The Political Economy of Punishment.” In Political Economy of Australian Capitalism (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, n.d.), 193-207.

3. Foucault, M. (1975).

   تنظیم و مجازات: تولد زندان

   Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.

   کتاب‌های پانتئون.

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4. Rusche, G., & Kirchheimer, O. (1939).

   تنبیه و ساختار اجتماعی

   Punishment and social structure

   کتابفروشی دانشگاه کلمبیا

5. Linz, J. J. (2000). Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

6. Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2012).

   The book “Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty.”

   ناشران کراون

   Crown Publishers

7. حقوق بشر نگهبان. (2024).

   Human Rights Watch. (2024).

   Iran: Minorities and Capital Punishment.

   نیویورک

   New York

8. UNDP Iran. (2023).

   The Human Development Report for Iran.

   Tehran.

9. Iran Statistics Center. (2023).

   آمار فقر و اشتغال

   Poverty and Employment Statistics.

   Tehran.

10. Wallerstein, I. (2004).

    تحلیل سیستم‌های جهانی: یک مقدمه

    World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction.

    دانشگاه دوک پرس.

    Duke University Press.